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This thesis explores the inter-disciplinary space that lies between fisheries management and 
stock conservation, resource extraction and economic return at the individual producer level, 
balanced with societal welfare. It considers policy implications in support of changing marine 
ecosystems and considers the values of the Maine lobster communities, which depend on it. We 
conducted a comprehensive lobster industry survey to assess costs and effort expended at the 
producer level for a representative fishing year, and establish a series of production function 
performance baselines for future comparison. The demographic data, attitudes and valuations 
collected allow us to characterize the fishing effort and regional dependency on the resource. We 
look at the Maine Lobster limited entry licensing system, to understand how the future 
participation in the fishery might change, and how Maine’s communities might be affected. We 
examine the influences of ex-vessel price in the Maine lobster fleet, as a primary driver of 
profitability and economic value of the fishery. We apply multiple disciplines, and present four 
separate essays, with appendices containing the tabulated results of our three surveys. First, we 
evaluate and model a stochastic frontier production analysis to assess lobster producer efficiency 
and create a vessel-level profitability model. We then evaluate willingness to pay for a Maine 
Lobster license model with a censored regression Tobit model, and general linear regressions to 
 evaluate desired number of traps, as stated by existing and potential new entrants. We explore 
the variety of influences of ex-vessel price through a multiple linear regression, building on 
previous studies that demonstrated an inverse demand price response in the Maine fleet; we 
consider how changes in monthly landings have created excessive inventory holdings and 
examine this has on ex-vessel price. We then conclude by applying a retrospective analysis to 
evaluate future profitability and economic performance in the fishery, under potential changing 
conditions facing the coupled natural and human system. In aggregate these analyses identify 
risks of overcapitalization in the Maine Lobster fishery which are likely to confound efforts to 
effectively manage the resource in times of changing harvest patterns, and in light of variability 
in supply and market demand.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rate of change to our earth’s climate has accelerated over the past century (Parry et al. 2007; 
Perry et al. 2011; Perry et al. 2005; Pinsky et al. 2013) shedding new and urgent light on risks 
facing the long-term sustainability of our ecosystems (Pecl et al. 2017). It has become clear that 
we must adapt our policies to look not only at species survival, diversity, resilience and the key 
role of ecosystem services, but also human behavior and resource extraction rates in light of the 
scientific evidence presented (Johnson et al. 2011; Perry et al. 2005; Wernberg et al. 2011; 
Hobday et al. 2016; Philippart et al. 2011). Evolutionary forces have allowed a continual 
adaptation of natural systems to occur over long periods of time, and new equilibriums have been 
reached and maintained repeatedly across various land, air and sea based ecosystems (Visser 
2008; Travis 2003; Parry et al. 2007). The relatively new introduction of the human species, 
however, has led to a coupled natural and human system with a different pattern of stress and the 
inclusion of bottom-up effects (Greene and Pershing 2007), resulting in different patterns of 
adaptations, as well as an acceleration in the effects of certain stressors previously felt over 
longer time scales (Pecl et al. 2017; Popova et al. 2016). Thresholds are just as important as 
averages, and these can be exceeded yielding surprise responses that present in non-linear 
fashion (Ottersen et al. 2013). Episodic events such as recruitment failure can have long-term 
consequences for a fishery (Vert-pre et al. 2013; Liermann and Hilborn 2001). Research to 
capture changes to global specific ocean hot spots (Wernberg et al. 2011; Philippart et al. 2011; 
Hobday et al. 2016) and the study of coupled natural and human systems (Liu et al. 2007; Lehuta 
et al. 2014; Perry et al. 2011) provide new insights, and can lead to improved understanding and 
forecasts of potential effects that may be observed in the future in other sites (Liu et al. 2007).  
 
Similarly, research into assessing the economics of fisheries as a classic natural resource 
extraction firm with production characteristics evolved from the field of agriculture, and has 
provided analytical tools to assess and describe the effects of such changes in underlying 
resource basis of production (Gordon 1954; Copes 1972) as seen in wild capture and even 
aquaculture fisheries. Seminal works by Gordon 1954 demonstrated the concepts of fisheries 
economics on the basis of maximized rent returns for the utilization of a fishery, and how 
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intensity of fleet effort has a maximum net economic yield, where the fishery both prevents over-
fishing, and captures the optimum yield from the fishery. The idea of community objectives for 
the fishery as well guide the notion of optimum, where fleet efficiency may be balanced with 
jobs and wage opportunities (Hilborn 2007; Anderson 1980; Anderson 1973). This field of study 
now extends into complex evaluations of management strategies to inform the decision-making 
process of fisheries managers (Ana and Petermala 1990; Munro 2010).   
 
The research presented in this thesis focuses on the impact of changing conditions in the Gulf of 
Maine and it’s lobster fishery, at the ecological, economic and policy levels to understand 
present state, and characterize potential future scenarios, as an example of how a large ecosystem 
may adapt to changes associated with altering climate and habitat. 
 
One of the primary drivers of change in our oceans is global temperature, including sea surface 
temperature (SST), bottom of the ocean temperature, long-range temperature averages and also 
maximum and minimum temperature thresholds (Alexander et al. 2018). Temperature effects can 
result from changes in key global oceanographic drivers (Popova et al. 2016), which may be felt 
differently in localized regions, and at different time scales (Pershing et al. 2014). Responses of 
the natural system components then are seen to through direct contact with the changed water 
temperature, but also through broader altered chemical and physical characteristics of the natural 
system (Chen et al. 2014), and components of the food web including pelagic species and other 
forage (Lehuta et al. 2014). Temperature effects felt mostly from the bottom up are coupled with 
responses of fishing behavior, which tend to be top down effects on the ecosystem (Greene and 
Pershing 2007). Fluctuations in the North Atlantic oscillation (NAO), the dominant mode of 
atmospheric variability, can lead to short term and long changes in sea surface temperature (SST) 
and also affect stratification and depth of mixing layers, as well as dissolved oxygen in the 
ocean, and primary production as the base of the food web (Drinkwater et al. 2003). Teasing 
apart the effect of temperature alone can be difficult, and should be considered an element of the 
natural systems changes that can occur (Liu et al. 2007; Incze et al. 2010; Tanaka and Chen 
2016; Bell et al. 2015). Its important to note that changes in temperature include both increases 
and decreases in SST, and these tend to have differing impacts. 
 
  3 
The effects of temperature take place against a backdrop of seasonal and inter-annual variability, 
felt differently at differing latitudes and within different localized systems (Nye et al. 2009). 
Localized short-term temperature changes can result from an atmospheric drivers such as the 
NAO (Drinkwater et al. 2003) and underlying shift or intensification of boundary currents, such 
as the California current or Eastern Australian current, and are often felt near the global 
upwelling sites which boast nutrient rich waters and higher primary productivity (Popova et al. 
2016). Multiple hotspots, where temperature has increased more rapidly, have been observed 
globally and have contributed to our understanding of the effects of temperature on ecosystems 
(Perry et al. 2011; Hobday et al. 2016; Mills et al. 2013). Short-term changes have been observed 
to alter migration and distribution patterns (Nye et al. 2009), changing species composition, 
changing diets, and altered growth rates (Drinkwater et al. 1996). Initially a system will develop 
coping mechanism, and we look at top down and bottom up forcing as separate elements of the 
system, to determine the major forces at work in a given system and assess rates of change 
(Pinsky et al. 2013; Kleisner et al. 2016). 
 
The effect of SST changes can be felt directly, but also through the effect on circulation patterns 
(Drinkwater et al. 2003), affecting the phytoplankton community first (Drinkwater et al. 2003), 
then up through the zooplankton (Pershing et al. 2005), then the small pelagic species and finally 
the higher trophic levels (Popova et al. 2016). In the case of phytoplankton, increased 
temperature affects their turnover rate, and changes in stratification have altered the critical depth 
for primary production to occur and leads to changes in the timing of the spring phytoplankton 
blooms (Pecl et al. 2017). Increased temperature has been observed to affect metabolic rates of 
zooplankton, where changes in development rates have been observed. Zooplankton are further 
affected by changes in temperature (Pershing et al. 2005), through their contact rates with food 
supplies i.e. phytoplankton (Drinkwater et al. 2003). Zooplankton such as Calanus finmarchicus 
represents a fundamental building block upon which higher trophic levels rely, and changes in 
abundance of zooplankton have been associated with increase in SST. Long term effects of SST 
on zooplankton include changes in the lipids and therefore protein quality of the zooplankton 
(Runge et al. 2012). 
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As these lower trophic levels experience changes, so too do the fish assemblages, which depend 
on them such as the herring, sardine, and the commercial valuable species such as cod and 
lobster (Frank 2005; Pershing et al. 2014; Pinsky et al. 2011). Highly mobile small pelagic 
species respond to changes in temperature by increasing their metabolic rate, and by shifting 
their distributions in response to changes in food availability (Nye et al. 2009; Lucey and Nye 
2010; Thomas et al. 2017; Henderson et al. 2017). In large fish species, changes in distribution 
then also result as they follow the food source, and changes in life history traits and recruitment 
have also been observed, leading to reduced yields and reduced stock productivity (Link et al. 
2011). 
 
Human responses to these ecosystem shifts can be temporary and may include short term fishing 
behavior changes include riding out the storm behavior, through tactics such as intensification of 
effort and diversification of fishing effort into other species involving gear modifications, 
licensing diversification (Stoll 2017), and migrations or longer trips farther sites to follow the 
fish (Perry et al. 2011). It’s not uncommon to see a temporary dispatch of the fishing fleet to far 
away fishing grounds and then a return home with the catch during periods of decreased 
abundance of certain key species. Market response is also a factor, where supply and demand can 
lead to ex-vessel pricing changes, and alter the economics of the fishing activity (Hobday et al. 
2016; Norman-López et al. 2014). Fishing pressure plus the emergence of new species in local 
waters, such a squid or jellyfish, can also lead to an opportunistic shift targeted species (Gucu 
2002). 
 
In the Gulf of Maine we saw an unprecedented increase in SST in 2012 (Thomas et al. 2017; 
Hobday et al. 2016; Anderson et al. 2013; Morse et al. 2017), revealing a complex set of 
interactions between the natural, human and market systems not felt with previous fisheries in 
the region (Pershing et al. 2015). The Maine lobster fishery experienced an unseasonably warm 
spring, which led to an early spring season for the Maine lobster industry across all Maine 
Lobster management Zones (Mills, et al. 2013). We saw an earlier spring molt, likely a 
metabolic response to the increased temperature, and suspect changes in mortality, and 
susceptibility to lobster shell disease, based on experiences in other regions such as Long Island 
Sound (Tanaka et al. 2017; Palmer 2014). This change in the ecological systems was rapidly 
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followed by a shift in the seasonal timing of the lobster harvest, as well as a shift in the centroid 
representing the spatial distribution of the harvest (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources).  
 
This period of increased biological production has led to a sharp increase Maine lobster supply, 
which has been unfettered by policy constraints and has led to significant variability in the ex-
vessel price per pound, directly correlating with volume (Dicolo and Friedman 2012). 
Compressed time periods and seasonal spikes in landings were seen to spark political unrest and 
competition between U.S. and Canadian lobstermen for limited Canadian processing capacity for 
the soft shell lobster product in 2012 (Woodward 2012), potentially creating a combined supply 
and demand challenge. Vessel level profitability was reported to decrease in the wake of 2012 
price deflation, (personal communication, Dayton and Sun) and led to an intensification of 
winter fishing, as well as an increase in the distance traveled to harvest lobsters from inshore to 
offshore during periods of higher price yields (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). Feedback 
between the human and natural coupled system has been observed and pressure on the resource 
increased, likely at a declining rate of return to the economy (Fogarty and Gendron 2004). 
Longer-term implications of this feedback response have yet to unfold, but early signals suggest 
a decline in the lobster population abundance is likely to occur in the next five years with further 
destabilization of the coupled ecosystem. 
 
Long-term changes can result from these types of short-term episodic events, especially when a 
threshold has been exceeded. In the case of the Maine lobster, research has shown that SST of 20 
degree Celsius represents a significant threshold, and as we near this benchmark, changes are 
likely (Wahle et al. 1991). Other experiences have shown that long term changes might include 
habitat changes, life history response such as changes in fishery age structure leading to a 
evolutionary response decrease in average age of maturity, permanent ecosystem restructuring 
and regime shifts with changes in abundance of species, and the emergence of new species in a 
system, as well as new speciation events (Steneck et al. 2002; Xue et al. 2008; Daskalov et al. 
2007). The ecosystem will likely lose some resilience and tend to resist returning to the previous 
state, even as the stressors are removed, such as over-fishing (Greene and Pershing 2007). Long-
term changes in the human component response in other regions have included geographic 
migrations that may include permanent resettlement closer to the fishing resource, socio-
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ecological change, economic contraction or diversification, re-training and reduction in 
professional pluralism, out-migration, and even community closures (Perry et al. 2011).  
 
The Gulf of Maine has already experienced radical changes in the past decade due to the impacts 
of SST on Gulf of Maine Cod, which provides important context and lessons for other fisheries 
faced with the same challenges (Pershing et al. 2015). Changes in the Gulf stream positioning, 
and atmospheric blocking through the jet stream which that brought warm air into the region 
(Chen et al. 2014), may have also added to fresh water melt in Greenland, causing changes in the 
distribution of C. finmarchicus which shifted steadily north and eastward over the period of the 
past decade (Castonguay et al. 2008; Runge et al. 2012). Other impacts include a physiological 
change and decline in copepod quality as forage, which has led to a decrease in food availability 
for Gulf of Maine Cod, and has contributed to the decline in abundance, and stock structure. As 
well, the removal of older Cod fish through fishing effort has progressively led to changes in the 
age structure of the population (Frank 2005; Palmer 2014; Pershing et al. 2015), thereby 
reducing the resilience of the stock and increasing risks to the reproductive capacity. Response 
on the part of policy makers to progressively limit the days of fishing available to members of 
the fleet in an effort to control catch, has lagged the decline of the population and likely does not 
adequately protect the resource from over-fishing. In turn, vessel permit database (NOAA 
Fisheries Office Greater Atlantic Region) reveals that the fishing fleet shifted its center of 
operations closer to fishing grounds based on stated homeport, suggesting an increased effective 
fishing effort, rather than a decrease. 
 
New management measures in the form of catch shares were ultimately implemented in the 
Northeast multi-species complex to protect the multi-species ground fish fishery (NEFMC 2010), 
but these reactive actions came very late for Gulf of Maine Cod and the fishing economy that 
depended has depended upon it. The fleet has substantially consolidated and contracted, and the 
community has been left with socio-economic consequences and federal disaster relief has been 
provided. A similar pattern was experienced in the N.W. Atlantic Cod stocks off the coast of 
Canada in the late 1990’s, and still today, despite a complete fishing moratorium in effect, the 
stock did not rebound as expected (Fu et al. 2001). An increase in the number of seals was 
observed, as well as increases in shrimp and crabs, coupled with a decrease in zooplankton 
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(Cook and Trijoulet 2016; Pershing et al. 2005). This provides an example of a permanent shift 
in the ecosystem structure, a foundational change in the food web, to where it can no longer 
support the original assemblage. The human system response has been a shift to other target 
species, including lobsters, urchin, shrimp and scallops. In the Gulf of Maine most recent 
experience, we have observed a pattern of fishing down the food web (Steneck and Wahle 2013) 
leading to marked decrease in the diversity of the fishery assemblage and community; we also 
begin to see the emergence of new species such as squid and warmer water species such as black 
sea bass, with consequences yet to be realized (McMahon 2017). Some have proposed that the 
inter-relationship between the fisheries can destabilize other fisheries unintentionally (Frank 
2005) through trophic cascades. For example removal of top predators such as cod, or the initial 
mid water pelagic capture and subsequent re-deployment of herring as bait in the lobster fishery 
for example, may have unintended consequences (Grabowski et al. 2010; Thunberg 2007; 
Grabowski et al. 2009). 
 
Humans have the ability to adapt and respond to long term as well as short term changes within 
the same generation, for example through education, re-deployment of capital to alternate uses, 
and by partnering. But risk assessment guides our probability of changing behavior (Kahneman 
and Tversky 2013) and so a decision-making takes place at the individual level and can alter 
expected outcomes. Ecological systems do not possess this measure of adaptation with the same 
generation and must rely on evolutionary processes to alter their interaction with the natural 
system in its new state. Longer lived species, such as lobster, may take longer to adapt to 
changing conditions, are suffer a population extinction well before it can genetically adapt or 
migrate to new habitat (Pinsky et al. 2013; Greene and Pershing 2007; Visser 2008). Therefore, 
governance models, education and community values are often the cornerstone elements 
determining the fate of the coupled natural and human systems and warrant further attention in 
our collective efforts to understand and adapt to shifting ecosystems and continue to derive 
economic utility and food supply from them (Hobday et al. 2016; Holland 2011; International 
Sustainability Unit 1998; Link et al. 2011). Our ability to learn from prior lessons in fisheries 
often depends on the ability to understand the potential impacts of changes. This research is 
motivated by a desire to understand the economic implications of climate change, and examines 
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the Maine lobster fishery as a case study for how a large marine ecosystem may adapt to changes 
associated with climate and habitat shifts. 
 
This first chapter of my research provides a quantitative assessment of the lobster fishery 
economics in the form of a stochastic frontier production model. I estimate profitability and 
technical efficiency of Maine’s lobster industry for the fishing year 2010, using confidential 
firm-level data and survey responses for 1,007 fishermen. The Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
stochastic frontier production models were estimated using the maximum likelihood method. I 
develop an economic stochastic frontier production-modeling framework to assess the three 
different vessel class production functions, and identify the combination of characteristics, which 
maximizes the production. Empirical results highlight the differences in technical inefficiency, 
and signal that societal benefits associated with employment levels have characterized the lobster 
production environment, over firm-level efficiency.  
 
Because of the variety of technical expertise and capitalization rates available for production 
maximization in Maine, we aim understand the vessel-level production functions, as a way to 
inform motivation and likelihood of firm participation in the fishery under changing input 
conditions. Producer efficiency is vulnerable to operational characteristics and subject to climate 
based regime shifts and shifts in resource distribution. Harvester effort, which is only marginally 
constrained by lobster management zones and trap quantity, will be driven by producer 
maximization characteristics. Current policies in effect will be tested by these market-drivers and 
increased fishing effort could result in over-fishing. This model is compared to experiences of 
other lobster fisheries. 
 
The second chapter of my research focuses on Maine’s Lobster Limited Entry Licensing 
Program, and explores the issue of additional entry into the Maine lobster fishery, as a social 
consideration in light of limited employment opportunities, but balanced with the concerns that 
the fishery is already over-capitalized and fishing at maximum yield. I conducted two contingent 
valuation surveys, one to elicit a value for a Maine lobster license and to describe the currently 
waiting additional incoming human and operating capital into the Maine lobster fishery through 
potential new boats and also increase in trap quantity for existing license holders. I offer 
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comparison to other crustacean trap fisheries that have engaged in effort limitations and resource 
conservation through policy reforms, for consideration as precautionary approach in advance of 
any downward or upward landings adjustments or other landings anomalies in the Maine lobster 
fishery. I consider two dimensions, first the social equity question of licensing, and second the 
economic impact of the potential incoming capital. 
 
In the third chapter of my research, I analyze the influences affecting Maine ex-vessel lobster 
price, as a primary driver in the economic performance of the fleet. Landings patterns have 
changed due to climate related underlying changes in the ecosystem, and the market demand 
struggles to align with current supply, especially with the increase in late season landings in 
October and November. I evaluate the impact of this late season supply on the next year in-
season ex-vessel price, with a regression analysis on the landings data, including Canadian 
imports of frozen lobster to the U.S. I also consider the effect of forecasted landings projections 
on this relationship. 
 
In the fourth chapter of my research, I have applied a retrospective analysis and model the 
potential vessel-level profitability impacts associated with changes in resource abundance and 
spatial distribution in Maine’s American Lobster fishery associated with climate variability and 
under current licensing policies. I describe the climate variability issues observed in other 
fisheries globally, and explore some of the early indicators of climate change observed in the 
Gulf of Maine specifically. I then analyze the profitability impact of changing spatial harvest 
patterns and landings volume on firm level short-run vessel profitability where there is sunk 
capital. I have modeled the potential return of the fishery to more historic landings volumes of 70 
million pounds but with current fleet participation and capitalization rates. Scenarios presented 
look forward 5 years and assume modest market price response associated with changes in 
supply and demand, as well as modest changes in other production inputs such as bait, and fuel. I 
evaluate long-run vessel participation rates in the fishery, with implications for Maine lobster 
fishery management and policy reform. 
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2. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY: AN 
ESTIMATE OF THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER PRODUCTION MODEL 
 
2.1  Abstract 
 
After several decades of steadily increased landings, the American Lobster fishery now 
dominates Maine’s marine economy. But, there is uncertainty about the future robustness of the 
stock due to underlying ecological and climate factors, and despite the volume increases the 
economic value and profitability of the fishery is vulnerable at both an individual and State level 
in recent years. The results of this research provide a quantitative assessment of the fishery 
economics in the form of a stochastic frontier production model. This paper quantifies the 
profitability and technical efficiency of Maine’s lobster industry for the fishing year 2010, where 
confidential firm-level data and survey responses for 1,007 fishermen are used. The Cobb-
Douglas and Translog stochastic frontier production models were estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method. Empirical results show that the industry is not characterized by constant 
returns to scale, and reported societal benefits associated with employment levels have 
characterized the lobster production environment, over firm-level efficiency. Further 
investigations into vessel class specific production functions reveal inshore fishing inefficiencies 
associated with larger vessels, which have become the dominant class along the Maine Coast, 
and suggest the fleet to be overcapitalized should spatial and temporal harvest patterns associated 
with increased water temperatures prevail. This paper establishes a baseline for comparison, to 
enable the evaluation of future policy reforms in the U.S. lobster fishery and provides a 
discussion of some of the drivers of the inefficiencies identified. 
2.2  Introduction 
 
The Maine Lobster fishery dominates the Maine Coast, has seen steadily increasing landings 
over two decades or more, peaking in 2016 at 136 million pound, with an ex-vessel value of 
$536 million (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). The lobster resource has done well in the Gulf 
of Maine for 50 years, both inshore and offshore where cold rich waters have helped to bolster 
landings, which have steadily increased over the past two decades (Maine Dept. of Marine 
Resources). The stock is not currently over-fished, and over-fishing is not occurring (ASMFC 
2015). But recent landings reports reveal changes in spatial and temporal patterns over time, 
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which may be early indicators of underlying changes in the resource health. These changes may 
be associated with a variety of factors including top-down or bottom-up forces such as 
depredation (McMahon et al. 2013), food availability (Tlusty et al. 2008; Grabowski et al. 2009), 
changes in habitat suitability (Tanaka and Chen 2016; Tanaka and Chen 2015; Chang et al. 
2010), climate and temperature (Chang et al. 2010; Tlusty et al. 2008). This variability in stock 
abundance, and shifts in timing and spatial distribution of the harvest can have predictable and 
unpredictable effects and affect economic return, with great impact on working communities 
(Cheng and Townsend 1993). 
 
Maine has a large number of communities that rely on the lobster fishery, deriving an average of 
83% of their household income from fishing (Dayton and Sun 2012). Prior anthropological 
research has found that lobstermen derive not only income, but also their identity from their 
occupation, and the culture of the working waterfront communities depends on the fishery too 
(Acheson and Gardner 2012). Maine fishermen operate as traditional firms seeking maximum 
profits, but there is also a social element where Maine seeks to maximize the number of jobs, 
regardless of the profitability of those jobs. According to neoclassical economic theory, all firms 
are assumed to be fully efficient in their use of technology, but there are examples where this is 
not the case (Hilborn 2007) and the idea of a worker satisfaction benefit as an additional form of 
utility derived from the occupation has also been proposed (Anderson 1980) to explain this 
phenomenon. A maxima is achieved where the number of jobs in the fishery lies at the point 
where the last unit of effort has a marginal cost of effort equal to the marginal return on effort. 
Maine’s lobster fleet provides an interesting contradiction, where the fishery dissipates rents 
through over-capitalization of inputs such as labor and vessels. This provides an example of this 
inefficiency, where this highly lucrative fishery operates in a fashion that is not economically 
optimal, especially when compared to other crustacean trap fisheries such as New Zealand or 
Australia, which have undergone significant policy changes (Reid et al. 2013; Norman-López 
and Pascoe 2011; Gardner et al. 2014). 
 
Maine’s fleet has observed a change in the fishing practices over the past twenty years (Lobster 
Advisory Council 1999), driven by changes in policy and governance (Steinback et al. 2008), 
where a decrease in licensing flexibility for multiple species has led to a specialization of effort 
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in each fishery (Stoll et al. 2017), and discourages multi-species fishing and seasonal gear 
changeovers. This has led to an increase in capitalization rates of lobster specific vessels, traps 
and technologies, which seems to have helped improve the efficiency in some portions of the 
fleet. Some operators are choosing to invest upwards of $300k+ in a boat, and many fishermen 
now hold inshore and offshore fishing permits allowing year round access to the fishery. Over 
the past two decades, there has been an increase in vessel capitalization, reflected in the and 52% 
decline in the number of vessels under 20 feet since 1996, and a 180% increase in vessels over 
40 feet during that same period as shown in figure 2.1. The number of vessels greater than 40 
feet rose from 4% of the total in 1997 to 11% of the total in 2011. Meanwhile, the number of 
vessels under 20 feet dropped from 40% of the total in 1996 to 20% of the total in 2012. The 
number of mid-size vessels has remained relatively constant over time but overall, there has been 
fleet-wide trend towards larger vessels, and with a greater technological advances on board the 
vessel, such as GPS receivers, satellite, and even acoustics.  
 
 
Source: Maine Dept. of Marine Resources 
Figure 2.1 Maine Lobster Vessel Size Distribution 1990 - 2012 
 
The observable physical attributes of the vessels in the fleet, however, are only one dimension of 
the performance of a fisherman (Squires 1987), and may not account for all of the variation 
among vessel catch. Other attributes have been suggested to explain variation in producer 
outputs (Thunberg 2007), such as the skills of the operator, age, education, competition from 
other fishermen, spatial and temporal fishing constraints and choices, and luck are also factors. 
Other utility derived on the part of the fisherman include non-pecuniary benefits (Fullenbaum et 
al. 2017), such as quality of life and freedom of choice in professional activities. Prior studies in 
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the English channel as well as New Zealand (Pascoe and Coglan 2002; Sharp et al. 2004) have 
attributed the variation in vessel performance on the skills of the operator, with certain 
individuals characterized as ‘highliners’ who seem to be able to earn substantially more than 
others with similar vessel. And still other studies have concluded that ‘luck’ is at the source of 
the variation.  
 
The degree of income these operators require to offset their capital investments is the subject of 
much question and leads directly to implications for the resource underlying these business 
models. Other lobster fisheries worldwide have observed similar long-term trends in vessel 
capitalization and effort escalation, and responded with governance reform (Australia 2009b; 
Australia 2009a; Yandle 2006; Philippart et al. 2011). The range of reforms is wide, and often a 
progression from effort controls, such as trap limits or seasonal restrictions, to output controls, 
such as ITQs and TACs. In many cases, crisis and resource collapse have been the driver for 
radical change, for example New Zealand, where communities tend to resist adaptation until 
alternate options have been fully exhausted (Popova et al. 2016; Yandle 2008). In these reactive 
situations it can be hard to assess whether policy reform has been successful after the fact, due to 
a lack of baseline data on the fishery performance stable performance periods (Sharp et al. 2004). 
 
This research is motivated by future changes to understand the impacts of changes to production 
inputs in the Maine lobster fishery, and to provide a contribution to the economics literature 
through the designation of the vessel of a unit of effort for evaluating technical efficiency and the 
idea that a fleet can comprise of several homogenous sub-groups within an otherwise non-
homogenous fleet. We hypothesize that the differences in producer efficiency lie in the 
characteristics of each individual operation, and choices made by the producer to maximize their 
profit. We have developed and implemented an industry survey to obtain original data with 
which to develop profit and producer production functions, and test our hypothesized differences 
in efficiency associated with the different firms, or in this case vessel characteristics. 
2.3 Empirical Approach 
2.3.1 Estimation of the Stochastic Frontier Production Function 
 
Theoretical Model specification 
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According to neoclassical economic theory, all firms are assumed to be fully efficient in their use 
of technology so that input and output prices are the only factors that decide output level. Farrell 
(1957) proposed a provocative idea to define the output of the most efficient firm as the 
production frontier for all firms. Given that efficient firms with full information should operate at 
“maximum” potential output levels (i.e. full technical efficiency), any deviation from the 
production frontier measures technical inefficiency. This allows for the fact that firms may 
encounter various uncontrollable exogenous factors (random effects), such as performance of 
various machines, weather conditions, uncertainty of input supplies, etc. 
 
Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a model that imposes allocative efficiency, removes the first-
order profit maximizing conditions, and permits panel data.  The Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model specification can be expressed as: 
NiuvuyXXY iiiiiiiii ...,,1,-)-exp()exp( ==+=+= εβεβ           (1) 
 
where Yi measures lobster catch of the ith firm; Xi is a k × 1 vector of output value and input 
costs; )1( k×β  is a vector of unknown parameters; the vi’s are assumed to be identical 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) random errors with N(0, 2vσ ) and are independently distributed 
of the technical inefficiencies ui; the ui’s are assumed to be non-negative random variables 
associated with technical inefficiency.  A common approach is to assume that ui is either non-
negative normal and truncated at zero N(0, 2uσ ), or for ui to have an exponential distribution with 
mean, mi , and variance, 2uσ . 
 
The catch inefficiency in this Stochastic Production Frontier (SFPF) (1) can be specified as: 
 
iii wzu += δ           (2) 
 
where zi is a p × 1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of the ith firm; and δ is 
an 1 × p vector of parameters to be estimated.  Note that the distribution range of the random 
errors vi is ],[ +∞−∞ , the distribution range of the random inefficiency factor ui is ],0[ +∞ , and wi 
is a truncated random error )( δiz−≥ . 
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Following the exposition of Battese and Corra (1977), the probability density functions for vi and 
ui are assumed mutually independent so they can form a joint p.d.f. We then apply a γ -
parameterization to search for suitable starting values with an iterative maximization algorithm.  
 
The log-likelihood function, in terms of γ -parameterization, is:   
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is the cumulative density function of the standard normal random variable.  The maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates of β , 2sσ  and γ  are obtained by finding the maximum value of the 
log-likelihood function, defined in equation (3). The ML estimators are consistent and 
asymptotically efficient (Aigner et al., 1977). The computer program, FRONTIER Version 4.1, 
is used to obtain the ML estimates for the parameters of this model. 
 
Hypothesis tests 
 
Generalized likelihood tests are used to test the hypotheses outlined below to ensure that 
inefficiency effects are absent from the model. 
(i)  𝐻!: 𝜇 = 0,  
(ii) 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 𝛿! =  𝛿! =  … =  𝛿! = 0 , or the null hypothesis which specifies that 
inefficiencies are absent from the model. 
(iii) 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 , or the null hypothesis which specifies that inefficiencies are not 
stochastic. 
(iv) 𝐻!: 𝛿! =  𝛿! =  … =  𝛿! = 0 , or the null hypothesis which specifies that 
inefficiencies effects are not a linear function of each of the base effects. 
Under the null hypothesis, 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0, the model is equivalent to the traditional average response 
function, without the technical efficiency effect 𝜇!. The test statistic is, 
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𝐿𝑅 =  −2 ln ! !!! !! =  −2 ln 𝐿 𝐻! − ln 𝐿 𝐻!  ~ 𝜒!!          (5) 
  
where 𝐿 𝐻!  and 𝐿 𝐻!  are the values of the log-likelihood function under the null and 
alternative hypotheses, and the test statistic has a 𝜒! distribution with twenty-three degrees 
freedom. Because 𝛾 = 0  lies on the boundary in the parametric space, the generalized 
loglikelihood- ratio statistic, LR, has an asymptotic distribution which is a mixture of the two chi 
distributions, namely !! 𝜒!! + !!  𝜒!! (Battese and Coelli, 1995). 
2.3.2 Empirical Model Specification 
 
Data Source and variable definitions 
A 2011 economic and fishing effort survey of Maine’s lobster industry is used in this study. The 
input costs and output catch and revenue for the various classes of lobster vessels across the 
seven Maine lobster zones were obtained through a telephone survey, administered by market 
research firm. For the purpose of this study, only those fishermen who landed more than 1,000 
lbs. during the calendar year 2010 were considered. These data were then merged with Federal 
dealer reported catch and revenue daily transaction source link party_id field, allowing firm-level 
individual catch and revenue to be appended, and observation level analysis for a sample 
population of n = 1,007, representing an average 23% sample frame of all full-time active 
lobstermen in Maine. Average input costs for the industry fell roughly into these categories: 24% 
bait, 22% fuel, 21% labor, 21% gear and vessel maintenance and 12% administrative & 
miscellaneous.  
 
Firm level observations were created for each calendar quarter in which the firm reported fishing 
effort, and in which revenue and catch were reported in the dealer data. Catch was used as the 
output (Y); labor including owner operator labor, measured as costs; intermediate inputs such as 
bait, fuel, repairs were measured as costs; capital including vessel replacement values plus costs 
of traps and rigging were used as the value of assets.  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics cost survey variables 
Variable Definition Mean (Std Dev) 
Lbs Production annual of the ith firm 29,414 (24,879) 
Labor Labor cost annual 98,699 (88,460) 
Bait Bait cost annual 14,922 (10,350) 
Fuel Fuel cost annual 9,014 (9,776) 
Yrs_exp Years of experience 29 (16) 
Age Age of fisherman 50 (15) 
Vessel_length Length of fishing vessel  33.77 (7.01) 
Engine Size Engine horsepower 309.15 (166.38) 
Max traps Maximum number of traps fished 655 (241) 
Money Owed  Loan Amount  50,221 (51,855) 
Vessel Value Current vessel value 84,493.63 (75,757.07) 
% Income lobster Proportion from lobstering 70.70 (29.30) 
Gear cost Cost of traps and rigging 8,695.13 (3,328.89) 
Years planned Years intending to keep fishing 52.39 (39.49) 
 
Table 2.2 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Unit 
Lbs_Q Lobster production quantity of the ith firm at interval Q lbs. 
Labor_Q Labor per quarter US $ 
Bait_Q Bait cost per quarter US $ 
Fuel_Q Fuel cost per quarter US $ 
Maint_Q Maintenance costs annual US $ 
Admin_Q Administrative costs annual US $ 
Yrs_exp Years of experience Yrs. 
Age Age of fisherman Yrs. 
Vessel_Cat Length of fishing vessel category i = 1 to 3 ft. 
Engine Size Engine horsepower Hp 
Max traps Maximum number of traps fished Integer 
Traps hauled_Q Number of traps hauled per calendar quarter  Integer 
Number_trips_Q Number of fishing trips taken per calendar quarter Integer 
Number qtrs Number of calendar quarters fished per year Integer 
Distance_traveled Steam time * average speed Miles 
Quarter_dummy_Q QDi = 1 if the ith firm was actively fishing during calendar 
quarter i; otherwise QDi = 0 
Integer 
Zone Maine fishing Zone (A to G).  1 – 7 
 
We acknowledge three shortcomings in our data: amortization schedule for annual asset 
depreciation used a standard 20-year schedule across all firms; annual reported bait costs were 
allocated by calendar quarters in proportion according to reported trap hauls per quarter; 
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observations with no crew costs cited were adjusted to zero crew costs, which may understate 
labor costs in some cases.  
 
The Translog stochastic frontier production model functional form selected used to measure the 
technical efficiency of Maine’s lobster industry is defined as: 
 ln𝑌! =  𝛽! +  𝛽 ln𝑋!" + !!  𝛽!" 𝑙𝑛𝑋!"  𝑙𝑛 𝑋!" + 𝑣! − 𝑢!!!!!!!!!!!!!    (6) 
 
where Yi is the observed output, and i represents the ith lobsterman for i = 1, 2, … 1,007 and Xji 
represents the amount of input of j used by each lobsterman, and there is symmetry in the input 
cross-effects by assuming 𝛽 jk = 𝛽kj. The estimated parameters 𝛽!,𝛽!,… ,𝛽!  represent output 
elasticity of corresponding inputs, and the sum of these parameters equals the total estimated 
output elasticity. We define output elasticity as the percentage change in output, resulting from a 
1% change of all input factors. Output elasticity greater than one indicates increasing returns to 
scale for the industry.  
 
For our study, we define technical efficiency 𝜇!  for each lobsterman as a combination of the 
inputs representing technical ability and production conditions in the Gulf of Maine inshore 
fishery, and that technical efficiency for each individual lobsterman is specified as follows: 
 𝜇! =  𝛿! +   𝛿!License!"# +  𝛿!Age+  𝛿!Soak+  𝛿!Vessel!" +  𝛿!Traps!"#$% +  𝛿!Bait!"#!" + 𝛿!Price!"#!"#$% +  𝛿!Dist!"#$%& +  𝛿!Income!"# +  𝛿!"Traps!"#$%& +  𝛿!!Q! +  𝛿!"Q! + 𝛿!"Q! + 𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!"Zone!"# +  𝛿!"Zone! + 𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!"Zone! +  𝛿!!Zone! + 𝜀       (7) 
 
In equation 7, the fisherman’s licenseyrs is used to represent technical ability. Two sets of dummy 
variables are included, one for Zones, and for calendar quarters, to account for differences in 
seasonal and spatial patterns. 
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Output Elasticity 
For each input factor Xj, (j = 1, 2, …., 4) there is a corresponding output elasticity evaluated at a 
sample mean, which is defined as the percentage change in the ith lobsterman’s output for a 1% 
change in the jth input factor.  
The production elasticity of the ith input is defined as: 
 𝐸𝑋!" =  ! !"!!! !"!!" =  ! !!! !!"  . !!"!! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!" ln𝑋!"!!!!       (8) 
 
The output elasticity for each input depends on the relative input of the other factors used. If 𝛽!" = 0 for all j and k then the production model specification reduces to where the output 
elasticity for the jth input is defined as Bj, and the sum of the parameters equals the estimated 
returns to scale. Since 𝐸𝑋!" is different for each lobsterman from the definition in Eq. (5) we use 
the sample mean of each input factor j across all lobstermen, 𝐸𝑋! to represent 𝐸𝑋!". 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Input factors to estimate output quantity 
 
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results of the SFPF, separately evaluated for three classes of 
vessels in Maine’s Lobster industry, using production functions based on lobster ‘catch’ as the 
dependent variable. All variables except trips per quarter are on a ‘per trip’ level. Coefficients 
should be interpreted as output elasticities1. 
 
Under the stochastic frontier model specification provided by Battese and Coelli, we are 
interested in the error structure of the parameterized model application, so we can tease apart the 
error due to random noise, from the technical inefficiency effects of interest. The null hypothesis, 
that there are no technical inefficiency effects in the model, can be conducted by testing the null 
and the alternative hypotheses, and most commonly the Wald statistic was used in most 
historical applications. However, this is often insignificant, and has a large probability of Type I 
error due to size properties, and so alternate methods have been identified involving gamma, and 
with generalized-ratio tests to test if inefficiency effects are absent from the model.  
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Table 2.3 Production function output elasticity estimation results by vessel class.  
Vessel Category 
 
34’ and below 35’ to 39’ 40’ and above 
Variable 
 
Parameter Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err 
Constant 𝛽!       
Labor2  𝛽! -4.97** 2.20 0.92 3.31   4.31** 2.19 
Trap hauls3 𝛽! -5.38** 0.91 1.48 3.42   5.07** 1.01 
Gallons of fuel 𝛽!    0.31 2.08 0.42 2.31   2.21** 1.65 
Trips per quarter 𝛽! 2.89** 1.95 0.41 4.08  -0.72** 2.80 
n =   139  276  105  
Log likelihood  -180.65  -369.75  --122.04  
        
1The percentage change of the ith fisherman's output for a 1% change in the jth input. 
2 Includes owner hours spent on fishing activities, as well as paperwork, and gear maintenance; 
3 Number of traps fished functions as the land equivalency of ith firm. 
**Denotes variable significant at the 95% confidence level. 
 
We are evaluating three separate vessel classes, and perform hypothesis tests for each empirical 
model evaluation presented in tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, and summarized as follows: 
 
(i) This null hypothesis tests specifies that under a generalized truncated-normal 
specification of the stochastic frontier model, we can simplify to a half-normal 
distribution and adequately represent the data. We estimate the model for both the 
null and alternate hypotheses and if H0 is true then our test statistic is assumed to 
be asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random variable. We compare our 
result to the critical chi-square value. We test whether the error term ui has a 
truncated normal distribution, obtained by truncating (at zero) the normal 
distribution with mean mu, and variance sigma-squared. Given our model 
specification, the test statistic for the semi-normal distribution is Ho: 𝜇  = 8.43, 
39.28, and 21.28 respectively, this leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis in all 
cases. 
(ii) Our second hypothesis tests for the existence of the inefficiency factor.  We test 
the null hypothesis that there is no inefficiency in the industry. However, a 
significant likelihood test value of 202.19, 375.06, and 161.64 with 23 degrees of 
freedom allows us to reject Ho and implies the presence of inefficiency among the 
Maine Lobster industry.  
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(iii) This null hypothesis test specifies that the inefficiency effects are not a linear 
function of each of the inefficiency factors. As well, the difference between the 
null hypothesis 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 and alternate hypothesis 𝐻!: 𝛾 > 0 provides for a 
potential asymptotic distribution, or a mixture of chi-square distributions. In our 
case, 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 represents the boundary space for parametization of our model. 
We evaluate the log likelihood-ratio value of the full model to determine if it 
exceeds the one-sided adjusted 𝜒!, we reject 𝐻! in favor of 𝐻!, suggesting that the 
traditional average response function is not an adequate representation of the data. 
(iv) This final hypothesis test specifies to what degree the existence of inefficiency 
affects the technical efficiency. The null hypothesis 𝐻!: 𝛿! =  𝛿! =  … =  𝛿! = 0 
is rejected in our analysis with a LR Ratio test value for each vessel class of 
28.661, 40.893, and 27.061 against a test statistic of 23.68, which indicates the 
inefficiency effects are not part of a normal error distribution.  
 
For the model reflecting smallest vessel class (<34 ft.), three of our parameters were found to be 
significant. The large negative parameters for labor and trap hauls, indicate that a 1% increase in 
labor or trap hauls would have a negative effect and decrease output by 4.97% and 5.38% 
respectively. Conversely, a 1% increase in the number of trips per quarter would increase output 
by 2.89%. None of the parameters for the mid-size vessel model were found to be significant, 
although the model itself was found significant. For the largest vessel class, we note that all of 
the parameters were found to be significant, which we interpret to indicate that a 1% increase in 
labor or trap hauls increase output by 4.31% and 5.07% respectively. The trips per quarter 
parameter in this vessel class was also found to be significant, indicating that a 1% increase in 
number of fishing trips would cause a 0.72% decrease in output. 
 
Technical efficiency related to production frontier; managerial experience, ownership 
characteristics 
 
Table 2.7 shows the technical inefficiencies of the three separate models specified by vessel size. 
Positive parameter estimates indicate relative technical inefficiency, while negative parameters 
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Table 2.4 Technical efficiency specification tests for model effects (vessels < 34’) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Log 
Likelihood 
Reduced 
Model 
Log 
Likelihood 
Full  
Model 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
(LR) 
Degree 
freedom 
Critical 
Value 
Decision 
𝐻!: 𝜇 = 0 -180.65 -176.43 8.43 1 2.7 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 =  𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -180.65 -79.55 202.19 23 35.172 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 -180.65 -110.51 23.06 13 22.36 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -180.65 -176.32 28.661 14 23.68 Reject 𝐻! 
 
Table 2.5 Technical efficiency specification tests for model effects (vessels 35’ – 39’) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Log 
Likelihood 
Reduced 
Model 
Log 
Likelihood 
Full  
Model 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
(LR) 
Degree 
freedom 
Critical 
Value* 
Decision 
𝐻!: 𝜇 = 0 -369.75 -350.11 39.28 1 2.7 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 =  𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -369.75 -182.22 375.06 23 35.172 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 -369.75 -350.11 39.28 13 22.36 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -369.75 -349.30 40.893 14 23.68 Reject 𝐻! 
 
 
Table 2.6 Technical efficiency specification tests for model effects (vessels > 40’) 
Null 
hypothesis 
Log 
Likelihood 
Reduced 
Model 
Log 
Likelihood 
Full  
Model 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
(LR) 
Degree 
freedom 
Critical 
Value* 
Decision 
𝐻!: 𝜇 = 0 -122.04 -111.40 21.28 1 2.7 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 =  𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -122.04 -41.22 161.64 23 35.172 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛾 = 0 -122.04 -109.35 25.37 13 22.36 Reject 𝐻! 𝐻!: 𝛿! =  𝛿!=  … =  𝛿! = 0 -122.04 -110.51 27.061 14 23.68 Reject 𝐻! 
* Has a mixed Chi-square distribution. 
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indicate relative technical efficiency, within each model and relative to the vessels in the size 
class. All variables are on a ‘per trip’ level. Parameters should be interpreted as factors 
contributing towards production inefficiency. Negative values indicate less inefficient and 
positive values indicate more inefficient. 
 
For our first, small vessel model (< 34 ft.), inefficiency appears as statistically significant for the 
variables indicating calendar quarter fished, and for the southernmost Lobster management Zone 
G. The parameters provide interesting insights into the temporal and geospatial aspects of the 
fishery, where those vessels who also fish in Q2, Q4, and Q1 are 3.32%, 1.88% and 1.01% 
respectively more inefficient in their operations in those calendar quarters. Similarly, the Zone G 
fishing vessels are 0.67% more inefficient. Other parameters in this model were significant, 
notably: License_yrs, Age, soak time, Number of traps fished, and amount of bait used. Younger 
operators with more experience, who deploy more traps, and input more bait, which soak longer, 
are found to be 0.65%, 0.37%, 0.54%, 0.39%, and 0.67% respectively less inefficient for each of 
these managerial decisions. 
 
For our medium size vessel model (35 – 39 ft.), we observe a similar trend where inefficiency 
appears as statistically significant for the variables indicating calendar quarter fished, and for the 
Mid-Coast Lobster Management Zone D, Monhegan Island specifically. Mid-size vessels who 
also fish in Q2, Q4, and Q1 are 3.10%, 2.17% and 0.88% respectively more inefficient in their 
operations in those calendar quarters. The only other parameters in this model that emerged as 
significant, was the amount of bait used, where vessels which deploy more bait, are found to be 
0.43% less inefficient for this managerial decisions. 
 
For our large size vessel model (> 40 ft.), we observe a similar trend where inefficiency appears 
as statistically significant for the variables indicating calendar quarter fished, and for Lobster 
Management Zones D and G. Large vessels who also fish in Q2, Q4, and Q1 are 2.94%, 2.16% 
and 0.96% respectively more inefficient in their operations in those calendar quarters. Zones D 
and G large fishing vessels are 1.44% and 1.86% respectively more inefficient. Other parameters 
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Table 2.7 Technical inefficiency model estimates for each specified vessel class model  
Vessel Category 
 
34’ and below 35’ to 39’ 40’ and above 
Variable 
 
Parameter Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
Constant 𝛿! 11.51 2.71 11.79 6.27 11.51 2.71 
License_yrs 𝛿! -0.37* -2.17 0.14 1.23 0.06 0.28 
Age 𝛿! 0.65* 2.39 -0.01 -0.06 0.36 0.89 
Soak 𝛿! -0.67* -2.93 0.17 1.08 -0.55 -1.86 
Vessel_hp 𝛿! 0.17 1.01 -0.20 -2.09 -0.43 -1.47 
Traps_owned 𝛿! 0.46 1.55 -0.38 -2.76 1.96 2.00 
Bait_total_cost 𝛿! -0.39* -3.56 -0.43* -3.93 -1.05* -3.46 
Price_lb 𝛿! 0.09 0.14 -0.51 -1.18 -0.54 -0.87 
Dist_travel 𝛿! -0.04 -0.55 -0.06 -0.97 -0.22* -2.21 
Income_lob 𝛿! -0.33 -1.83 -0.37 -1.67 -0.92 -2.66 
Traps_fished 𝛿!" -0.54* -2.46 -0.27 -1.79 -1.18* -3.35 
Q1 𝛿!! 3.32* 10.22 3.10* 12.87 2.94* 8.65 
Q2 𝛿!" 1.88* 12.44 2.17* 12.30 2.16* 8.48 
Q4 𝛿!" 1.01* 8.16 0.88* 5.67 0.96* 4.43 
Zone_A 𝛿!" 0.16 0.60 -0.02 -0.13 0.46 1.66 
Zone_B_SI 𝛿!" 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.96 0.00 0.00 
Zone_C 𝛿!" 0.12 0.47 -0.27 -1.53 0.78 1.94 
Zone_D 𝛿!" 0.25 1.02 0.04 0.24 1.44* 4.00 
Zone_D_MI 𝛿!" 0.00 0.00 -1.61* -3.52 0.00 0.00 
Zone_E 𝛿!" 0.30 1.20 0.26 1.27 0.25 0.58 
Zone_F 𝛿!" 0.32 1.33 0.33 1.63 0.42 1.21 
Zone_G 𝛿!" 0.67* 2.42 -0.09 -0.36 1.86* 3.93 
Sigma 𝜎! 0.20 7.01 0.27 9.28 0.24 6.00 
Log-likelihood  -79.22  -182.22  -41.22  
***, **, * Indicate estimates are significant at the 1%, 2% or 5% level respectively.  
 
in this model were significant, notably: number of traps fished, amount of bait used, and distance 
traveled. Vessels that deploy more traps, input more bait, and travel farther offshore are found to 
be 1.18%, 1.05%, and 0.22% respectively less inefficient for each of these managerial decisions. 
Most interestingly, the distance-traveled parameter was found to be significant in the large vessel 
model, but not the other models, suggesting that larger vessels operate more efficiently offshore 
than they do inshore. 
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The technical expertise parameters such as age and years experience were found to be significant 
in only the smaller vessel class model; however, we note the directional trends of the parameters 
provide some insights. For the small vessel model, increased years of experience contributed to a 
less inefficient operation, which is offset by the age parameter, where older captains are more 
inefficient. For the large vessel model, these parameters were both positive, and so increased 
years experience contributed to a more inefficient operation, where the age of the captain had a 
negligible impact on the inefficiency and so there was no differentiation among the vessels based 
on age. This is surprising, as we would expect technical experience to promote efficiency; 
however, the more seasoned captains may be more consistently engaging in additional measures 
aimed at resource conservation, such as v-notching, which requires operational time and may 
account for the observations in this parameter. Alternately, because many fishermen begin their 
fishing careers as crew, they develop significant experience early. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Technical inefficiencies scores for vessels in our study, relative to the frontier 
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In figure 2.2, we see the distribution of vessel efficiency within each vessel class model. We note 
that interpretation of technical efficiency of each vessel class is relative to the most productive 
quarter, Q3, which serves as our base for comparison for the class, and relative to the maximum 
producer or stochastic frontier within the vessel class.  The mid size vessel class appears to be 
only modestly less efficient in Q4, relative to Q3. The same patter holds true for the large vessel 
class, which does not appear to have much of an advantage in Q4 efficiency, despite the large 
capital investments. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
Through our study of the production functions for the Maine lobster fishery, we are able to 
observe a range of fleet producer efficiency, which differs for in-shore and off-shore vessels and 
varies by vessel class. Human capital and vessel capital do not appear to be operating at optimum 
yield in Maine, where social fabric and job have been valued over efficiency, consistent with 
prior research. This leaves room for effective effort increases, despite the restrictions on new 
entrants into the fishery. 
 
In our study, we have established an effective baseline measure, with repeatable methods to 
assess producer efficiency for in-shore and off-shore harvest vessel classes. For the study year 
with base data for year 2010, we have observed different producer classes exhibit different 
production economics and vary in their inefficiencies. For the smaller vessels under 34 ft, we see 
that as that human capital and vessel capital are not exhibiting optimum production. This has 
been historically acceptable, where the Maine social fabric and job creation have been valued 
over efficiency of fishing operations. This allows maximum participation in the fishery with 
lower costs of entry.  
 
The traditional vessel size for the coast of Maine (between 34 ad 39 ft.) appears to have the least 
inefficiency of inshore fishing operations of all the three vessel classes we examined, especially 
during the peak harvest months in Q3 in which the fishery sees the largest proportion of the 
landings. This bodes well for these traditional vessels under changing conditions, as they are 
traditionally more nimble in their operational scaling and represent less capital investment to the 
producer.  
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The large vessel class (40 ft.+) benefits from additional investments in labor, trap hauls and fuel, 
which improves efficiency in the Q3 time period relative to the other vessel classes. These 
vessels can withstand the winter ocean conditions as well, and show less inefficiency in Q4 and 
Q2 but under declining harvest volumes may have too much invested in capital to remain 
profitable. 
 
And as we look to the future, it’s important to note that producer efficiency is vulnerable to 
subject to climate-based regime shifts and shifts in resource distribution where harvest is 
constrained by lobster management zones, and the Hague Line. The lobster resource has seen 
changes in recruitment patterns, and landings are expected to also shift even further (Mills et al. 
2013; Wahle et al. 2009; Fogarty and Gendron 2004; Holland 2011; Steneck and Wahle 2013). 
Stratification of waters in the Gulf of Maine have been changing, and additional research looking 
into suitable habitat for lobsters would help to inform the future of vessel profitability to build on 
prior knowledge (Wahle et al. 1991). Where mid-size vessels appear optimally positioned, larger 
vessels appear over-capitalized for shifting distributions favoring eastern most fishing grounds, 
and more inshore areas of Maine. Overall, lobster industry human and fixed capital, appear non-
malleable (Munro 2010), due to the limited alternate employment opportunities associated with 
resource economies such as forestry and fishing for example, but efforts to diversify marine 
economies and licensing could offset this.  
 
Input controls have been a long-standing choice for trap fisheries worldwide (Anderson 1976; 
Anderson 1985), where the gear lends itself to simple restrictions such as trap limits (Gordon 
1985). But input controls are only as effective at restricting effort for fishing operations that 
could never exploit further inputs effectively (Deacon 1994; Deacon et al. 2011, Campbell and 
Lindner 1990). Fisheries with allocation by first come-first served, observe competition to 
acquire the stock before the competitor raises cost, and this cost increase can then simultaneously 
ration the access to the stock. The net result is a rent dissipation from an optimum level the stock 
could generate if managed efficiently and the extent of rent dissipation can depend on production 
input prices and on the elasticity of substitution of those inputs, (Deacon 1994). 
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We have demonstrated that the Maine lobster fishery possesses additional effort increase through 
improved technical capacity of existing producers. And since the Maine lobster fishery 
management relies exclusively on a limited-entry system, with no other restrictions such as effort 
controls or volume controls, a decrease in harvest volume coupled with increases in consumer 
market preferences for lobster, will affect supply and demand relationships and inversely impact 
ex-vessel prices (Barten and Bettendorf 1989). This positive ex-vessel price trend may lead to 
increased participation in the fishery through activation of latent effort, and increased production 
inputs to sustain volume, which poses a risk for the resource as well as the fishermen who 
depend on it. Further research is suggested around target fleet capacity and optimum yield for the 
fishery, and implementing harvest controls for both biological conservation and also market 
controls. 
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3. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR A MAINE LOBSTER LICENSE AND POTENTIAL 
FURTHER CAPITALIZATION OF THE FISHERY 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
This research focuses on Maine’s inshore lobster fishing fleet consists of approximately 6,500 
commercial fishermen, organized into diversity of firms of differing sizes and with differing 
technical experience, as characterized by size of fishing vessel ranging from 10’ to 50’ in length 
and organized by management Zone. By further performing a quantitative assessment of the 
incoming capital, managers can evaluate the risks associated with changes to the entry allowed. 
This research applies contingent valuation methods to provide an estimate of the Willingness to 
Pay (WTP) for a license, as well as quantify the intended capital investment levels on the part of 
new entrants and existing participants in the fishery. The desired number of traps on the part of 
existing license holders provides a gauge for potential increase in effort through improved 
technical skills and suggests a market for latent permits from within the fishery. We have 
conducted two contingent valuation surveys, one administered to existing license holders, and a 
separately designed survey was administered to non-license holders who are on the waiting list, 
currently estimated at a 10-year average wait time. We have further captured community 
attitudes towards the goals of the licensing program, and uncovered core values of the 
community, which lie at the root of the economic argument. We have evaluated the willingness 
to change and consider new licensing policies.  
3.2 Introduction 
 
Many lobster fisheries worldwide have faced increasing fishing effort with decreasing resource 
abundance, leading to policy reform and other measures to ensure long-term sustainability of the 
resource (Townsend 1990; Australia 2009b; Australia 2009a), with acknowledgement that at 
times the number of individuals deriving a livelihood from the species might need to contract 
(Jensen 2002; Yandle 2008; Yandle 2006; J. Sun 1999). A wide range of management 
frameworks for lobster fishery management have been implemented globally, as shown in figure 
3.1, and we see that Maine’s lobster fishery has retained effort controls, in contrast with other 
jurisdictions that have adopted a form of output control. Given the current technical inefficiency 
in the Maine lobster fishery (Dayton and Sun 2017), an increase in effective effort is possible, 
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suggesting the fleet may have excessive capacity. In New England ground fish and elsewhere, 
the connection between excessive effort that could lead to over-fishing, has caused jurisdictions 
to realize that the vessel capacity must be reduced, and have engaged in buy-back programs to 
ensure their permanent retirement (Kitts et al. 2000) and compensate the fisherman for the lost 
utility (Holland et al. 1999). This process of sharp downsizing of a fleet in response to resource 
crisis comes with an economic and also social toll, leaving many fishermen seeking alternate 
employment often in geographic regions where limited alternatives exist (Holland et al. 1999), 
effectively stranding the non-malleable capital including boats and labor (Munro 2010). As well, 
total contraction of the fleet can leave the working waterfront infrastructure vulnerable to 
development for alternate uses, such as tourism and real estate, which are non-reversible. Any 
economic benefits of future recovery of an underlying fishing stock could be difficult to reap 
once a human fishing infrastructure shift has occurred, and the tenuous balance of the ecosystem 
has exceeded a threshold (Popova et al. 2016). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Continuum of management options used for lobster fisheries 
 
To enable effective decision-making around policy options, economic theory provides for non-
market valuation techniques that have been used in various industries to assess the value of 
different natural assets, and also arrive at values for goods, which have no transactions directly to 
measure, or which present hypothetical transactions in the future (Sagoff 2000; Carson 2012). 
The classic example, valuation of clean air (McGartland 2013) or the willingness to pay (WTP) 
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for restoration for example, is difficult to measure directly and requires inferred approaches to 
assess the value a population places on this (Bateman et al. 2002). Within the forestry context, a 
resource not too dissimilar from fisheries, WTP analysis has been successfully applied to 
estimate the value of changes on forest management practices (Teisl and Boyle 2006). 
 
In a fisheries context, we see a growing body of research aimed at understanding attitudes of 
fishery participants and general public in valuing this natural resource for the extraction benefit, 
but also the recreational value, and ecosystem values. Previous research has applies contingent 
valuation to assess community WTP for Coho salmon restoration on the Columbia River in 
Oregon (Bell et al. 1995). Sport fishermen in Maine were surveyed for their perceptions on the 
added value of Penobscot River restoration efforts related to Atlantic Salmon, providing a critical 
perspective to the conservation effort (Teisl et al. 1996). Research has been done to quantify the 
WTP for a salt water angling licenses, and studies have shown that the use of funds from a 
license can strongly influence the WTP estimates (Whitehead et al. 2001), and that anglers from 
across different types of groups consistently support fees which improve quality of fishing 
experiences. In 2001, researchers also demonstrated the WTP for increased license fees in Fort 
Hood, Texas and further derived number of potential displaced anglers so as to estimate impacts 
on fishery participation rates (Sutton et al. 2001).  
 
Currently, there are no estimates of WTP for a Maine Lobster License or Maine lobster trap tag, 
which we believe to be an important consideration prior to policy changes, which may create an 
open market for these assets. In today’s policy framework the transaction of licenses and tags is 
strictly limited to the initial issuance, and retirement of license with the Department of Marine 
Resources only. Open market transactions are strictly prohibited. In the nearby Canada lobster 
fishery however, private transactions of license sales have been allowed, and the cost of a license 
reported ranges from $10,000 - $1,000,000 (Dayton and Sun 2012). In Massachusetts, 
transactions of licenses are allowed on a restricted basis, and prices have ranged closer to $5,000 
- $10,000 where the additional provision for a 10% trap tap reduction ‘tax’ on transfers helps to 
prevent effort escalation over time. There has been speculation about the impact of these 
additional license costs on the fishing firm’s profitability and hence fishing behavior, and 
questions have been raised as to the level of fishing return needed to pay back this investment. 
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But to date, no one has quantified the WTP for a coveted Maine lobster license, and our research 
fills this important gap in our knowledge-base.  
 
The question of biological sustainability has been raised when fishing effort increases to the 
extent needed to cover these additional license acquisition costs, and raises real questions for 
fishery managers in Maine, should licenses become a transferrable commodity in Maine. And so, 
our research will help inform lobster policy and licensing reform efforts to ensure that 
consideration is given to the open market forces that may ensue from licensing changes aimed at 
addressing social equity concerns.   
 
Maine lobster governance reform will likely reflect the community’s priorities between 
managing the lobster harvest at optimum economic yield, with retention of the jobs and 
community structure that has long defined Maine. This research provides a quantitative 
assessment of the new entrants’ and existing fisherman’s attitudes towards various policy 
options, and a measure of the amount of production capital that could enter the fishery if 
unconstrained. We also look at an age analysis of the Maine fishing community, as a by-product 
of the current entry licensing system for insight into how the long-term resilience of the fleet 
may be impacted. 
3.3 Background 
 
In response to concerns about escalating effort on the Lobster fishery in the mid 90’s, territorial 
conflicts, and potential risk of resource collapse, The Maine Department of Marine Resources in 
partnership with the lobster industry and the Maine State Legislature, developed a formal 
management regime to institutionalize and preserve the traditional harbor-based nature of the 
fishery in 1995 (Acheson and Gardner 2012; Acheson 1974). Maine established a zone 
management system that divides the coast up into seven geographically defined management 
zones and moved some of the decision-making from the State to local Lobster Policy 
Management Councils. A trap tag system with an individual trap limit of 1,200 (with a build-
down for those who were fishing more) was also enacted in 1995 and lobstermen were required 
to declare the zone in which they fish the majority of their traps, and to purchase trap tags to 
identify their lobster traps. No restrictions are placed on the number of hauls per trap. Further 
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constraints on entry beyond a Lobster Apprentice Program were implemented through the 1999 
Limited Entry Law. In addition, an owner-operator provision was put in place, requiring the 
owner of a fishing vessel to hold a lobster license and be on board the vessel when it is fishing 
for lobsters. A tight social fabric, and low degree of vertical integration characterize the inshore 
sector; where harvesters engage in conservation measures such as V-notching of females and 
self-enforcement as a society (Acheson and Gardner 2012). Lobstermen actively co-manage the 
resource with regular Zone Council meetings, and listen and adopt measures specific to their 
Zone (Acheson and Acheson 2010). 
 
A lack of seasonal restrictions however, allows harvesters to choose when they wish to fish 
within their Zone, and lobster product landed is not subject to any further quality, quantity, or 
other restrictions apart from legal minimum size limit of 3 ¼” and maximum 5” carapace length. 
Harvesters can choose to fish only in summer months, with or without crew, as a second 
profession for example, or year-round as a primary occupation. There is no limit placed on trap 
hauls, only a limit placed on number of total number of traps, and limits that 49% of the traps 
must be placed within the primary Zone fished (Maine Dept of Marine Resources).  
 
Entry into the fishery only can occur as exit from the fishery takes place, an effort to ensure a 
constant level of effort in the fishery, or even a reduction over time. And since 1997, the number 
of licenses declined statewide by 12%, suggesting reduced effort - but it’s the number of tags 
which are a more accurate measure of effort, as they reflect the annual registered traps that can 
be deployed. The number of trap tags has increased by 13% since 1997 (Dayton and Sun 2012), 
and overall fishing capacity has also increased in the past decade in the form of larger vessels, 
more crew, hauling more often. Scientific and industry consensus suggests that the number of 
traps actively being fished is near the maximum for the resource and gear density. Fishermen 
have reported high fishing effort densities in certain regions, and cite increases in competition as 
a factor in decreased catches per trap (Wilson 2007).  
 
As well, many of the existing licenses and tags are currently under-utilized, or not fished at all 
(Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). At the same time, a long waiting list of new entrants has 
created a sense of social inequity, raising the question of fairness of the current system. With 
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high exit-to-entry ratios, latent tags keep new entrants out by remaining on the books and latent 
licenses and tags pose a high risk to the resource. ASMFC analysts have raised concerns about 
the uncertainty of potential effort. Likewise, latent tags pose a risk to current fishermen. If 
inactive tags became active traps, they would have an impact on individual earnings, especially 
in high-density fishing areas. This also poses a risk of future overfishing and hinders fishery 
management efforts, should those licenses be re-activated in an already congested fishery.  
 
Our survey of waiting list members suggests that many are either already fishing likely as crew, 
plan to take over a family business, or want to fish part-time. We see individuals who have 
sought higher education and returned to Maine, only to be subsequently excluded from the 
fishery. This gives rise to social consequences as a result of excluding these groups of 
individuals from the fishery. The current student license program allows ample opportunity for 
those who satisfy the age criteria of the program to enter the fishery, and fishermen attitudes 
indicate they believe the student program should be kept and that it continues to be an important 
element for communities. However, social equity concerns have been raised as a result of the 
policy that allows students to by-pass the long line of apprentices and others on the waiting list 
(Steinback et al. 2008). We now see that over half of the people on the waiting list are 36 or 
younger, which suggests regional economic cost associated with excluding these individuals 
from the fishery, and favoring the younger under-educated adults who have remained 
homebound. An increase in social issues such as opioid drug addiction among deck hands and 
crew in particular, has also more recently been observed, and raises additional major concerns.  
 
In Figure 3.2, we also see the age structure of the current Maine license holders population. It 
reveals a significant number of older fishermen, who represent the bulk of the fishing fleet effort 
as of 2014. We also observe a large cohort of under 18 fishermen with student licenses, but note 
a low conversion rate of only 5% who continue into full commercial activity with the fleet, as 
shown through the decrease in numbers of active fishermen between the ages of 19 – 39 over the 
past two decades. This has contributed to a lack of fishermen in the labor pool during their most  
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Figure 3.2 Age cohort analysis of Maine lobster fishermen (2013) 
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physically able and highest income earning years, and draws concerns over the long-term 
outlook for this industry.  
 
At the same time, the currently restrictive entry into the fishery is likely to ease significantly as 
the dominant older cohort of fishermen reaches terminal age. This will create both opportunity, 
and also creates concern over increased fishing effort. The incoming new entrants represent 
significantly more fishing effort through age, technical skill and long pent up demand for entry. 
Any review of the licensing policy needs will do well to consider this additional pressure. As we 
see in figure 3.3, there also remains the potential for 56% immediate increase in fishing effort if 
all latent trap tags become active. It is hard to judge the full implications of latent licenses and 
tags because much depends on the intentions of the holder – some keep licenses and tags as a 
sense of identity, some to keep their options open, and some in the hopes of monetizing their 
value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Estimated latent license and effort in the Maine lobster fishery (2014) 
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Should economic uncertainty persist, or should sudden increases in price and profits occur, micro 
economic theory would suggest that new firms would enter the fishery, or in this case the latent 
effort might activate into active effort over a short period of time, and the health and 
sustainability of the underlying resource becomes an important consideration as the sheer 
number of participants tests the current framework. The governing principles then must guide 
decision-makers to choose between economic viability of individual businesses in a free-market 
environment, or maximize jobs, and prioritize equal access rights to all who have a public 
interest in the Maine Lobster fishery. As well, a sharp decline in the harvest could occur, which 
in a congested fishery could leave many fishermen without the needed income to continue to 
operate, resulting in stranded capital assets such a labor and boats (Munro 2010). 
 
In this research we integrate a variety of disciplines to arrive at new insights and evidence into 
what seem to be perennial arguments with and amongst fishermen. The questions of equity of 
access, property-rights, funding for government and fisheries management (Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001), as well as individual fisherman’s profitability require a broad perspective on the issue 
(Schlager and Ostrom 2016). Valuation of the increased utility associated with fishery access, or 
additional fishing effort provides a measure of the importance the community places on these 
goods, and we apply contingent valuation techniques in this research.  
 
We examine three separate models; first we estimate a general linear regression on the stated 
number of traps desired by current lobstermen, if and when licenses and traps became 
transferrable and effort per person was thereby unconstrained. We then estimate the WTP for a 
license and separately WTP for a trap tag of fishermen interested in gaining access to the Maine 
Lobster fishery as full commercial license holder, and quantify the stated rates of capitalization 
desired for potential new entrants. We have applied contingent valuation techniques in the form 
of two separate surveys to elicit the value for these products and services for which we do not 
have observable transactions.  
 
In the following sections, we describe the survey methodology and the study population of both 
existing lobstermen and those seeking entry to the fishery. Then we describe the theoretical 
model of our general linear model, and the WTP and its estimation with the censored regression 
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(Tobit) model for both a Maine lobster license, and separately and Maine lobster trap tag. A 
discussion of the factors influencing the number of traps desired, and the WTP estimates are then 
presented. Conclusions, policy implications, and suggestions for future research follow. 
3.4 Survey Questionnaire Design and Response 
 
Data for this analysis were drawn from responses to two different surveys administered; one 
survey for fishermen currently licensed, and a second separate survey for those who are 
apprenticing, or waiting to be admitted to the fishery. Both surveys were designed as multi-
purpose research instruments, seeking the opinions of fishermen on variety of matters including 
efficacy of the current limited entry licensing system, goals for the licensing system, attitudes 
towards alternate management structures in particular output controls, and open-ended response 
formats for our WTP and capitalization rate questions. Both surveys were designed in 
consultation with fishermen, and written with the input of local lobster scientists, anthropologists 
and resource managers. The survey was pre-tested with a small sample group to identify 
problematic questions and other design issues.  
 
The sample files consisted of commercial lobster license holders as well as those not holding a 
commercial license but are on waiting lists to acquire a license or who are completing training.  
Sample lists contained 5,195 commercial lobster license holders and 1,572 non-license holders 
(1,276 in training programs and 296 on a waiting list). Sample files contained addresses for 
mailing. A separate survey was developed for the license holder and non-license holder groups.  
 
Data collection took place between August 10, 2012 and September 10, 2012.  Potential 
respondents from the sample list were mailed a survey along with a cover letter stating the 
purpose of the research, and a business reply mail envelope for easy return. In addition to the 
survey, we collected comments through public meetings and provided on the back of the cover 
letter was a list of those meetings which were scheduled to be held in various locations across the 
state regarding the limited entry lobster license system. Furthermore, additional comments were 
gathered through a dedicated phone line. The number and instructions on how to access the 
phone line were included in the cover letter as well. Survey data were collected on 1,416 license 
holders and 313 non-license holders. A breakdown of response rates is provided in the table 
below: 
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Table 3.1 Survey response rates and quantities 
Type of Survey Total Surveys Mailed 
Returned as 
Bad Address 
Total Completed 
Surveys Returned 
Response 
Rate 
License Holder 5,195 27 1,416 27.4% 
Non-License Holder 1,572 20 313 20.2% 
Total 6,767 47 1,730 25.7% 
 
The non-license holders survey  
The survey included questions designed to elicit baseline demographics, and future intentions for 
fishing effort level, quantity existing capital investment in gear and boats, as well as intended 
future investment. The survey also included a section eliciting the amount a fisherman would be 
willing to pay for a commercial lobster license, and separately how much a fisherman would be 
willing to pay for a single trap tag. We considered best practices for elicitation of this value in 
accordance with guidance from the NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel (Arrow 2013) on contingent 
valuation, as well as guidelines set out by Mitchell and Carson (1989) (Bateman et al. 2002), as 
we aimed to assign a value for these non-market goods.  
 
The survey also asked respondents to rate their concerns for the health of the lobster resource and 
then prioritize the different potential goals of a licensing system. The responses to these 
additional questions provide a measure of sensitivity associated with the valuation component of 
the survey, and offer insight into the social dynamics of the potential new entrants and what they 
perceive as threats or opportunities. The valuation questions were presented as open-ended 
responses, due to the limitation of space in the questionnaire and because of the multi-purpose 
goal of the survey instrument. This open-ended method is not the preferred method for 
contingent valuation as it allows for protest and idealistic responses and fails to offer a 
probability associated with the valuation. We acknowledge this shortcoming and consider this 
limitation in our results interpretation. The specific wording of the questions, are as follows: 
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How much do you currently have invested:  
a. lobster gear?   $ ___________________   b. Lobster boat?   $ ___________________ 
 
How much do you plan to invest?     
b. lobster gear?   $ ___________________    b. Lobster boat?   $ ___________________ 
 
If licenses were transferrable, how much would you be willing to pay for one? $ ___________________ 
 
If tags were transferrable how much would you be willing to pay for one?        $ ___________________ 
 
 
Data were visually inspected for obvious errors, and observations, which did not provide a 
response to the WTP question, were considered protest responses and these were omitted from 
the data set. Observations, which contained a zero response, were deemed a response and were 
included in the final data set. The distribution of the open-ended survey questions is often 
presented with a large number of zero responses. The selection of statistical tools in this study 
reflects this normal distribution with a probability spike for the ‘zero’ response. 
 
The license holder survey  
This separate survey also included questions designed to elicit baseline demographics, license 
type, and future intentions for fishing effort level, quantity existing capital investment in gear 
and boats, as well as intended future investment through number of traps desired. The survey 
included an open-response format eliciting of the total number amount of traps a fisherman 
would want to fish with their commercial lobster license, and what restrictions should apply, 
given alternative licensing transferability options. Once again, we considered best practices for 
elicitation of this value in accordance with guidance from the NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel (1993) 
(Arrow 2013) on contingent valuation, as well as guidelines set out by Mitchell and Carson 
(1989), as we aimed to assign a value for these non-market goods.  
 
This survey also asked respondents to rate their concerns for the health of the lobster resource 
and then prioritize the different potential goals of a licensing system; a question regarding their 
support for transferability of licenses and trap tags was also included. The responses to these 
additional questions provide a measure of community values, and offer insight into the perceived 
or real threats and/or opportunities. The number of traps desired question was presented as open-
ended response format, and the specific wording of the questions as follows: 
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13. If tags were transferable, how many traps would you ideally fish (max # in the water at once)? 
# ______________ 
 
Data were visually inspected for obvious errors, and observations, which did not provide a 
response to the desired number of traps question, were considered to be satisfied with status quo 
and included in the data set with their current totals. Observations, which contained a zero 
response, were deemed a response and were included in the final data set as a zero.  
 
According to the 2012 License Holders Survey results, approximately 52% of existing license 
holders indicate they derive between 80 – 100% of their livelihood from fishing activity, 18% 
indicate they derive between 50 – 80% income from fishing, for a total of 70% if the industry 
derives more than 50% of their income from lobster fishing.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 License holders self-reported percent income derived from fishing activity. 
 
Over 65% of the fishermen surveyed report either somewhat or very concerned about the level of 
fishing in their area. This suggests that additional effort in the form of traps and licenses would 
likely incur a congestion effect. 
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Figure 3.5 Perceptions of fishing congestion and concern for total fishing effort 
 
Of those individuals seeking entry to the fishery, 26% of the people already fish (likely as a 
sternman) on a full-time basis, 14% fish on a part-time basis, and 33% are students. The average 
reported earnings for this group already in the fishery is $25,000/year. Forty percent earn less 
than $10,000/year. Approximately 60% of the surveyed new entrants indicate they wish to fish 
full-time, 29% indicate they wish to fish part-time seasonally, 9% indicate they wish to fish part-
time year round, and less than 2% are seeking to fish recreationally.  
 
Theoretical Models 
 
Should economic uncertainty persist in the Maine lobster fishery, or should sudden increases in 
ex-vessel price occur, micro economic theory would suggest that new firms would enter the 
fishery (Deacon et al. 2011; Anderson 1985; Anderson 1980), and existing firms would increase 
production inputs to maximize profits (Homans and Wilen 1997). Given the policy constraints on 
new firm participation through the limited entry and restricted supply of available licenses, rents 
would not be dissipated and therefore each unit of access would retain a monetary value, which 
can be captured through a willingness-to-pay contingent valuation analysis. Economic theory 
would expect this valuation to be in keeping with possible rent returns from the fishery, which 
may or may not be the case for this fishery, and provides us with an interesting research 
question. A second source of increased production could also occur through an increase in firm 
production inputs, in this case additional traps may be deployed on the part of existing producers 
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or hauled more often, which we mode separately. We employ two modeling approaches in this 
research described as follows: 
 
(i) General Linear Model  
 
To estimate the firm’s increase in production associated with additional traps, we evaluate the 
factors, which influence firm level decisions. The general linear model is a statistical linear 
model can be written as follows:  
𝐘 = 𝐗B+ 𝐔          (1) 
where, 
 
Y is a matrix with series of multivariate measurements, X is a matrix of attributes, B is a matrix 
containing parameters to be estimated and U is a matrix of error terms. The errors are assumed to 
be uncorrelated across measurements, and follow a multivariate normal distribution. In this case, 
where Y, B, and U are column vectors, the matrix equation above represents a multiple linear 
regression. Hypothesis tests with the general linear model are evaluated through the log 
likelihood function and model fit was evaluated with AIC score. 
 
(ii) Censored Regression (Tobit) Model 
 
Fishermen possess a utility function, which is increasing in z, the composite of all market goods 
and services; increasing in x in fishing access, and increasing in q, fishing quantity. The 
expenditure function, 𝑒 𝑝, 𝑐,𝐹, 𝑞,𝑢  results from expenditure minimizing, where {min 𝑝𝑧 +𝑐𝑥 + 𝐹 𝑠. 𝑡.𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑞)} , where the variable p is equal to the price of all goods, c is the cost 
of fishing, and F is the incremental cost of the Maine lobster license. The expenditure function is 
increasing in in p, c, F, and u but then decreasing in q through trap tag limits.  
 
It is required to hold a license, which in this analysis would come at a cost but also representing a 
measure of Hicksian surplus (Willig 1976). Holding quality constant, the WTP for access to the 
Maine lobster fishery is defined as the difference of two expenditure functions. One expenditure 
function represents the amount of expenditure needed to reach a reference utility level given the 
status quo scenario. The other expenditure function represents the expenditure needed to reach 
  52 
the new reference level of utility (i.e. possess a license), where the license purchase cost reaches 
the choke price, or 𝐹! , the maximum price that a fisherman is willing to pay to achieve this 
higher level of utility. 
 𝑊𝑇𝑃!!,! = 𝑒 𝑝, 𝑐,𝐹! , 𝑞,𝑢 −  𝑒(𝑝, 𝑐,𝐹 = 0, 𝑞,𝑢)     (2) 
 
This equation specifies that fishermen will compare the expenditures necessary to reach the 
reference level of having a Maine lobster license, and the WTP will be greater than or equal to 
zero, since 𝐹! > 𝐹 and 𝑞 <  𝑞∗.  
 
For our open-ended survey format, we calculate the arithmetic mean WTP as follows: 
 𝑥 =  !!!!!            (3) 
 
We further specify 𝑋! as a vector of variables z, that provide explanatory power for the WTP 
responses, and estimate a vector of corresponding coefficients 𝛽!, for i = 1, …, n respondents and 
to assign relative strength of the parameters of interest on the WTP value. The error term 𝑒! =  𝑢! +  𝑣!, is the sum of the individual error and the model effects error term.  
 
Where our WTP data do not allow for negative values, and we have a probability spike at zero, 
we can not estimate our vectors of coefficients by ordinary least squares regression, for it is 
likely to be inconsistent and likely to yield a downwards-biased estimate of the slope coefficient 
and an upward-biased estimate of the intercept. We therefore look to the Tobit model, originally 
proposed by James Tobin in (1958), which describes the relationship between a non-negative 
dependent variable and an independent variable or vector of variables, and for which Takeshi 
Amemiya (Amemiya 1979) has proven that the maximum likelihood estimator suggested by 
James Tobin is consistent. The model supposes that there is a latent (i.e. unobservable) variable 𝑦!∗, which linearly depends on 𝑦! via a parameter (vector), which determines the relationship 
between the independent variable (or vector) and the latent variable 𝑦!∗ as follows: 
 𝑦! = 𝑦!∗, 𝑦!∗ > 00       𝑦!∗ ≤ 0         (4) 
 
where 𝑦!∗is a latent variable: 
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 𝑦!∗ =  𝛽 𝑥! +  𝜀!;  𝜀!  ~ 𝑁(𝑜,𝜎!)        (5) 
 
The observable variable 𝑦! is defined to be equal to the latent variable 𝑦!∗ whenever the latent 
variable is above zero and, zero otherwise. There is also a normally distributed error term to 
capture random influences on this relationship. 
 
Next, let Φ be the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and ∅ to be the standard 
normal probability density function. For our data set with n observations, the likelihood function 
for this Tobit model is defined as:  
 ℒ 𝛽!,𝛽!,𝜎 =  ( !!!!!!  ∅ !!! !!! !!!!! )!!  (1−  Φ  !!! !! !!! )!! !!  (6) 
 
Where the values of 𝛽!, 𝛽!and 𝜎 are resolved to maximize the likelihood function and then taken 
as the Tobit estimators of the model parameters. The log likelihood function for this model is 
given by: 
 Log ℒ 𝛽!,𝛽!,𝜎 =  𝑦!!!!! log( !!  ∅ !!! !!! !!!!! )+ 1− 𝑦!  log (1−  Φ  !!! !! !!!  )  (7) 
 
Where the marginal effect of each parameter is interpreted by evaluating either (1) the change in 𝑦! for values above the limit, weighted by the probability of being above the limit, and (2) the 
change in probability of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of 𝑦! if above as 
follows: 
 
 ! !  !  ! )! !! =  𝛽!  Φ (!! !!  )         (8) 
 
We considered incentive compatibility, and tested to ensure effects were heterogeneous across 
respondents. 
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3.5 Empirical Approach 
 
Our regression analysis of the survey response data revealed insights into the demographic 
factors influencing the desired number of traps, should transferability be introduced to the 
licensing system and eliminate the cap on total number of traps per license. It also reveals factors 
influencing WTP estimates for a Maine lobster license, and trap tags on the part of non-license 
holders. We also observe specific attitudes towards the licensing system, which influence the 
different dependent variables, and interestingly these are different between the two primary 
survey groups. We first look at the responses to key demographics questions, as these inform the 
results of the modeled regressions.  
 
Table 3.2 Variable definitions for license holders model 
 
Name 
 
Definition 
AGE Age 
HOW_WORRIED Level of concern for fishery health. Category = 1 (low) to 4 (high) 
PCT_INC_FISH Percent income from fishing 
STABIL_LIC Stabilize the number of license holders in the fishery 
REDUC_LIC Reduce the number of license holders in the fishery 
STABIL_TRAPS Stabilize the number of traps fished in the fishery 
REDUC_TRAPS Reduce the number of traps fished in the fishery 
PROTECT_LOB Protect the lobster resource from depletion 
VIABLE_BIZ 
Ensure the financial viability of existing license holders by limiting 
participation 
ENTER_YOUNG 
Ensure that there is a mechanism for young people to obtain a 
lobster license 
ENTER_ADULT 
Ensure that there is a mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster 
license 
ZONE Zone A to G; binary no = 0 or yes = 1 
LIC_TYPE Category = 1 to 4 for ME License Type Class = l, II, III, LCO 
FED_EEZ_FLAG Federal EEZ (offshore) lobster license? No = 0 or yes = 1 
ELIM_LIC Eliminate latent licenses not fished 
ELIM_TAG1 Eliminate latent tags issued but not fished 
ELIM_TAG2 Eliminate latent tags not issued and not fished 
TRANSFER_Y Support transferability of license? No = 0 or yes = 1 
RESTRICT1 Restrict transferability? No = 0 or yes = 1 
QUOTA_Y Support for quota on overall pounds landed in ME 
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Table 3.3 Variable definitions for non-license holders model 
 
Name 
 
Definition 
L_TYPE Category = 1 to 4 for ME License Type Class = l, II, III, LCO 
EMPLOY Current level of employment; category = 1 to 4 
EDU Highest level of education; category = 1 to 5 
AGE Age 
INCOME Household income 
FTPT =1 if intending to lobster full time, 0 for part time 
WHY Category = 1 to 5; motivation 
WAIT_TIME Expected wait time to obtain license (yrs.) 
LN_INV_TRAPS Amount currently invested in lobster traps 
LN_INV_BOAT Amount currently invested in a lobster boat 
ZONE Maine lobster zone 
STABIL_LIC Stabilize the number of license holders in the fishery 
REDUC_LIC Reduce the number of license holders in the fishery 
STABIL_TRAPS Stabilize the number of traps fished in the fishery 
REDUC_TRAPS Reduce the number of traps fished in the fishery 
PROTECT_LOB Protect the lobster resource from depletion 
VIABLE_BIZ 
Ensure the financial viability of existing license holders by limiting 
participation 
ENTER_YOUNG 
Ensure that there is a mechanism for young people to obtain a 
lobster license 
ENTER_ADULT 
Ensure that there is a mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster 
license 
QUOTA_Y 
Support for quota on overall pounds landed in ME; binary no = 1 
yes = 1 
TRANSFER_Y Support transferability of license? No = 0 or yes = 1 
  
 
 
The variables used in the analyses are defined in tables 3.2 and 3.3, and we have called out 
several of the survey responses in the following section, as they help to directly inform the 
interpretation of the empirical models. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of the number of trap 
tags this group has indicated they wish to fish if admitted to the fishery. We see that the number 
of traps ranges from 0 to 2,000 with a spike at 800 traps desired, and again at 600 traps desired. 
A trap count of 1,200 was also seen, and in keeping with former trap limits allowed prior to the 
start of trap rationalization. Also notable are the number of fishermen who would fish between 
400 and 500 traps, a significant reduction from today’s 800 trap limit and perhaps an early 
indicator that efficiency of fishing effort over volume of fishing effort may be sought in the 
longer term. 
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Figure 3.6 Distribution of desired number of traps desired by existing license holders 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Number of trap tags desired by new entrants 
 
The distribution of the WTP_LIC responses shown in Figure 3.8 follow the distribution expected 
from an open-ended survey question, and the application of the Tobit model appears warranted. 
The distribution of the WTP_TAG estimates shown in Figure 3.9 also follows a truncated one-
tailed distribution, with a spike at one dollar. 
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Figure 3.8 Distribution of WTP responses for a Maine lobster license 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Distribution of WTP responses for a Maine lobster trap tag 
 
We have further calculated the mean WTP_LIC estimate, which on average for the entire 
population sampled is $16,665 (+/- $72,869). Differences in sub-groups provide some interesting 
insight into the length of amortization expected on this additional cost needed to achieve the 
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higher utility level of having a license, for each of the sub-groups and correlates with average 
age of the sub-groups sampled, and expected length of time to realize benefits associated with 
their higher utility.  
 
Table 3.4 Mean willingness-to-pay calculation for a license and trap tag by user group 
 
All Wait List Apprentice Student 
AVG AGE  27  38 36 14 
WTP_LIC $16,665 $6,037 $9,434 $28,160 
Std Dev. $72,869 $6,776 $16,092 $107,869 
Max. $1,000,000 $25,000 $100,000 $1,000,000 
     
WTP_TAG $1,896 $169 $213 $4,040 
Std Dev. $12,591 $1,250 $998 $18,703 
Max. $100,000 $10,000 $5,000 $100,000 
     
n =  203.0 64.0 49.0 90.0 
 
 
Table 3.5 Mean willingness-to-pay calculation for a license and trap tag by Zone 
 
WTP_LIC Std Dev Max WTP_TAG Std Dev Max n = 
Zone A  $10,554 $21,165 $100,000 $137 $800 $5,000 39 
Zone B $50,124 $170,923 $1,000,000 $10,347 $29,573 $100,000 34 
Zone C $8,113 $20,942 $100,000 $15 $34 $100 23 
Zone D $14,402 $27,142 $100,000 $441 $1,838 $10,000 36 
Zone E $10,649 $16,106 $50,000 $31 $118 $500 18 
Zone F $7,172 $11,233 $50,000 $414 $1,958 $10,000 26 
Zone G $6,817 $7,561 $25,000 $6 $8 $25 27 
 
In addition to the WTP estimates, we can evaluate the reported fishing effort intentions stated in 
the survey, and apply an economic impact multiplier to calculate a hypothetical economic value 
of the potential fisheries activity of members of waiting list. However, the vast uncertainties 
associated with the current exploitation rate of the resource by zone, potential conflict on the 
water, effectiveness of new entrants, and the market price response introduce too much 
variability to the model to allow for such generalizations to be used as absolute values and 
should be viewed to provide relative trend.  
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Table 3.6 Potential incoming capital investment to lobster fishery 
  Sample Responses (n=203) 
 
Expanded to full population 
 
Total Sum Desired Tags  
 163,492 653,968 
Total Current Assets – Gear 
 $946,495 $3,785,980 
Total Current Assets – Boat 
 $2,623,500 $10,494,000 
Potential Capital Investment 
in Traps $5,369,100 $21,476,400 
Potential Capital Investment 
in Boats $12,376,900 $49,507,600 
Total Potential Jobs 
 203 1,248 
Total Potential Earnings 
($25K ea.) $7,800,000 $31,200,000 
 
Total Additional License Revenue Possible to State of Maine 
 
$3,383,093 
 
We applied a simple expansion factor using the proportion of the population surveyed relative to 
the total population, which allows for a straight forward projection of this hypothetical potential 
incoming capital into the fishery as seen in table 3.6. Our survey penetration was 20.8% of the 
total population, for a total possible population 1,572 individuals seeking entry to the Maine 
lobster fishery. 
 
In Table 3.7 we see the differences in beliefs held by the two surveyed populations. For the 
license holders, the primary objective of the licensing system is to allow for students to enter the 
fishery, where the non-license holders place greater priority on ensuring entry for adults as well 
as students. Notable differences between the groups surface around the attitudes concerning 
financial protections provided to existing fishermen through the current limited entry system, 
with 50.1% of existing license holders reporting that ensuring for viable business is important, as 
opposed to the minority 23.2% of non-license holders who felt this was a top priority. Existing 
license holders also place much greater priority on reducing number of licenses and reducing 
number of traps than the non-license holders group. Both groups had over 50% strong agreement 
that the limited entry system goals should involve protection for the lobster resource. 
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Table 3.7 Comparison of surveyed groups’ priority ranking of limited entry system goals 
 
Name 
 
Statement 
% Strongly Agree 
License holders 
% Strongly Agree 
non-License holders 
STABIL_LIC Stabilize the number of license 
holders in the fishery 
52.5 39.9 
REDUC_LIC Reduce the number of license 
holders in the fishery 
36.1 15.7 
STABIL_TRAPS Stabilize the number of traps 
fished in the fishery 
45.8 41.5 
REDUC_TRAPS Reduce the number of traps fished 
in the fishery 
44.5 19.5 
PROTECT_LOB Protect the lobster resource from 
depletion 
50.2 51.4 
VIABLE_BIZ Ensure the financial viability of 
existing license holders by 
limiting participation 
50.1 23.2 
ENTER_YOUNG Ensure that there is a mechanism 
for young people to obtain a 
lobster license 
62.7 63.3 
ENTER_ADULT Ensure that there is a mechanism 
for adults to obtain a lobster 
license 
39.8 51.1 
 
 
Estimation of General Linear and Censored Regression Models 4.5.1 
 
The coefficients of the WTP model are estimated with a censored regression procedure as 
described in Greene (2000), using software package ‘R’ by CRAN, and the coefficients of the 
Q_Trap_Desired model are estimated with the general linear model procedure. 
 
Empirical Model Specifications 
 
(i) General Linear Model  
 
The general linear model functional form selected used to evaluate the desired number of traps 
for license holders in the Maine’s lobster industry is defined as: 
 𝑌! =  𝛽! +  𝛽! 𝑋! +⋯𝛽!  𝑋! +  𝜀!      (8) 
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We consider n observations of one dependent variable and p independent variables. Thus, Yi is 
the ith observation of the dependent variable, and i represents the ith lobsterman for i = 1, 2, … 
1,413, Xij is ith observation of the jth independent variable, j = 1, 2, ..., p. The values βj represent 
parameters to be estimated, and εi is the ith independent identically distributed normal error. 
 
For our study, we perform a multiple linear regression of the stated number of desired lobster 
traps for each lobsterman as our dependent variable, analyzing a combination of the 
demographics, and attitudes towards the licensing system goals for fishermen sampled in the 
Gulf of Maine inshore fishery to explain the variation observed, as follows: 
 𝑄!"#!!"#$ =  𝛽! 𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝛽! 𝐿𝐼𝐶!"#$ +  𝛽! 𝐹𝐸𝐷!!!!"#$ +  𝛽!𝐻𝑂𝑊!"##$%& + 𝛽! 𝑃𝐶𝑇!"!!"#$ + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿!"# +  𝛽! 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶!"# +  𝛽! 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿!"#$% + 𝛽! 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶!"#$% +  𝛽! 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇!"# +  𝛽!" 𝑉𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸!"# +  𝛽!! 𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅!"#$% + 𝛽!" 𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅!"#$% +  𝛽!" 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑀!"# +  𝛽!" 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑀!"#! + 𝛽!"  𝐸𝐿𝐼𝑀!"#! + 𝛽!" 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅! +  𝛽!" 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑇1+  𝜀  (9)  
  
The estimated parameters 𝛽!,𝛽!,… ,𝛽! are interpreted to represent the relative effect of each 
parameter on the dependent variable, as a one unit contribution to the value of the dependent 
variable. 
 
(ii) Censored Regression (Tobit) Model 
 
The censored regression functional form selected used to measure the willingness to pay for a 
lobster license of Maine’s lobster industry is defined as follows: 
 ln𝑌! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!  𝐗!" +  𝜀        (10) 
 
where Yi is the WTP response, and i represents the ith lobsterman for i = 1, 2, … 313 and Xji is a 
vector of variables, 𝛽k is a vector of corresponding coefficients to be estimated represents the 
demographic characteristics j used by each lobsterman. The estimated parameters 𝛽!,𝛽!,… ,𝛽! 
should not be interpreted as the effect of x on y, as one would with a linear regression model; 
instead they should be interpreted as the combination of (1) the change in y of those above the 
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limit, weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and (2) the change in the probability 
of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of y if above. 
3.6 Estimation Results and Discussion 
3.6.1  Desired Number of Traps Model 
 
We sought to determine the factors influencing the desired number of traps for existing 
lobstermen. As we see in table 3.8, we first evaluated a reduced model with demographic and the 
system goals attitude variables, labeled Model 1. 
 
Table 3.8 General linear model estimation results for desired number of traps 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Variable 
 
Coeff 
 
t-ratio 
  
Coeff 
 
t-ratio 
  
Coeff 
 
t-ratio 
 
(Intercept) 973.52 0.000 *** 851.83 0.000 *** 965.50 0.000 *** 
AGE -5.59 0.000 *** -6.00 0.000 *** -6.05 0.000 *** 
HOW_WORRIED 4.50 0.656  3.62 0.719  8.26 0.403  
PCT_INC_FISH -67.44 0.000 *** -48.66 0.000 *** -48.20 0.000 *** 
STABIL_LIC -6.51 0.098 . -5.84 0.130  -6.17 0.103  
REDUC_LIC -7.10 0.090 . -5.52 0.188  -7.44 0.069 . 
STABIL_TRAPS -1.17 0.765  -1.16 0.764  -0.91 0.811  
REDUC_TRAPS 11.85 0.003 ** 9.88 0.013 * 9.68 0.013 * 
PROTECT_LOB 2.17 0.560  1.07 0.771  0.72 0.842  
VIABLE_BIZ -4.66 0.220  -3.64 0.330  -0.16 0.965  
ENTER_YOUNG -4.13 0.239  -2.22 0.554  -2.37 0.519  
ENTER_ADULT 0.98 0.545  1.07 0.765  1.62 0.646  
LIC_TYPELC2    66.12 0.040 * 76.29 0.016 * 
LIC_TYPELC3    188.96 0.000 *** 210.69 0.000 *** 
LIC_TYPELCO    87.51 0.230  107.24 0.134  
LIC_TYPELCU    -85.96 0.550  -122.2 0.385  
FED_EEZ_FLAG       118.86 0.000 *** 
ELIM_LIC       -14.82 0.249  
ELIM_TAG1       -10.44 0.183  
ELIM_TAG2       18.69 0.100 . 
TRANSFER_Y       -24.34 0.022 * 
RESTRICT1       -3.33 0.000 *** 
n = 1413          
AIC 21310   21261   21209   
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
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This model performed well, and we see the AGE, PCT_INC_FISH, and trap and license 
reduction goals emerge as significant parameters. From these results, we see that fishermen who 
fish full time, are younger in age, and share in license and trap rationalization goals for the 
licensing system, are more likely to desire a higher trap count, should higher trap quantities 
become available through transferability, for example. 
 
In our second model, we then included the factors associated with the geographic location of 
their fishing effort, and the commercial license type they currently hold. This model was a 
slightly better fit for the data, driven by the strength of the license type parameter, specifically 
for those fishermen who bring 2 or 3 crew on board. The Zone variables were not found to 
contribute to the model and we did not present them in our results. For our final model 3, we 
dropped the non-significant variables from prior model runs, and added in the final set of 
attributed related specifically to their offshore fishing activity (i.e. do they hold a Federal 
offshore license as well) and their attitudes towards license and trap transferability, support for 
output controls in the form of a quota system, and efforts to eliminate latent effort and 
restrictions on transfers if allowed. Model 3 was the best fit to the data, and the variables 
FED_EEZ_FLAG, TRANSFER_Y and RESTRICT1 were found to be significant, suggesting 
that individuals who also fish offshore, believe in transferability with tight restrictions are more 
likely to desire a higher number of traps. 
 
3.6.2 Willingness-To-Pay Model for Maine Lobster License 
 
We sought to determine the foundation factors influencing the WTP estimates for a Maine 
Lobster license, on the part of non-license holders. As we see in table 3.9, we first evaluated a 
reduced model with demographic attributes only, labeled Model 1. This model performed well, 
and we see the AGE, INCOME, plus EMPLOY parameters emerge as significant parameters. As 
fishermen on the waiting list get older, for each year older our model predicts a .5% decrease the 
willingness-to-pay, and for a one-bracket shift in income our model predicts a 4% increase in 
willingness-to-pay. The education parameter did not emerge as a statistically significant variable, 
reflecting an underlying social factor in this fishery.     
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We next estimated an enhanced model, Model 2 in Table 3.9, which builds on Model 1 and 
includes parameters associated with future intentions and desired level of participation in the 
fishery, to determine additional factors influencing the WTP estimates for a Maine Lobster 
license.  
 
Table 3.9 Tobit model parameter estimates for willingness-to-pay for a license 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Variable 
 
Coeff 
 
p-value 
  
Coeff 
 
p-value 
  
Coeff 
 
p-value 
 
Intercept 8.112 0.000 *** 7.429 0.002 ** 12.991 0.000 *** 
L_TYPE 0.094 0.863  -1.638 0.123  -1.720 0.094 . 
EMPLOY -0.255 0.081 . -0.107 0.469  0.006 0.968  
EDU -0.095 0.581  -0.023 0.896  -0.140 0.408  
AGE -0.058 0.039 * -0.069 0.018 * -0.079 0.004 ** 
INCOME 0.405 0.052 * 0.354 0.098 . 0.359 0.100 . 
FTPT    -0.395 0.106  -0.532 0.023 * 
WHY    0.394 0.030 * 0.363 0.034 * 
WAIT_TIME    0.007 0.634  -0.001 0.961  
LN_INV_TRAPS    0.011 0.916  -0.063 0.517  
LN_INV_BOAT    0.168 0.153  0.199 0.078 . 
ZONE_A    2.926 0.079 . 2.875 0.076 . 
ZONE_B    4.553 0.012 * 5.058 0.004 ** 
ZONE_C    1.102 0.501  1.437 0.361  
ZONE_D    3.144 0.064 . 3.484 0.034 * 
ZONE_E    1.143 0.553  1.216 0.514  
ZONE_F    3.796 0.041 * 4.154 0.021 * 
ZONE_G    2.687 0.156  3.000 0.097 . 
STABIL_LIC       0.061 0.511  
REDUC_LIC       0.237 0.052 . 
STABIL_TRAPS       0.063 0.510  
REDUC_TRAPS       0.037 0.732  
PROTECT_LOB       -0.110 0.220  
VIABLE_BIZ       -0.192 0.061 . 
ENTER_YOUNG       0.197 0.034 * 
ENTER_ADULT       -0.144 0.096 . 
QUOTA_Y       -2.482 0.000 *** 
TRANSFER_Y       -0.230 0.346  
          
n = 313          
Log Likelihood  -521.52   -508.58   -494.75  
          
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
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This model also performed well, with LR likelihood ratio statistic exceeding critical chi-square, 
and indicating that Model represents the data better than Model 1 (p < .001). We see the AGE, 
and INCOME parameters emerge as again significant parameters, but EMPLOY is now not 
significant. The newly added variable WHY, which measures the intentions and reasons for 
entering the fishery, is significant in this model, and suggests that it is not so much current 
employment status but aspirations and desired goals of the fisherman that motivate the individual 
and influence WTP estimates. We also see strong regional parameters emerge as significant, 
suggesting certain fishing grounds may be more productive and therefore command a higher 
WTP. We see a 4.5% increase in WTP on the part of fishermen waiting to enter ZONE_B and a 
3.8% increase for ZONE_F, which correspond to fishing sites in relatively populated areas of the 
coast near Ellsworth and Casco Bay Portland, Maine. We note that WAIT_TIME has no impact 
on WTP, and LN_INV_BOAT also does not emerge as significant parameter in this model, 
which was a surprise where we might expect current capital investment to influence their 
motivation.  
 
In Model 3 of our analysis, we incorporated a series of attitude variables, which aim to quantify 
the goals for the limited entry licensing system. Model 3 outperformed both Model 1 and Model 
2, and was deemed a better fit to the data through likelihood ratio test (p < .001). Several new 
statistically significant parameters emerged in Model 3. The ENTER_YOUNG and 
VIABLE_BIZ parameters indicate that individuals who believe the licensing system should 
ensure for viable businesses, provide for the entry of adults, and who are open to a quota system 
are predicted to be willing to pay less for a lobster license than others who seem to favor the 
entry of young people to the fishery and believe the system should reduce the number of active 
license holders. We also see the LN_INV_BOAT parameter emerge as significant in this model, 
indicating that fishermen with higher current capital investment in a boat have a 2% higher WTP 
for a license. 
3.6.3 Willingness-To-Pay Model for Maine Lobster Trap Tag 
 
We further sought to determine the foundation factors influencing the WTP estimates for a 
Maine Lobster trap tag. As we see in table 3.10, we first evaluated a reduced model with 
demographic variables only, labeled Model 1. This model performed well, and we see the AGE, 
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and INCOME parameters emerge as significant parameters. Fishermen who are younger in age, 
and with higher income are more likely to desire a higher trap count, and the entry of young 
people parameter emerges as significant when we include it in Model 3, again reinforcing the 
community values around new entry to the fishery. 
 
Table 3.10 Tobit model parameter estimates for willingness-to-pay for a trap tag 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Variable 
 
Coeff 
 
p-value 
  
Coeff 
 
p-value 
  
Coeff 
 
p-value 
 
Intercept 1.365 0.000 *** 1.291 0.000 *** 1.228 0.000 *** 
L_TYPE 0.048 0.933  -0.525 0.626  -0.771 0.462  
EMPLOY -0.086 0.568  -0.026 0.864  -0.022 0.889  
EDU 0.275 0.115  0.292 0.105  0.296 0.095 . 
AGE -0.099 0.002 ** -0.087 0.008 ** -0.086 0.006 ** 
INCOME 0.916 0.000 *** 0.802 0.000 *** 0.686 0.002 ** 
FTPT    -0.434 0.095 . -0.529 0.036 * 
WHY    0.082 0.663  0.065 0.719  
WAIT_TIME    -0.004 0.784  -0.006 0.668  
LN_INV_TRAPS    0.009 0.934  -0.011 0.910  
LN_INV_BOAT    0.076 0.535  0.098 0.399  
ZONE_A    0.636 0.707  1.311 0.427  
ZONE_B    3.462 0.054 . 3.976 0.022 * 
ZONE_C    -0.408 0.809  -0.232 0.888  
ZONE_D    0.552 0.751  0.729 0.669  
ZONE_E    -0.851 0.675  -0.949 0.633  
ZONE_F    2.499 0.176  3.226 0.074 . 
ZONE_G    0.029 0.988  0.466 0.806  
STABIL_LIC       0.056 0.566  
REDUC_LIC       -0.102 0.406  
STABIL_TRAPS       -0.143 0.151  
REDUC_TRAPS       -0.010 0.928  
PROTECT_LOB       0.008 0.930  
VIABLE_BIZ       -0.129 0.227  
ENTER_YOUNG       0.178 0.065 . 
ENTER_ADULT       -0.012 0.890  
QUOTA_Y       -0.478 0.507  
TRANSFER_Y       0.381 0.114  
          
n = 313          
Log Likelihood  -312.15    -301.42    -219.2  
          
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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In Model 2, where we add the geographic and future intention parameters, we note fishermen 
seeking entry to Zones B have a 3.5% higher predicted WTP and in our final Mode 3 those 
entering Zone F also show a 3.2% higher WTP for a trap tag. The FTPT parameter also emerged 
as significant in both models, again reinforcing that future intentions of employment drive their 
behavior rather than their current status of employment. Again, we see the ENTER_YOUNG. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
We have summarized the results of two contingent valuation surveys: a survey of existing Maine 
lobstermen, and another survey of those waiting to enter the fishery. Through these surveys we 
described the willingness to pay for a Maine Lobster License, a Maine Trap tag, and quantified 
the potential additional incoming effort in the form of traps and vessel capital, should entry 
policies to the fishery be relaxed.  
 
We experienced several empirical problems commonly associated with survey research that 
necessitate further study of individual vessel level panel data. We recognize the limitations 
imposed by our survey design where the open-ended question format may have biased our 
estimates, given the potential for unrealistic responses of high value. Despite these problems, the 
statistical results presented confirm that waiting entrants and future Maine lobstermen are 
generally willing to pay for the privilege to fish. In addition, the modeling results provide-
insights about the community concerning the Maine limited entry-licensing program 
 
Willingness to pay for a Maine lobster license was calculated overall at $16,665 and is closely 
related to the age and intended fishing effort of the new entrant, with younger individuals willing 
to pay more. We also see a strong regional component to the WTP estimates, where certain 
fishing Zones command a higher WTP, such as Zone B, which was reported to be an average of 
$50,124. Other zone averages clustered more tightly around $10,000 WTP for a license. Our 
empirical modeling found that certain parameters for our WTP for a lobster license model are 
significant, and positively correlated with WTP, notably age and whether the individuals are 
seeking full time entry to the fishery. 
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Willingness to pay for a Maine lobster trap tag was estimated overall at $1,896 and is closely 
related to the age and intended fishing effort of the new entrant as well, with younger individuals 
willing to pay more. We also see a strong regional component to the WTP estimates, where again 
certain fishing Zones command a higher WTP, such as Zone B, which was reported to be an 
average of $10,347. Other zone WTP averages clustered more tightly between $5 and $400 for a 
trap tag. Our empirical modeling found that certain parameters for our WTP for a lobster license 
model are significant, and positively correlated with WTP, notably age and whether the 
individuals are seeking full time entry to the fishery. 
 
We see that the survey reported prioritization of limited entry system goals influences WTP 
estimates in different directions. The linkage between the endorsement for the goals and 
objectives of the licensing program and the WTP estimates is an extremely interesting result, for 
it underscores the importance of community outreach and education when devising licensing 
policies, and resource protection strategies. We see the goal of ensuring entry for young people 
emerge in all of our surveys, again reinforcing the strong community values around new entry to 
the fishery for young people, and maintaining generational access to the fishery. 
 
But this comes in juxtaposition with the education parameter in our analyses, where higher 
education is negatively correlated with WTP. The opportunity cost is higher for those individuals 
with higher education levels, and so this result is in keeping with expectations. It is important to 
note that the current licensing system has historically and unintentionally created a barrier to 
entry for the individuals who may have chosen to further their education after high school and 
prior to settling down for a full time lobstering career. These individuals may be more 
conservative or realistic in the amount of money they are willing to pay for a license and tags, 
given the possible future returns. The lower estimated amount of capital investment desired also 
supports the theory that they hold a more prudent perspective on the financial outlook of the 
profession with potentially greater insight into the unintended consequences of increased capital 
investment, and what it means for the long-term health of the resource.  
 
This fairness of access to the fishery, and the viability of the labor pool issue is a significant 
social issue for Maine to grapple with. From our surveys we see clear signals that Maine 
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lobstermen wish to protect the fabric of the existing fishing community and also preserve access 
to a traditional way of life. However, the age cohort structure of the fishing population reveals 
big gaps in participation by fishermen in their 30s and 40s and we see a strong pent up effort 
pool ready for entry and with it additional capital. The age structure of the current licensed 
fishing population reveals that a large proportion of the current population is aged between 50 
and 60 years old, and this group is nearing retirement age within the next 5 to 8 years. This 
suggests that exit from the fishery will accelerate, allowing an accelerated rate of entry into the 
fishery at that time. Therefore, the social concerns over excluding individuals from the fishery in 
the prime earnings years will likely be addressed through this natural attrition, and negate a need 
to change the policies for the sole purpose of fairness.  
 
The potential jobs associated with new entrants to the fishery however, both on the water and 
through ancillary professions, is a significant source of potential income for Maine and offers a 
cost recovery mechanism for fishery managers. Our survey revealed that a potential 1,200 
individuals are willing to fish an additional 654,000 trap tags, which would contribute an 
additional $3.3 million in trap tag and license fees per year. The incoming entrants are estimated 
to be willing to capitalize new lobster businesses for a total of $49 million in boats and $21 
million in gear, and generate an additional $31 million in annual wages, based on a per job 
average of $25,000/year. The incremental ratio of this added and investment and fishing effort in 
the Maine lobster fleet could be either to offset exiting license holders capital holdings and create 
a source for capital malleability, or it could further split the fishery into proportionally smaller 
allocations of resource access, and declining profitability for all. 
 
Our analyses reveal that in addition to entry for young people, both existing fishermen and those 
seeking entry, fifty percent of the study population responded that a licensing system should 
function primarily for the purpose of managing fishing effort, stabilizing and reducing the 
number of licenses, and ensuring the viability of lobster businesses. A clear opposition attitude 
towards the idea of output controls emerged though and surprisingly, we found that only 50.2% 
of existing license holders and 51.4% of non-license holders indicated that ensuring the health of 
the resource was a goal of the licensing system. Maine lobster governance and resource 
protection of the future will require amendment as the fishery faces changes associated with 
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climate shifts, and the results of our surveys provide insights into the goals of the community, 
which will be critical considerations.  
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INVENTORY HOLDINGS ON EX-VESSEL IN-
SEASON PRICE IN THE MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
In 2012, abnormally warm water temperatures in the Gulf of Maine pushed the start date of the 
lobster harvest season an average of 25 days earlier than normal, and created a high landings 
scenario during a compressed time period. The Maine fishery saw an average of 109% increase 
in landings over prior year, which then also coincided with the peak of the Canadian lobster 
season. The market responded with an average 40% decrease in price and fisherman’s 
profitability decreased significantly. This study analyzes Maine’s ex-vessel lobster prices, as a 
primary driver of vessel profitability, and with rent return implications for the fishery. Classic 
fisheries economics has assumed a stable price of output as a component of the social 
optimization for a fishery; advances in modeling techniques have sought to relax this 
assumption. This research builds on these advances and provides a case study for how price 
impacts rent returns in a volume-driven fishery, and further highlights the need for a robust 
policy platform to ensure continued resource health of the resource and to optimize fleet 
capacity. We considered the timing of Maine lobster landings and the seasonality of the 
Canadian lobster supply to show to what extent these factors impact the lobster ex-vessel price 
and how prices respond to landings anomalies such as those created by climate related impacts 
on the fishery. The monthly ex-vessel prices, trade of processed lobster between U.S. and 
Canada are compiled to specify a price function for U.S. wholesale lobster market, based on soft 
shell high volume product. This study provides an example of how the timing of the U.S. and 
Canadian lobster landings can have unintended consequences for markets and supplies, thereby 
calling for specific management objectives to reduce oversupply and maximize product quality 
and meat yield, as well as reduce capacity in the fishery. The intertwined objectives of business 
viability and resource sustainability lie at the intersection of this ex-vessel price. New policies 
may be needed as the environment alters traditional harvest patterns and expectations of the 
fishery, leading to changes in the economic return of the fishery with consequences for the 
community. 
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4.2 Introduction  
 
The Maine lobster fishery provides over 6,000 jobs to the Maine economy and is an important 
economic driver for the state of Maine (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). Nearby Canada also 
supports a large lobster fishing industry, with similar revenues and trends as the U.S. fishery, 
although under different production economics and governance. The combined global valuation 
of these two dominant markets places the American lobster (Homarus americanus) as the most 
valuable fishery in North America. Profit maximizing firm behavior within this fishery exhibits 
sensitivity to ex-vessel price (Thunberg 2007), which can be observed through the U.S. vessel 
level production functions (Holland 2011). Recently observed climate change (Mills et al. 2013) 
has altered the supply and demand market relationships, with a price response, a trend likely to 
continue. We propose that ex-vessel price response is a key variable in fishing vessel profits and 
optimization of resource rent return from the fishery (Gordon 1954).  
 
In the Gulf of Maine we saw an unprecedented increase in sea surface temperature (SST) in 
2012, revealing a complex set of interactions between the natural, human and market systems felt 
with previous fisheries in the region (Pershing et al. 2015). The Maine lobster fishery 
experienced an unseasonably warm spring, which led to an early spring season for the Maine 
lobster industry across all Maine Lobster management Zones (Mills, et al. 2013). We saw an 
earlier spring molt, likely a metabolic response to the increased temperature (Drinkwater et al. 
1996), and suspect changes in mortality, and susceptibility to lobster shell disease, based on 
experiences in other regions such as Long Island Sound (Tanaka et al. 2017; Palmer 2014; 
Pearce and Balcom 2005). This change in the ecological systems was rapidly followed by a shift 
in the timing of the lobster harvest, as well as a shift in the centroid representing the spatial 
distribution of the harvest (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources).  
 
This led to a period of dramatic Maine lobster harvest abundance increase in Maine, which has 
been unfettered by policy constraints, and has led to significant variability in the ex-vessel price 
per pound, directly correlating with volume (Dicolo and Friedman 2012; Barten and Bettendorf 
1989). Compressed time periods and seasonal spikes in landings have sparked political unrest 
and competition between U.S. and Canadian lobstermen for limited Canadian processing 
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capacity for the soft shell lobster product in 2012 (Woodward 2012), potentially creating a 
combined supply and demand challenge. Vessel level profitability was reported to decrease in 
the wake of 2012 price deflation, (personal communication, Dayton and Sun) and led to an 
intensification of winter fishing, as well as an increase in the distance traveled to harvest lobsters 
from inshore to offshore during periods of higher price yields (Maine Dept. of Marine 
Resources). Feedback between the human and natural coupled system has been observed (Liu et 
al. 2007; Lehuta et al. 2014; Xue et al. 2008; Incze et al. 2010) increasing pressure on the lobster 
and bait resources, likely at a declining rate of return to the economy (Fogarty and Gendron 
2004). Prior research has shown that entry restriction controls only one of the inputs used to 
produce fishing effort, leading to expansions of effort, participation in the fishery, or other 
production inputs which lie on the uncontrolled margins of the production environment (Deacon 
et al. 2011). The net result of this lack of controls is a derby effect, which can have 
counterintuitive effects on behavior and in turn pushes the industry toward too much effort as ex-
vessel price increases (Deacon et al. 2011). The study of ex-vessel price becomes therefore 
critical to the understanding of this economic system of a fishery. 
 
The classical study of fisheries economics, pioneered in the 1950’s (Gordon 1953, 1954), and 
applied to countless fisheries in the U.S. has generally allowed for fishery rent maximization 
analysis which assumes a fixed price of output in a perfectly competitive market. Gordon (1953) 
suggested that social maxima in a fishery can be achieved where the marginal revenue of output 
(MRQ), is equal to the marginal cost of output (MCQ). The concept of a received doctrine model 
provides tools for managing the fishery at a socially optimal level, where total revenue of effort 
(TRE) is equal to total cost of effort (TCE) (Anderson 1973; Andersen 1982). But this model 
framework assumes that the output of the fishery does not change and a that price is fixed. This 
limitation potentially leads to bias in determining the social optimum for a commodity fishery, 
especially where commodity products are known to have a high degree of price volatilility 
(Pindyck 2004). 
 
Price variability can have significant impacts on the profitability of the fishing industry, as well 
as the rents derived from the fishery, and the participation rates. Further seminal work by 
economists (Copes 1972) relaxed the assumptions of price in the Gordon model, and allows for a 
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study with variable price of output yielding new techniques for fishery economists (Norman-
López et al. 2014; Barten and Bettendorf 1989). In our research we contribute an understanding 
of the relationship between price and the shifts in the underlying resource harvest and supply 
changes driven by climate variability. We seek to understand the price determinants in the Maine 
lobster fishery, which will allow us to assess the vessel level proftability and characterize the 
vessel level economics of the fishery, with implications for policy to optimize rent returns from 
the fishery. We conclude with a discussion of maximum economic yield (MEY) as potential 
management reference point for the Maine lobseter fishery, and a potential policy reform 
framework that builds on the experience of other jurisdictions (Anderson 1973; Copes 1972; 
Gardner et al. 2014; Reid et al. 2013). 
4.3 Background 
 
Maine lobster landings have increased each year for the past decade as shown in figure 4.1. 
However, the trend of increased landings has occurred at a time of year when community 
demand for luxury goods such as lobster, during back-to-school fall time period are low, as seen 
in figure 4.2. In the months following recent peak Maine harvest in October, there is a lag until 
Christmas and New Year’s, which present the first major demand opportunity. This is followed 
by the traditional Chinese New Year in late January, but again this demand period is four months 
offset with peak harvest. Recently, we’ve observed expansion of the Chinese market in particular 
(Lindkvist et al. 2008), with early October festivals in Asia such as the popular Chinese 
weddings period, which has offered a new source of demand but its unclear if this can absorb all 
of the recent supply excess.  
 
This timing mismatch between supply and demand has been a perennial problem for the lobster 
industry in both the U.S. and Canada, and has led to efforts such as holding lobsters in salt ponds 
over a period of time until markets or quality were optimal, a practice called ‘pounding’. In the 
past decade though, Maine has moved away from pounding practices, favoring direct disposition 
of live product into the wholesale and retail markets (MIELDA). However, under recent shifts in 
harvest patterns (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources), Maine’s late November harvest may not be 
fully absorbed by the market and therefore has potentially contributed to stored frozen inventory 
holdings over the winter months. Efforts to bolster consumer demand for lobster product in a 
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variable luxury goods market may have offset this effect to some degree (Maine Marketing 
Collaborative).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 U.S and Canadian lobster landings and ex-vessel price for period 1950 - 2014 
 
As an additional source of lobster supply, we consider the similar pattern of increased harvest 
volume, which has been occurring in the Canadian lobster fishery as suggested by figure 4.1. 
Ongoing trade flow of product in a variety of forms has been observed between the two 
countries, and product substitution effect has likely been observed in the U.S. through alternate 
product forms imported from Canada (Fig 4.2). Previous studies have examined the impact that 
Canadian firm lobster pounding has on U.S. ex-vessel price (Cheng and Townsend 1993) and 
showed that this product did contribute to overall product volume spikes due to product 
substitution for fresh harvest lobster, with clear impacts on U.S. lobster in-season ex-vessel 
price.  
 
Equally important to consider in a homogenous product fishery, are the supply chain dynamics, 
(Plagányi et al. 2014). The quality of the landed lobster product varies by season, affecting the 
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meat yield and therefore ex-vessel price paid by the wholesaler. The Maine live lobster market is 
divided between low price new shell product, which makes up about 75% of landings, and the 
more valuable hard shell lobster market, which makes up 8% of landings. Approximately 17% is 
ungraded (Maine Lobstermen’s Association). The new shell is typically caught between July and 
the end of November and is predominantly for the summer and fall restaurant market and the 
processing sector. The new shell season has been extending earlier in the summer in recent years, 
associated with the observed changes in climate, and of consequence and importance from a 
value and market loss perspective, as well as price response. 
 
The soft shell product, which does not have the needed resilience to withstand the added 
transport for the live market and as much as 20% shrink, will be sold and transported to a 
primary processor, historically in Canada during their closed season, where it is typically 
processed into lobster meat product. The meat yield tends to be as low as 37% of the harvest 
weight, and provides meat that is the sold to a second value-added processor as filling for pasta, 
for example, or canned meat product, at a lower price near $7.00/lb (Maine Lobsterman’s 
Association 2015). The various players in the supply chain deduct the expected 20% loss from 
the price, from the dock to the wholesaler, adding to the buyer power of the dealers. The hard 
shell product is typically harvested in winter months November through early June, and tends to 
be more resilient to transport with a meat yield as high as 85% of the harvested weight, and 
supplies a market that commands higher prices, near $20.00/lb. There has also been increased 
market segmentation in recent years, with an increase in added value products1and improved 
transport methods, all demonstrating the value and possibility of increased market access through 
product segmentation and the existence of new market opportunities for further product 
specialisms.  
 
The observed volatility in early season June ex-vessel price in years 2011 – 2016 calls for 
stabilization in supply rather than peaks in production, and research into other crustacean trap 
fisheries has shown this can lead to higher rent returns (Gardner et al. 2014). In Maine however, 
harvesters are by law not allowed to collude on price or volume (Sullivan 2000) and limited 
                                                1	Retail	ventures	such	as	Shucks	Maine	Lobster,	Calendar	Island	Lobster,	Catch	a	Piece	of	Maine	and	Linda	Bean’s	Maine	Lobster.	
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entry does not limit the extraction rates, only the number of participants, and so the fishery 
effectively operates as a regulated open access fishery with sole ownership (Copes 1972). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Monthly Maine lobster landings and ex-vessel Prices 2011- 2016 
 
Given a future increasing volume trajectory for the fishery, the question remains as to how much 
of the product can be dealt with through existing supply chains, and how much of the product 
needs increased demand and access for the conventional and less specialist market. On a 
declining volume trajectory, the question remains how much is there available for the current 
level of fleet capitalization to derive a living.  
 
Under these circumstances, we hypothesize that the in-season ex-vessel price the wholesaler is 
willing to pay a harvester will depend on the existing inventory held, the mix of hard and soft 
shell product coming in, balanced with the market demand and price received in the retail 
market. The price received by the wholesaler is a function of the consumer income, seasonal 
patterns affecting consumption rates, and any product substitution opportunities.  
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4.4 Ex-Vessel Pricing Model Empirical Estimation 
 
Theoretical Model 
According to economic theory, firms will behave as profit maximizers, and their supply decision 
is guided by the relationship where marginal cost of supply is equal to or less than marginal 
return of supply. Should a price-taking firm be faced with a market price below “shut-down 
price”, the profit maximizing decision would be to produce nothing. A price that allows for 
production at a level above the marginal cost of output is likely to lead to continued supply 
operations by the firm, even though profits may be negative when fixed costs are considered. 
 
In our study, we propose that the price the wholesaler is willing to pay a harvester will depend on 
the existing inventory held, the mix of hard and soft shell product coming in, balanced with the 
market demand and price received in the retail market. Based on prior research examining price 
changes in response to changes in lobster supply due to minimum size decrease (Wang and 
Kellogg 1988), we hypothesize that the price received by the wholesaler is a function of the 
consumer income, seasonal patterns affecting consumption rates, and any product substitution 
opportunities. The ordinary least squares regression functional form using log-log transformed 
data is selected used to measure this price response of Maine’s lobster industry is defined as: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃! =  𝛽! +  𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑋! +  𝜀!!!"!!!      (6) 
 
 
where, 
 
Px is the observed average monthly ex-vessel price, and i represents the ith month of the year for 
i = 1, 2, … 12 and Xi represents the amount of input of total lobster catch in each month plus 
other explanatory variables. We further assume a normally distributed error term 𝑁 (0,𝜎!). 
 
The estimated parameters 𝛽!,𝛽!,… ,𝛽!  represent relative contribution of each factor to the 
wholesale price, with each observation reflecting the total by month of each of the factors 
examined, for the actively fishing population across Maine. We interpret the percentage change 
in price, resulting from a 1% change of the model parameters.  
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Empirical Estimation 
 
The main purpose for modeling the lobster markets is to evaluate the impact of dealer inventories 
held over in frozen form from prior year, on in-season ex-vessel price paid to harvesters. We use 
a multiple linear regression model, to look at a variety of factors that may influence harvester ex-
vessel price. We consider factors such as seasonality of product demand, including summer 
tourism season in Maine, Chinese weddings in October, and summer restaurant peaks in 
consumption. We compare the inventory holdings parameters in models run for two separate 
time periods, to assess the recent impact of climate driven volume changes since 2011. 
 
We specify U.S. ex-vessel price (Pt), as a function of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a 
proxy for consumer income, three seasonal variables to capture effect of seasonality in demand 
(SD1, SD2, SD3), lagged inventories (Qt-1), landings in U.S. (Qt), and frozen meat (QCAN_Z) 
and live (QCAN_NZ) imports from Canada as follows: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃!!" = 𝑓(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃, SD1, SD2, SD3, 𝑙𝑛𝑄!!!!" , 𝑙𝑛𝑄!!", 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝐶𝐴𝑁_𝑍, 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝐶𝐴𝑁_𝑁𝑍)    (1) 
 
We use the demand shifters to capture seasonal peaks in the market, where SD1 is a binary 
variable to represent the months July through September; SD2 represents the months with 
holidays including October, December, and January. All other months are considered SD3. We 
have also included live imports from Canada as a factor in our regression, on the basis that while 
live product forms of lobster sold in to the U.S. tend to immediately flow into the retail market 
directly, this could still affect market demand, and therefore U.S. ex-vessel price. We have used 
a log-linear functional form for our model evaluation, and ordinary least squares regression.  
 
Data Sources  
NOAA Office of Science and Technology was the source for U.S. lobster landings and values. 
Within the Office of Science and Technology website, the foreign trade section provided U.S. 
lobster imports from Canada in terms of landings and total value. U.S. ex-vessel prices and 
lobster trade prices from Canada were calculated by dividing total value of landings volume. The 
Department of Oceans and Fisheries Canada, Statistics group and web site were the source of 
exports to the U.S. and other countries, with notable implications in the timing of these exports 
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to the United States and for impact on trade. The other variables included in the regressions were 
economic indicators. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research and Data section was the 
source for the U.S. personal consumption index, U.S. and GDP. 
 
The model is estimated with monthly data during two separate time periods, to enable 
comparison and contrast. We have a pre-2011 model for time period 1990 – 2010 and a second 
model post-2011, for time period from January 2011 – December 2016. Data on prices and 
income are in real terms. 
4.5 Results  
 
We first analyzed the broad trends in the data. In figures 4.2 and 4.3 we see the annual trade 
patterns of the U.S. and Canada, and observe an increase in exports for both countries. In figure 
4.4, we see the annual spring large influx of Canadian live lobsters to the U.S., and in figure 4.5 
we observe a pattern that supports the findings of Maine caught, Canadian processed, and 
shipped back to the U.S., lobster meat which coincides at times with Maine’s opening of the 
annual live harvest market.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 U.S. Lobster exports 1990 - 2013 by lobster product type 
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Figure 4.4 Canadian lobster exports 1990 – 2013 by lobster product type 	
 
 
Figure 4.5 Value of monthly Canadian exports to U.S., Asia, and EU for years 2015 - 2016  
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Figure 4.6 Monthly Canadian live lobster exports to U.S. 2005 - 2016 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Monthly Canadian processed lobster exports to U.S. 2005 - 2016 
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Figure 4.8 Average monthly volume of processed Canadian lobster exports to U.S.  
 
In figure 4.5 we see a significant change in the post -2011 import pattern of Canadian frozen and 
processed products, especially in the second half of the year and with a peak in June; this was a 
statistically significant difference from pre-2011 import patterns (ANOVA p < .05, F = 4.386), 
and we hypothesize that this contributes to the influences on U.S. ex-vessel price in new ways. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Average monthly volume of live Canadian lobster exports to U.S.  
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Figure 4.10 U.S. annual lobster exports to China 2005 - 2017  
 
U.S. exporters have increased their export volume for both the processed product form and the 
live product form since 2011 with 7,000,000 kg exported to China in 2017 (Fig 4.10) and 
2,000,000 kg exported to Hong Kong in 2017 (Fig 4.11). This is the result of improved handling 
and shipping practices since 2016, which have decreased shipping mortality significantly. A 
decrease in processed product lobster exports was observed as a result of this change in shipping 
practices.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 U.S. annual lobster exports to Hong Kong 2005 - 2017  
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Empirical Model Results & Discussion 4.5.1 
 
The following regression models were run to explain the determinants and factors influencing 
wholesale price and ex-vessel price in the Maine lobster fishery:  
 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑃!!" =  𝛿! +   𝛿!𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛿!SD1+  𝛿!SD2+  𝛿!SD3+  𝛿!𝐿𝐴𝐺_𝑄𝑇 +  𝛿!𝑄𝑇+  𝛿!𝐿𝑁_𝑄𝐶𝐴𝑁_𝑍 + 𝛿!𝐿𝑁_𝑄𝐶𝐴𝑁_𝑁𝑍 +  𝜀 
 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for the pre-2011 
and post-2011 periods respectively. Variables were log transformed to allow for the range of 
variation observed and to account for different scales within the data. Our models performed 
well, and accounted for a significant proportion of the variance observed. We analyzed model 
performance using AIC score to improve on the fit.  
Table 4.1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the period pre-2011 
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev 
LN_P Ex-vessel price per pound 1.34 0.258 
LN_QT Lbs. of Maine lobster landed  15.08 1.155 
LAG_QT Lagged lbs. of Maine lobster landed  15.08 1.155 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 10,580 3134 
LN_QCAN_Z Lbs. Canadian frozen imports to U.S. 9.22 0.3093 
LN_QCAN_NZ Lbs. Canadian non-frozen imports to U.S. 14.56 0.9940 
SD1 Seasonal Demand Dummy 1 (yes=1/0) 0.5 0.25 
SD2 Seasonal Demand Dummy 2 (yes=1/0) 0.25 0.25 
 
Table 4.2 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the period post-2011 
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev 
LN_P Ex-vessel price per pound 1.41 0.23 
LN_QT Lbs. of Maine lobster landed  15.41 1.06 
LAG_QT Lagged lbs. of Maine lobster landed  15.41 1.06 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 17,107 3120 
LN_QCAN_Z Lbs. Canadian frozen imports to U.S. 14.47 0.521 
LN_QCAN_NZ Lbs. Canadian non-frozen imports to U.S. 15.14 0.7520 
SD1 Seasonal Demand Dummy 1 (yes=1/0) 0.5 0.25 
SD2 Seasonal Demand Dummy 2 (yes=1/0) 0.5 0.25 
 
For our pre-2011 time period analysis, the reduced model was first applied to establish a baseline 
of seasonal landings to volume relationships coupled with consumer confidence measures of 
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well-being and based on in-season effort, and catch rates. The results of our regression are shown 
in Table 4.3, model 1. This model fit the data well based on AIC score, and our estimated 
parameter for the effect of in-season quantity of product available was 0.138, which indicates 
that a 1% increase in the quantity of in-season landings contributes to a 13.8% decrease in price. 
The model also included seasonal demand shifters, dummy variables, which were both found to 
be significant and in keeping with expectation that certain months of the year will command a 
higher price; SD1 and SD2 coefficients were estimated at -0.08 and -0.07 and account for 
seasonal demand peaks contributing an 8% and 7% respectively, price improvement during the 
months associated with seasonal demand over non-seasonal demand months.  
 
For model 2 we then included the lagged quantity parameter, which is presented in Table 4.3. 
This variable is intended to capture the effect of over-supply against market demand, which 
would lead to inventory holdings. The estimated parameter, -0.06, reflects the negative 
correlation with price as expected, and we also observed a decrease in the SD1, SD2, and QT 
parameters with the addition of the lagged quantity variable. In model 3 we included the 
Canadian export quantities to the U.S., and found an overwhelming influence of the Canadian 
live lobster, which is exported according to a regular annual trade pattern as observed in figures 
4.2 through 4.6. This trend is felt in the LN_QCAN_NZ model parameter coefficient of 2.126, 
with model performance improving significantly over prior estimations as a result of the 
inclusion of this parameter. This was a surprise, but also shows that the incoming product from 
Canada in historical times was a positive influence on price in the U.S., likely because the 
increased marketing activities on the part of the Canadians in the U.S. also bore a benefit on the 
U.S. product demand, where supply did not historically outpace demand. All but one set of 
parameters in our analysis emerged as significant variables at the 5% confidence level, and our 
model accounts for 75.3% of the observed variability in ex-vessel price. 
 
Among the models, we also observe a trade-off between the seasonal demand shifter dummy 
variables, which were significant as parameters in our study initially in model 1, as were the 
quantity of U.S. product landed initially. In model 2, this was then offset against the lagged 
landings variable in our analysis, which became significant, and accounts for a greater proportion 
of the variation observed than the seasonal demand shifters. Model 3 indicates that supply 
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volume drivers associated with combined U.S. and Canadian product landings overwhelmingly 
outweigh the market demand influences on ex-vessel price and multiple sources of product 
substitutions correlate with this negative relationship to ex-vessel price. 
 
The variable definitions for our post-2011 analysis are found in Table 4.2, and model run 
parameters estimations are presented in Table 4.4. Our models performed well, and accounted 
for a significant proportion of the variance observed. We analyzed model performance to 
improve on the fit, using AIC score. Model 3 outperformed the other models based on the AIC 
score of -310.62. The reduced model 1 was first applied to establish a baseline of seasonal 
landings to volume relationships coupled with our seasonal demand and consumer confidence 
measures of well-being and based on in-season effort, and catch rates. This model fit the data 
well and suggests that a 1% increase in the quantity of in-season landings contributes to a 15.3% 
decrease in price. The model also included seasonal demand shifters, dummy variables, which 
were both found to be significant and in keeping with expectation that certain months of the year 
will command a higher price; SD1 and SD2 coefficients were estimated at -0.20% and -0.167% 
and account for seasonal demand peaks. As compared to the pre-2011 models, we see a 
significant increase in the relative strength of the seasonal demand parameters, which show an 
order of magnitude increase over pre-2011 estimations. This demonstrates a significant change in 
supply to demand relationship between the two time periods in our study. 
  
For model 2 we then included the lagged quantity parameter LN_LAG_QT, which was 
significant with an estimated coefficient of -0.065 and similar to the pre-2011 analysis results, 
captures some of the variance previously captured in the seasonal demand dummies. Model fit 
was also strong, as evaluated with AIC score comparison. 
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Table 4.3 Price Model Parameter Estimation Results pre-2011 (1990 – 2010) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Variable Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  
             
(Intercept) 2.960 18.65 *** 3.199 18.17 *** -13.570 -7.81 *** -13.680 -7.85 *** 
LN_QT -0.138 -11.71 *** -0.093 -5.00 *** -0.100 -7.49 *** -0.106 -6.43 *** 
LN_LAG_QT    -0.066 -3.07 ** -0.080 -5.90 *** -0.085 -4.54 *** 
GDP -.0005 15.58 *** -.0005 16.19 *** -0.0002 -7.19 *** 0.0002 -7.24 *** 
LN_QCAN_NZ       2.126 9.82 *** 2.165 9.83 *** 
LN_QCAN_Z       -0.002 -2.55 * -0.003 -2.74  
SD1 -0.079 -2.53 * -0.021 -0.57     -0.029 0.87  
SD2 -0.084 -3.04 ** -0.008 -0.21     -0.007 0.21  
             
             
AIC -239.23   -245.48   -310.62   -306.52   
df = 4   4   5   7   
F-statistic 122.8   122.8   160.8   114.6   
R2 = 0.6479   0.6479   0.753   0.7521   
Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
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Table 4.4 Price Model Parameter Estimation Results post-2011 (2011 – 2016) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Variable Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  Coefficient t -value  
             
(Intercept) 2.013 6.28 *** 2.234 2.23 *** 4.157 7.69 *** 4.168 -7.85 *** 
LN_QT -0.152 -8.82 *** -0.129 -0.10 *** -0.133 -4.86 *** -0.148 -6.43 *** 
LN_LAG_QT    -0.065 -0.06 * -0.100 -4.42 *** -0.086 -4.54 ** 
GDP 0.000 7.15 *** 0.000 7.34 *** 0.000 8.86 *** 0.000 7.24 *** 
LN_QCAN_NZ        -0.097 -2.84 *** -0.093 -2.58 *** 
LN_QCAN_Z         -0.061 -2.18 ** -0.071 -2.16 ** 
SD1 -0.207 -3.79 *** -0.133 -0.13 *    -0.032 0.87  
SD2 -0.167 -3.15 *** -0.074 -0.07     -0.056 0.21  
             
             
AIC -73.642   -77.102   -86.165   -83.178   
df = 4   5   5   7   
F-statistic 68.53   59.3   69.03   48.62   
R2 = 0.7919   0.6479   0.8273   0.8244   
Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
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In model 3 we incorporate the influence of the Canadian live and frozen lobster, which is 
imported according to a regular annual trade pattern as observed in figures 4.2 through 4.6. This 
is captured in the LN_QCAN_NZ, and LN_QCAN_Z model parameter coefficients, which 
previously were a positive contribution to the price in the pre-2011 model, and now emerge as 
negative parameters at -0.097 and -0.061 respectively, with model performance improving 
significantly over prior estimations as a result of the inclusion of these parameters based on 
improved AIC score. This model was statistically different relative to the base model and 
supports our hypothesis that post-2011 price is now responding negatively to the additional 
supply incoming from Canada as a result of over-supply. All but one set of parameters in our 
analysis emerged as significant variables at the 5% confidence level, and our model accounts for 
potentially 82.73% of the observed variability in U.S. ex-vessel price.  
 
We again in all of the model runs observe a trade-off between the seasonal demand shifter 
dummies, which were significant as parameters in our study initially in model 1, and then offset 
against the lagged landings variables in our analysis, and the incoming Canadian supply, which 
accounts for a greater proportion of the variation observed than the seasonal demand shifters. 
Our model indicates that supply volume drivers overwhelmingly outweighed the market demand 
influences on ex-vessel price post 2011 and multiple sources of product substitutions correlate 
with this negative relationship to ex-vessel price. This differs from the pre-2011 analysis when a 
positive effect was felt due to the different supply sources. These results provide an insight into 
the effects of climate mediated changes in lobster landings patterns, and suggests significant 
changes in the demand to supply function for the U.S. lobster industry that will lead to continued 
price effects. 
 
In 2016, researchers unveiled new forecasting tools and prediction in February, which called for 
an early season and repeat landings pattern to 2012, and prices immediately dropped sharply 
with dealers citing a devaluation of their inventories associated with a high volume forecast. The 
subsequent season ex-vessel prices within the 2016 did not follow the pattern observed in 2012, 
instead rebounding and sustained over the long term, despite the record setting harvest levels of 
the fishery at 131 million pounds for 2016. We examine these two scenarios, and hypothesize 
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that stored inventories in response to late season increased landings drive a significant portion of 
the ex-vessel price paid to harvesters. The use of forecasting tools can aid harvesters in their 
ability to plan and manage their effort, and in turn causes a re-valuation of inventory holdings. 
The counter-intuitive impact of this scenario is to improve the financial profitability of the 
harvesting sector, as they improve their leverage with dealers and purge latent inventory impacts 
caused by frozen or pounded product but at lower cost to the dealer. Because the harvester 
benefits, the resource extraction rate is then likely to decrease, or stabilize, and in turn benefit of 
the lobster population. 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
Lobster landings have increased significantly since 1997, but for many years since 2004 the 
market did not absorbed the expanded supply and the economic downturn was particularly 
difficult for the lobster market, resulting in lower price per pound. The Maine lobster industry 
has faced extraordinarily strong “buyer power” as all players struggle to sell the same 
undifferentiated and commoditized product and maximize revenue through volume, and a strong 
rivalry among various lobster industry constituents confounds efforts to address market 
challenges to the industry. This has had a negative price effect and hurt the overall profitability 
of the U.S. lobster industry in a highly competitive worldwide marketplace.  
 
The State funded Marketing Initiative has the potential to change this pattern, and trade relations 
with Asia and Europe can also invigorate demand for Maine’s staple export, but without 
stabilization of the overall supply of lobster, it is expected that any further expansion of the 
supply in the peak months, especially in the second quarter (April – June), and then again in the 
fourth quarter (Oct – Nov), is likely to result in further price deflation and have a further negative 
effect on individual profitability. Further research into the price and market integration of U.S. 
Maine caught and Canadian lobsters is warranted, where New Zealand and Australia experienced 
a similar trend as they compete to supply emerging Asian markets. Harvest policy reforms, such 
as output controls, might also offer a solution with many advantages.  
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5. APPLYING A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS TO ESTIMATE FUTURE VESSEL 
PROFITABILITY RATES IN MAINE’S LOBSTER FISHERY 
 
5.1 Abstract 
 
This analysis quantifies the potential economic impact of changes in resource abundance and 
spatial distribution in Maine’s American lobster fishery associated with climate change where 
declines in settlement rates and projected to lead to a decline in landings. We specifically analyze 
the projected changing spatial harvest patterns and volumes on firm level short-run profitability 
(i.e. the lobster vessels) with sunk capital, and evaluate overall industry profitability rates and 
implications for Maine lobster fishery management.  In this research we have created a series of 
scenarios with changes to lobster firm production inputs, providing an inter-disciplinary 
complement to the ecological modeling and abundance forecasts of other researchers. We have 
looked at a five-year horizon from 2016 to assess future fleet wide and vessel-level profitability. 
We examine three vessel classes, across seven Maine lobster zones at the producer level, and 
also in aggregate for the State of Maine. We provide several point-in-time profiles over different 
regional scales, to inform the discussion around community adaptation strategies both within 
communities, and at the State level. Our analysis reveals that future individual vessel level 
profits are highly sensitive to projected changes in landings patterns, ex-vessel price, and fleet 
participation rates. Our modeling of future profitability indicates that while 95% of the fleet has 
operated above break-even up through 2015, as much as 65% of the active Maine lobster fleet 
may operate at below break-even by the year 2020 if declines occur as expected. The distribution 
of fleet profitability changes are not uniform across all vessel categories and Maine lobster zones 
however, and vessels with a high degree of capital investment, and those located in lobster Zones 
west of Penobscot bay Maine appear more vulnerable to changes. Our modeling suggests that the 
most resilient vessel category is the traditional 35 – 39’ vessel with no loans and operating with 
one crewman, where smaller vessels (< 34’) will struggle to overcome operating costs under 
lower future landings projections, and the larger vessel category (> 39 ft.) will be hampered by 
over-capitalization. These findings have implications for fisheries managers, seeking to balance 
ecological resource conservation with economic return on resource extraction. 
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5.2 Introduction   
 
The dynamic environment of fisheries offers a unique glimpse into the long term effects of 
anthropogenic changes in our environment (Perry et al. 2011; Perry et al. 2005), and we are 
observing both large and small changes from historical patterns (Kleisner et al. 2016; Ottersen et 
al. 2013; Walsh et al. 2015; Bell et al. 2015; Pinsky et al. 2011), as our world adapts to new 
inputs and stressors (Hobday et al. 2016; Popova et al. 2016; Wernberg et al. 2011). Change and 
uncertainty have become the norm. Forecasting techniques, and learning to proactively respond 
to future perils are skills we must develop (Ogier et al. 2016; Pinsky and Mantua 2014; Scheffer 
et al. 2018; Miller et al. 2018; Ford et al. 2011; Hare et al. 2016), and communities would do 
well to engage in difficult discussions and adapt ahead of time (Verweij et al. 2010; Stoll et al. 
2017). Natural variability in the natural environment has long held patterns upon which we build 
our human economies; the past three decades however have seen an increase in episodic events 
such as hurricanes and storms, winter warming and icing events, extreme heat and vanishing 
water resources, and changes in ocean temperature and chemistry, all of which have become 
more frequent and intense (Hobday, et al. 2016; Thomas et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2014). 
Ecosystems rebuild after these events and anomalies, but over time we see that our natural 
environment never quite returns to the previous state, a slight alteration occurs (Johnson et al. 
2011; Madin et al. 2012). A cumulative impact of these small adjustments, ultimately leads to a 
new expectation of normal (Pecl et al. 2017). 
 
Prior research has shown that ecosystems can withstand changes, but will tend to lose some 
resilience and resist returning to the previous state even as the stressors, such as climate shifts, or 
in the case of fisheries resource management, over-fishing (Daskalov et al. 2007), are removed 
(Fu et al. 2001). Long term changes can then occur in an ecosystem when a threshold has been 
exceeded, and can lead to a cascade of habitat changes (Frank 2005), life history response such 
as changes in fishery age structure (Ying et al. 2011; Pershing et al. 2015; Le Bris et al. 2015) or 
evolutionary decrease in average age of maturity (Ottersen et al. 2013; Kleisner et al. 2016). 
Permanent ecosystem restructuring and regime shifts can also occur, with changes in abundance 
of species, the immigration and emigration of species in an ecosystem (Daskalov et al. 2007; 
Johnson et al. 2011; Perry et al. 2005; Link et al. 2011), as well as new speciation events (Rose 
et al. 2001). Long-term changes in the human component response also include the migrations 
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that may be permanent resettlements closer to the fishing resource (McIlgorm et al. 2010) or 
engaging in community–based conservation efforts to ensure resource sustainability such as 
protections for spawning stock and egg bearing females (Le Bris et al. 2018). Other changes in 
policy and governance may be needed support of economic diversity include: re-training, 
professional pluralism, and out-migration (McIlgorm et al. 2010; Ogier et al. 2016; Pinsky and 
Mantua 2014; Miller et al. 2018; Perry et al. 2011). 
 
In this research we examine the Maine lobster stock and fishery as an example of a physical 
ecosystem and assemblage of species on the brink of change (Nye et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 
2013; Bell et al. 2015; Thomas et al. 2017; Wernberg et al. 2011; Johnson et al. 2011). 
Development of Maine’s fisheries up through the early 1990’s showed a large diversified fleet 
and harvest, enabling fishermen to vary their gear configurations between summer and winter 
months and enjoy year-round operations and income (Stoll 2017; Thunberg 2007). However, 
declines in the Gulf of Maine ground fishery, sardine, northern shrimp, urchin, and cod fisheries 
have caused changes in Maine’s economy, such as the closure of Maine’s sardine canning 
industry for example, and many fishermen now specialize and focus almost exclusively on 
harvest of American lobsters (Homarus americanus) since the late 1990s (Steneck and Wahle 
2013). The American lobster fishery now dominates Maine’s marine economy, and the outlook 
for fishermen, and the State’s economic welfare, is deeply intertwined with the future of this 
iconic fishery. Since 2011, more than 70% of the all fishery landings values of Maine’s fisheries 
are generated by the lobster fishery, and the economic diversity of the fishery is in it’s lowest in 
the past 50 years (Maine Department of Marine Resources).  
 
Lobstering provides a critical social construct and source of jobs in Maine, and understanding the 
inputs to the harvest production process is important to understanding factors influencing long-
term sustainability of the industry (Dayton and Sun 2012). The Maine lobster fishery provides a 
study system for evaluating the impacts of climate variability on a fishery and offers important 
insights into how policies can help communities adapt. Since the 1990’s, the American lobster 
fishery has seen over three decades of steadily increased landings. Of the total American lobsters 
landed in the U.S., approximately 90 percent have historically been caught in Maine, which has 
seen dramatic landings increases in the last two decades, rising from an annual average of 20 
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million pounds from 1950 to early 1990, to and average 50 million pounds in the end of 1990s. 
Lobster landings have continued to rise, and peaked in 2016 with a total harvest of 136 million 
pounds and a market value of $536 million (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources), propelling this 
fishery to the second largest fishery by value in the U.S.  
 
According to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s (ASMFC) most recent 
assessment, the stock is currently not overfished and overfishing is not occurring (ASMFC 2002, 
ASMFC 2015) but, there remains uncertainty about the future robustness of the stock due to 
underlying ecological and climate factors (Mills et al. 2013). Despite the landings volume 
increases in recent decades, the net profitability of the fishery has been questioned at both an 
individual and State level (Holland 2011). Many have cited the fishery as an example of fishery 
management twin ills, suggesting unsustainable harvest rates, and economic inefficiency 
(Steneck et al. 2011).  
 
Scientists have expressed concerns over stock assessment risks (Chen and Wilson 2002) and 
potential future stock recruitment failure (Chang et al. 2016), and early indicators have identified 
changes in larval settlement patterns, which will affect future harvest levels and spatial and 
temporal patterns (Oppenheim et al. 2017 in progress). Economists have expressed concern over 
the profitability and economic sustainability of the industry (Steneck and Wahle 2013; Thunberg 
2007) due to a number of factors, including: an increase in capitalization rates, the potentially 
unrecognized market integration with Canada leading to price response (Sun et al. 2015; 
Norman-López et al. 2014; Béné et al. 2000; Barten and Bettendorf 1989) and changes in the 
industry’s input costs such as fuel and bait (Sumaila et al. 2008; Thunberg 2007). These 
underlying issues can be further compounded through increases in fishing effort. Additional 
entry is sought into the fishery; long waiting lists for a lobster license have fueled debate at the 
legislative level regarding fairness and equity of access. Managers continue to be concerned 
about the threat of excessive effort associated with management policies, as they do not limit 
resource extraction rates effectively and increases in effective effort are possible (Dayton and 
Sun 2012). Climate variability and changes in ecosystem structure further present question for 
the health of the underlying resource, and impact the species in yet to be fully understood ways.  
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The lobster resource has already declined precipitously in Long Island Sound and Southern New 
England (Pearce and Balcom 2005). In Southern New England the lobster resource is estimated 
to be at low abundance and low recruitment. The depleted stock abundance, low recruitment, and 
high fishing mortality rates over the past few years have led to consideration of additional 
harvest restrictions. Decreased recruitment and abundance have also been estimated in 
Massachusetts Bay and Stellwagen Bank (Dodoti 2012). In Long Island Sound shell disease has 
been observed in areas of high lobster densities (Tanaka et al. 2017; Tlusty et al. 2008), and in 
combination with other conditions has decimated the lobster population, suggesting that suitable 
habitat may be disappearing with other large scale environmental processes (Tanaka et al. 2017; 
Chang et al. 2010; Tlusty et al. 2008). In Southern New England, lobsters have succumbed to a 
shell disease during the same period that landings have fallen to less than one half of what they 
were four years ago. There is evidence that the same shell disease may be on the increase in 
Northern Gulf of Maine, although incidents currently still remain low overall (Reardon personal 
communication, Maine Fisherman's Forum 2017). 
 
The social structure of the lobster industry is tight, and management of the fishery reflects the 
traditional social fabric of the lobster industry, extensively described by prior anthropologists 
(Acheson 1975). A co-management system implemented in the form of a Lobster Advisory 
Council guides the decision-making, and industry associations play a key role in 
communications to help fishery managers balance resource conservation (Le Bris et al. 2018) 
with the welfare of the community, and economic benefit (Acheson and Gardner 2012; Acheson 
and Acheson 2010). This provides for regional flexibility along the very large Maine coast, and 
aims to preserve the diversity of the lobster fleet and coastal community infrastructure, protect 
the small boat operators from consolidation pressures, and yet allow large-scale operations to 
operate under the same governing laws. In 1997 the Maine lobster industry began governance 
reform (Lobster Advisory Council 1999), and more potential management changes have already 
been identified to amend harvest and licensing strategies (Steinback et al. 2008; Cheng and 
Townsend 1993), but a lack of quantitative assessment and weak industry buy-in has stymied 
discussions in recent years. Maine’s fishing industry operates in an economic environment that 
provides limited opportunities for alternate employment with declining timber, paper, and other 
natural resource harvest professions, which have anchored the economy for two centuries.  The 
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opportunity cost of lobstering also varies along the coast, and reflects the economics of the 
localized county economies.  
 
The management of fisheries has evolved in other regions, and the toolkit of managers has 
expanded (Australia 2009b; Australia 2009a; Yandle 2006; Yandle et al. 2011). In Maine 
however, management focuses primarily on various forms of effort controls, and so fishery 
policy adaptation has the opportunity to provide lasting frameworks for community structure in a 
changing environment. Much attention has been paid to the development of tools to evaluate the 
underlying health of the lobster population resource (Fogarty and Gendron 2004; Berger et al. 
2009; Chang et al. 2016; Jiao et al. 2005; Wahle et al. 2009; Wahle et al. 1991; Steneck and 
Wahle 2013). In recent years more attention has been paid to co-management strategies and 
evaluating these strategies (Reid et al. 2013; Gardner et al. 2014). Economic modeling of 
fisheries is becoming increasingly relevant as well as it relates to both the cultural and financial 
well being of the fishing industry, and often drives observed behaviors (Thunberg et al. 1998; 
Anderson 1980; Anderson 1973; Sumaila et al. 2011). The complexities of future questions 
asked, coupled with the complex issues facing fisheries such as the Maine lobster fishery, 
demand an integrated and inter-disciplinary approach to ensure that we balance resource 
management with a robust policy platform to support human endeavors (Lehuta et al. 2014). The 
fusion of economic, biological, and ecosystem modeling disciplines has gained recent popularity 
in fisheries yielding new insights and approaches (Le Bris et al. 2018; Le Bris et al. 2015).  
 
We apply retrospective analysis in this research to produce potential future scenarios associated 
with the impacts of climate change facing the Maine Lobster fishery and stimulate proactive 
governance discussions. 
 
5.3 Background 
 
Of the total American lobsters landed in the U.S., approximately 90 percent have historically 
been caught in Maine. American lobster landings in Maine increased dramatically in the last two 
decades, rising from an annual average of 20 million pounds from 1950 to early 1990, to 50 
million pounds in the end of 1990s. Landings peaked in 2016 at 137 million pounds with a 
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market value of $530 million (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). During the summer of 2012, 
record warm seawater temperatures resulted in soft-shelled lobsters coming on the market a 
month early (Mills et al. 2013) and the market was unable to absorb the volume of low-meat 
yield “shedder” lobster, thereby significantly depressing ex-vessel prices. Overall, during the 
period 2008 – 2014, the industry experienced a 33% reduction in price per pound with a 64% 
percent increase in landings (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources). 
 
Changes in input costs have challenged the economic efficiency of the lobster fleet. Where hard-
shell lobsters command a higher price, they also require more effort to harvest as they are 
typically found offshore in winter months (Chang et al. 2010). Fuel and bait cost associated with 
targeting those lobsters that have migrated farther away from shore, either to deeper warmer 
bottom during harsher winter months or colder temperatures during the summer months, have 
changed the input ratio of the traditional lobster fishing operation and have called for an increase 
in managerial skill and capitalization rates (Sumaila et al. 2008).  
 
In 2012, an unprecedented confluence of events led to more than 80% of Maine lobster landings 
occurring during June to October (Maine Dept. of Marine Resources), focused primarily on soft 
shell product, which is highly vulnerable to harvest injuries and subsequent transport mortality. 
Of that, more than 60% of U.S. soft-shell landings were exported to Canada for processing and 
then largely exported back to the U.S. and distributed into the U.S. frozen and canned lobster 
meat markets. Historically, this initial export of the annual soft-shell lobsters to Canada typically 
increases sharply in July, peaks in September, and drops again in December, matching the 
seasonality of U.S. landings, and complimenting the Canadian lobster season, which is open 
from November to June. In 2012 however, the shift in timing of the U.S. landings caused an 
overlap in the harvest of the two countries, specifically in June, and created an unprecedented 
landings volume during a compressed time period. The excessive demand for truck 
transportation, and excessive amount of product competing for limited processing capacity at the 
peak of the season created tensions in trade relations between the two countries, and as a result 
prices responded negatively to the oversupply. Fishermen on both sides of the border suffered 
significant financial losses, and individual fishermen reported significant personal losses 
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(personal communication), even if the direct aggregate impact on the Maine economy was 
difficult to detect (Sun et al NAREA.) 
 
Four years after the episodic heat wave event the Maine Fishery has seen a reprieve. The lobster 
landings have increased steadily in the past 5 years, and a recent confluence of events since 2014 
have helped to push individual profits to a stable platform upon which to invest in capital such as 
new (often bigger) boats and trucks. Reduced fuel costs have allowed for small reprieve from 
capital layout required to set and bait lobster traps and begin fishing, and as of 2016, fishermen 
in Maine have seen relatively steady conditions in their fishery, with increasing volume and 
modestly improving ex-vessel prices. Maine has further invested in its fishery with a generic 
advertising campaign designed to spur summer product sales when the new shell season peaks 
and fishing operations are least costly. This strategy is aimed at bolstering overall product 
demand and enhancing consumer awareness. The recent reduction in fuel expenses has offset 
other increases such as bait cost, and has helped to improve the industry’s profitability (Dayton 
and Sun, 2012), perhaps masking underlying weakness in reproductive health and other density 
related issues, as well as market structural issues, and weight of the very complex lobster supply 
chain.  
 
Research into the species continues through oceanographic larval transport modeling (Incze et al. 
2010; Xue et al. 2008), forecasting of biological abundance has several approaches including 
molt time predictions (Staples 2017), ecosystem modeling (Le Bris et al. 2018; Le Bris et al. 
2015), and direct sampling programs such as the American Lobster Settlement Index (ALSI) 
(Wahle et al. 2009), which has for years provided a consistent sample methodology for larval 
Lobster Stage 4 Settlement assessment delivering a wide scale trend-based index to inform future 
lobster fisheries recruitment. From time of Stage 4 settlement to recruitment into the lobster 
fishery represents a period of biological production that has a lag period of 4 – 6 years before 
lobsters reach full size. The ALSI region wide scale sampling effort for early life history 
indicators provides an early indicator of future trouble or success, a sentinel. The sampling effort 
is implemented as a consortium of academic and research institutions, and extends from 
Southern New England, the Gulf of Maine, the Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. An annual compilation of the findings is used to compare 
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year over year settlement within the range and characterize shifts in larval settlement volume, 
transport mechanisms, and phenology patterns. These data have been used to inform future 
commercial harvest landings patterns and recently further modeled to specific yields by Maine 
lobster Zone (Oppenheim et al. 2017 in progress). This landings prediction information provides 
a primary input assumption to our profitability modeling and scenarios. 
 
Other climate based predictions and bio-economic models for the Maine lobster fishery have 
been developed (Xui 2015, Le Bris et al. 2018, Holland 2011). Our bioeconomic modeling 
framework presenting in this essay provides a tool for the comparison of the economic impacts 
of each potential outcome, and provides a discussion framework for key assumptions around 
fishery participation rates, and ex-vessel price along with a discussion of how it will impact 
specific individuals in the fishery, and which vessel classes are more resilient than others. 
5.4 Materials and Methods  
 
We developed a vessel level profit forecasting model based on our original 2010 cost survey of 
the Maine lobster industry (Dayton and Sun 2012), which was combined with the dealer data for 
landings and price. Linking this data to the licensing data (i.e. number of fishermen per landings 
class), we are able to apply an expansion factor using the current number of license holders 
within each representative vessel class and lobster zone. We created a statewide and fleet wide 
perspective of representative vessel categories and estimate the impact of different scenarios on 
overall fleet profitability, and estimate what proportion of the fleet will operate above or below 
break-even.  
 
We have chosen to run three scenarios through our modeling framework, examining short-run 
profits, which include operating costs primarily (bait, fuel and labor) and other operating 
expenses. We have four vessel landings classes, stratified by vessel annual landings and the 
seven Maine lobster management zones, referred to as zones A through G (Dayton and Sun 
2014), and each modeled individually. The historical fleet harvest patterns as reported in the 
dealer data are used to allocate simulated total Zone landings among the different vessel sizes. 
Our price model assumed all exogenous factors and market categories remain constant. Fishery 
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profitability is assed through a set of accounting relationships, as uncovered in our survey. Input 
assumptions are discussed in further detail below. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Lobster industry profitability modeling framework 
 
Theoretical Economic Model 
The model estimates the net revenue 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣!" for each vessel i in lobster management zone j 
and 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣!", which is 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣!"  less the variable fuel and bait costs (vij). The model further 
estimates profit (𝝅ij), which is the 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣!" less the fixed annual and monthly costs of fishing 
(fij), and the crew share. Here, the fixed (fij) and variable costs of fishing (vij) are fleet and area 
specific, where variable costs are incurred linearly with effort (Eij) and fixed costs are a function 
of the underlying firm’s capitalization structure as reported in our survey. We applied mean 
variable costs by vessel category. This detailed information allows for a robust analysis of the 
profitability of the fleet and allows us to characterize differences among firms, which other 
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analyses of this nature have previously been unable to specify (Holland 2011; Thunberg 2007, 
Sun and Franklin 2017) and recommended for future research. Vessel class specific differences 
in costs may represent distance from a fleet’s homeport to a particular area, vessel size, engine 
efficiency, crew size, and other costs.  
 
The gross revenue function 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣!", for vessel in class i in area j with quarterly time periods 
t is given by: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣!" 𝑡 =  𝛼𝐶!"# ∗ 𝛽𝑃!!!!!       (1) 
 
where 𝐶!"is the quarterly vessel level catch as reported in the dealer data for 2012, and scaled 
according to assumption 𝛼. This allows us to vary the resource production input to our model for 
each area j as a percent change in lobster catch from our baseline time periods, as predicted by 
the American Lobster Settlement Index lobster recruitment based fishery modeling. 𝑃! is defined 
as the price for landed product class at time t, scaled by 𝛽, and selected in accordance with the 
inverse demand relationship of the lobster fishery as shown by (Holland 2011; Norman-López et 
al. 2014).  
 
The net revenue function 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣!" for vessel class i in area j with quarterly time periods t, is 
given by:  
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣!"(𝑡) =   (𝛼𝐶!"# ∗ 𝛽𝑃!)−  𝑣!"#!!!!      (2)  
 
Where 𝑣!"# is defined as a vector of variable costs calculated by calendar quarter based on effort, 
and then aggregated to annual variable cost component of each firm, in this case lobster vessel, 
including bait cost, fuel cost, and crew costs. 
 
This model differs from prior studies, we have focused our attention on detailing the vector of 
cost variables with primary survey data, so as to estimate the vessel level characteristics and 
provide improved estimates of the previously lumped average cost data sets (Holland 2011; 
Thunberg 2007).  
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For our simulations, cost parameters were allowed to vary as a simulation of potential business 
and natural environments, specifically: cost per gallon fuel with the assumption of similar fishing 
effort levels and fuel consumption year over year, vary crew percent of gross based on number of 
crew employed, bait cost percent increase or decrease from previous year. It’s important to note 
that although our data were collected to allow for a trap haul based and trip based cost profile, 
our outreach revealed that data collected at quarterly calendar year increments would provide 
maximum insight. 
 
We further estimate the annual profit function (𝜋𝑖j) for vessel in class i in area j with time periods 
t as given by:   𝜋!" =  (𝐶!"# ∗  𝑃!)−  𝑣!"#!!!! −  𝑓!"       (3)  
Where 𝑓!"is defined as a vector of fixed annual costs such as license fees, equipment and boat 
repair and replacement expenses, insurance, wharf & mooring, truck costs, interest on loans and 
accounting expenses. We assume that each vessel class is a profit maximizer, and also takes the 
actions of the fleet for vessel class i in area j. We finally define, Π! as the total annual fleet profit 
for the sum of all sub-fleet vessels in class i and all area j:   
 
 Π! =  𝜋!"!!!! ∗ 𝑛!        (3) 
 
where 𝑛! represents the number of licensed vessel for each sub-fleet, as reported by Dept. of 
Marine Resources (2012) and representative vessel profit is indicated by 𝜋!"  per equation (2) 
above. 
 
Bioeconomic Model 
To provide a baseline for comparison, in late 2015, we took our cost survey based vessel-level 
profitability models (Dayton, A. 2017), which were constructed with the 2010 cost inputs, 
retrospective as of Jan 2016, and validated with year-by-year hind casts for the known years 
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2010 – 2015 to assess the model’s ability to capture dynamics of the fleet. This was validated in 
person with the accounting inputs from lobstermen in Maine through a series of outreach 
meetings, small presentations, and one on one working sessions over the years 2016 – 2017. This 
scenario for fishing year 2015 is presented in the results below as a measure of current state of 
the industry at the time of this publication and to allow for meaningful comparison with 
projections and scenarios, developed through changes to operational inputs as follows.  
 
Lobster catch. Projected landings by Maine lobster zone for year 2015 – 2020 (Oppenheim et al. 
2017) were provided as inputs to the profitability forecast model. These estimates were provided 
by the American lobster settlement index (Wahle et al. 2009), as presented in figure 4.3, and 
represent a direct estimate of recruitment changes in the fishery and the intended sole source of 
variability in our series of scenarios presented. We have not further evaluated stock-recruitment 
relationships, where this is implicit in the settlement index provided by ALSI. 
 
Stock dynamics. We held catch composition constant when predicting harvest levels in future 
years 2015 – 2020, thereby smoothing potential effects associated with changes in product 
quality or age structure/size. The underlying harvested product for the prior two decades consists 
of 85% lobsters that have gone through their first molt into legal harvest size, with some small 
proportion of second molt (Steneck and Wahle 2013). Older, larger lobsters are not deemed a 
significant proportion of the catch, where these forecasts are focused on the inshore component 
of the fishery harvest. This assumption may be over-simplified however, given the potential 
metabolic changes associated with climate variation leading to earlier size at maturity, and 
increased growth rates (Le Bris et al. 2018). 
 
Ex-vessel price. Although we see a variety of lobster product grades brought to market, only two 
market categories are recorded in the statistics of the fishery. We have assumed a stable 
proportion of market categories in the scenarios provided, which may be an oversimplification of 
the underlying ecological response over time, and we acknowledge this shortcoming in our 
analysis. Economic theory would suggest a price response associated with changing supply 
market conditions, and we have applied an inverse relationship with volume in accordance with 
findings of prior research (Barten and Bettendorf 1989). 
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We also consider the active efforts to create new markets for lobster product both domestically 
and internationally, and reflect a constraint on supply in years where volume decline may be 
coupled with an increase in market demand. As well, periods of excessive inventory can create a 
market lag, which is hypothesized to decrease price in the following season and can further 
confound ex-vessel prices. For these modeling scenarios, a constant price was rejected because it 
was deemed too simplistic and ignores the volume relationship that has been clearly observed 
(Sun 2011); we have applied assumptions to the ex-vessel price increases per year, based on the 
aggregate rate of resource harvest decline, with possible seasonal gluts and a stable or growing 
market demand, as noted in Table 5.1. 
 
Bait and Fuel. For these direct operational inputs, we build from the example of the Taiwan 
mackerel fishery, which observed a 10% increase in fuel consumption and a minimum of a 10% 
increase in bait costs during a period of declining catch rates (Sun et al. 2006) a pattern that 
would be expected in the Atlantic herring fishery, the primary source of bait for Maine 
lobstermen. Current rationing measures, affecting the Atlantic herring fishery in late 2015, have 
reverberated throughout the bait market however, and current bait rates passed on to the lobster 
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Figure 5.2 Landings projection provided by Oppenheim et al. 2017. 
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harvest sector have been closer to 50% above bait prices in 2010. Prior research has estimated 
that upward of 70% of the herring catch is re-deployed as bait in the lobster fishery (Grabowski 
et al. 2010) and so our bait cost assumptions may be optimistically low. Fuel prices in 2015 stand 
at a historic low point for the decade and presently the oil price is $48 per barrel. Domestic oil 
production in the U.S. has increased and this trend is projected to continue, barring climate 
driven episodic weather events that impact refineries and other fuel-producing firms. We have 
therefore applied a small fuel increase of 5% in keeping with observed historical patterns in the 
early 2000’s.  
 
Fishing Effort. The observed economic benefits of an ex-vessel price increase, combined with 
reduced shrinkage in shipping and handling costs to new markets such as China, could become 
an even more attractive business for new entrants from the student and apprentice programs. In 
addition, many others hold licenses and have since shifted to other economic activities, but under 
improving short-run firm level profitability, an increase in the number of firms is predicted by 
neo-classical economics (Deacon et al. 2011) and market behavior. In the case of the Maine 
fishery, this could be observed as the activation of latent fishing effort. Game theory has also 
been applied to the Maine lobster fishery to bolster fleet and individual participation and specific 
predictions by season, the results of which support our microeconomics based approach (Wilson 
2016). Short-run consumer price theory and short-run marginal cost benefit analysis would 
indicate both an improvement in short-run marginal profitability, followed by an increase in the 
number of firms participating in the market, with potential lagging observation of eroded 
profitability due to increase in number of firms. 
 
In the State of Maine, there exists 30% latency of lobster trap tags held by active lobstermen, and 
eligible for immediate issuance in the fishery, as well as a 10-year waiting list for new entrants 
over age 18 representing new effort. These entry and exit issues appear inexorably linked with 
each other, and individual business profitability and current fisheries policy drive the rates of 
participation in the fishery. It’s very difficult to project whether latent effort will become active 
effort, and it’s even harder to know if one might see increased traps per person, or additional 
firms entering the fishery. Based on the results our previous study on lobster licensing (Dayton 
and Sun 2012), it is highly likely that some additional effort will enter the fishery under current 
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licensing framework whether through additional trap hauling or new entrants. Given the 
concerns raised by fishermen for the already high number of traps in their region, it is further 
likely to decrease catcheability per trap due to congestion effects.  
 
The range of technical expertise and skill as outlined in our production frontier analysis also 
indicates that significant efficiency and technical gains remain available to the current fleet. 
Therefore, for our economic modeling purposes, participation and effort rates in the fishery are 
deemed sufficiently dense at baseline (Wilson 2007) that any increase in active effort will only 
add to operating cost baselines and sunk capital. We anticipate that additional harvest 
contributions to the fishery will be non-incremental, given that the current fleet already lands 
95% of harvestable year class. For our economic model, we do not increase effort to reflect new 
entrants, given the current limited entry restrictions; this is likely then to understate the potential 
impact of effort increases. However, we do apply a catcheability coefficient decrease of 20%, to 
account for a congestion effect associated with more frequent hauling of traps and or additional 
trap deployment on the part of existing fishermen.  
 
Crew costs. A large degree of variability exists in the number of crew per vessel, seasonal crew 
hiring, and calculation of payment method (hourly wage, percent of gross revenue, percent of net 
revenue). We have found that the majority of the fleet however applies remuneration based on 
landings value, after deductions for fishing expenses including ice, bait and fuel. We have held 
this method constant in our analyses, and crew costs scale directly with revenue across the 
underlying relationships associated with the specific vessel class. 
 
Simulation Methods 
 
For our first forward looking scenario, all lobster vessel operating and fishing behavior factors 
are held constant, including effort variables (# hauls, # trips and operating costs), and we 
assumed no changes in participation in the fishery, market response or ex-vessel price.  
 
In our second scenario, we add an inverse demand price response, where a decrease in landings 
is projected lead to an increase in price. We applied stepwise increases in price for years 2016 
through 2020. We also have assumed a lag effect between resource decline beginning gradually 
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in 2016, and subsequent price response. A confluence of events is poised to drive a sharp 
increase in ex-vessel prices several years after the landings decline is observed. We also vary the 
operational input costs for bait and fuel. 
 
Table 5.1 Profitability forecast modeling assumptions and scenario inputs2 
Year 
Zone 
A 
Zone 
B 
Zones 
C+D Zone E Zone F 
Zone 
G 
Total 
Lbs. Fuel Bait Price 
Catch-
ability 
2008 -60% -23% -24% -3% -39% -20% -29% 20% 0% 20% 0% 
2009 -34% -12% -11% -2% -11% -8% -14% -18% 0% 0% 0% 
2010 (lbs) 14.8m 11.8m 45.8m 7.9m 11.6m 3.5m 95.5m  $3.00  $48  $3.82  Base 
2011 19% 14% 13% 0% 9% 4% 12% 28% 0% 5% 0% 
2012 39% 30% 28% 3% 13% 6% 25% 32% 0% -3% 0% 
2013 57% 45% 36% 3% 9% 5% 33% 31% 0% 5% 0% 
2014 63% 59% 40% 1% 0% 3% 36% 11% 0% 5% 0% 
2015 55% 61% 41% -2% -11% -2% 34% -21% 5% 5% 0% 
2016 37% 56% 33% -7% -30% -10% 24% -25% 5% 5% 0% 
2017 14% 47% 23% -12% -50% -19% 11% -5% 5% 5% 0% 
2018 -11% 37% 11% -17% -70% -28% -3% 10% 20% 35% 0% 
2019 -39% 25% -3% -22% -89% -38% -18% 15% 20% 35% 0% 
2020 -66% 13% -17% -27% -100% -46% -34% 25% 20% 35% -20% 
 
 
In our third scenario, we further simulate activation of increased fishing effort and technical skill 
on the part of the existing fleet, by applying the decrease in catcheability. New entrants have not 
been incorporated into this scenario, where the limitations associated with current limited entry 
law are assumed to be constant. The average age of the licensed fishing population will likely 
increase by close to one year annually, although some exit of older individuals may be observed 
and will likely to be offset then by younger new entrants. We have conservatively modeled this 
as a net zero effect, although in practice the new entrants are likely to possess greater energy and 
expend more effort than retiring captains.  
                                                2	Changes	noted	in	our	assumptions	are	relative	to	the	base	year	2010	survey	data;	additional	years	modeling	was	performed	retrospectively	and	as	a	forecast	in	2015.		
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5.5 Results 
 
When applied to a baseline condition, our model suggests that most of the fleet was profitable in 
2010 (Fig 5.3) and profitability further increases for 2015 (Fig 5.4). These represent the baseline 
for comparison of the different scenarios. We note that our simulation statistics do not reflect the 
full uncertainty associated with model projections. Biological characteristics such as growth 
rates, natural mortality rates, or habitat availability are not fully specified in the landings 
projections. Uncertainties in market and price response, as well as product form and size and 
weight have also been assumed to be stable relative to prior time periods. The results must 
therefore be interpreted in light of these limitations.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Distribution of estimated fleet profitability for fishing year 2010  
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of estimated fleet profitability for fishing year 2015 
 
 
For 2015, our model indicates 100% of fleet operates above break-even due to lower operating 
costs such as fuel, and increased landings with marginal price improvements over base year. 
When aggregated over the fishery, we see that while landings have shown an upward trend, 
profits have increased as well, but at a faster rate than landings (Fig 5.5); the fleet bears an 
amount of structural overhead in the form of loans, and other fixed costs which, once overcome, 
lead to a higher profit margin for the incremental revenue. This presents a very favorable 
situation for the Maine lobster fleet. 
 
We next consider the profitability under projected landings declines out to 2020 under different 
market and participation scenarios.  
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Figure 5.5 Landings and modeled fishery profit for fishing years 2008 - 2015 
 
For our first scenario, where we have used the modeled regional declines in the lobster landings 
per the projections from the ALSI, and we note that the modeled profitability of the varying 
vessel classes follows similar trends over the period. Each of the three vessel classes shows a 
decline in profits by the year 2020 (Fig 5.6), and 45% of the fleet is projected to operate below 
break-even (Fig 5.7), and comprises largely the smallest vessel class, those with the lowest 
landings typically, who will be most impacted by the decline. The middle and larger vessel 
operators will also experience reduced profits, but they are likely to continue to operate above 
break-even. In aggregate, fleet profitability is projected to decline (Fig 5.8). 
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Figure 5.6 Projected vessel level profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #1) 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Distribution of estimated fleet profitability for fishing year 2020 (Scenario #1) 
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Figure 5.8 Projected total fleet profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #1) 
 
For our second scenario, we have added in a price response to reflect potential market forces 
associated with declining supply, and at minimum stable demand. 
 
The effect of the price increase is quite significant on all vessel classes, and our model projects 
that it will offset the decline in landings for many vessels (Fig 5.9), where an additional 9% of 
the fleet is likely to benefit and operate above break-even (Fig 5.10). In aggregate, fleet 
profitability also declines (Fig 5.11) but we see that price response may dampen the impact of 
the decline in landings.  
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Figure 5.9 Projected vessel level profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #2) 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Distribution of estimated fleet profitability for fishing year 2020 (Scenario #2) 
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Figure 5.11 Projected total fleet profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #2) 
 
For our third scenario, we have added in an increase in harvester fishing effort, through 
activation of latent effort in the form of increased participation rates in the fishery, or an increase 
in trap hauls on the part of existing fishermen. 
 
The results of scenario 3 show a divergence in the trends for the primary dimensions analyzed 
versus the previous scenarios. If we compare the individual profitability (Fig 5.12), we note that 
the two larger vessel classes are now also affected, in addition to the smaller vessel class.  
Activation of latent effort would potentially cause approximately 60% of the fleet to operate at 
below break-even (Fig 5.13). This represents a significant impact at the vessel level profitability, 
and jobs and living wages will be impacted. Interestingly, the aggregate perspective for the fleet 
as a whole remains relatively unaffected. The aggregated fishery profit in scenario 3 (Fig. 5.14) 
does not appear to have marked differences from aggregated fishery profit in scenario 2 (Fig. 
5.11) and suggests the impacts are less likely to be felt at the level of the Maine state economy, 
and much more likely to be felt at the individual harvester level. This issue could potentially 
create very different perceptions of the health of the fleet and the fishery, and could confound 
efforts to respond to changes and shifts in productivity of the underlying biological resource.  
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Figure 5.12 Projected vessel level profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #3) 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Distribution of estimated fleet profitability for fishing year 2020 (Scenario #3) 
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Figure 5.14 Projected total fleet profit for fishing years 2016 - 2020 (Scenario #3) 
5.6 Conclusions 
	
Change in the fishery is inevitable. Climate related ecosystem shifts are already being observed 
in the Gulf of Maine, with warming temperatures and altered thermal habitats (Nye et al. 2014; 
Friedland et al. 2013; Saba et al. 2015). Phenology is changing (Thomas et al. 2017; Anderson et 
al. 2013), shifting predator prey dynamics and altering food supplies (Henderson et al. 2017; 
Morse et al. 2017). Changes in the habitat suitability for lobster are expected (Tanaka and Chen 
2015; Tanaka and Chen 2016; Alexander et al. 2018), and changes in molt patterns likely to 
continue (Staples 2017). We have already observed a decline in settlement (Oppenheim et al. 
2017 in progress), portending a decline in landings. 
 
Lobster landings have increased significantly since 1997, and the market has also grown in that 
time, absorbing the expanded supply more so in 2017 than it was able to in 2004, but ex-vessel 
price per pound has continued to respond inversely to increased volume. Without changes in the 
overall market demand for lobster, it is expected that any further expansion of the supply, 
especially in the second quarter (April – June) and based on our analysis of inventory holdings 
fourth quarter late season landings may also be impacting ex-vessel prices in the following 
season as hold over inventory; this trend of late summer landings then is likely to result in further 
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price deflation with a delayed effect, which could have a further negative effect on individual 
profitability despite beneficial in-season conditions. Conversely, landings volume decreases and 
market development activities should lead to higher demand and price increases, but in turn may 
lead to increased participation and activation of latent effort, and so over-fishing is possible. 
 
This analysis suggests that the predictions of climate driven changes such as those which are 
likely to cause a decrease in landings, or a return to historical landings patterns of the early 
1990s, a large proportion of the fleet, as much as 60%, could be facing unprofitable fishing 
conditions. Effort in the fishery could increase despite the marginal or even negative profits 
being derived by existing lobstermen. The relationships within the supply chain and the lobster 
co-management structure will benefit from adapting as well, with science advice and forecasting 
tools to help inform the discussion. For capital restrictions as modeled here, the ease of 
substitution among suppliers implies excessive effort, which is consistent with excessive labor 
inputs. Although rents are dissipated, some stakeholders may see this as a positive outcome 
because it delivers higher employment in Maine’s fishing community (Hilborn 2007). 
 
Prior research (Boyce 1994; McIlgorm et al. 2010) provides an examination of governance 
choices for fisheries to explain why suboptimal controls such as input restrictions and entry 
limitation persist in fisheries management. The inefficiency we demonstrated in our research is 
consistent with these prior findings, and suggests that suboptimal controls such as limited entry 
benefit input suppliers by transferring rents from the fishery resource to the owners of inputs 
permitted to operate. Inefficient regulation appears entrenched in Maine, which based on our 
analysis are to prevent rent dissipation and rent benefit transfer, which is so common and 
durable, particularly in the U.S. where fishery management councils are heavily influenced by 
resident input suppliers with organized, entrenched lobbying power. 
 
Similar to other fisheries, Maine may need to consider community support, such as vessel buy 
back scheme or capital asset taxation, and possible incentives associated with property rights. 
Biological reference points and harvest control rules (Zhang et al. 2011) based on expected 
CPUE may also provide some additional tools for managers, so as to protect and preserve the 
lobster population and the economic engine of Maine’s fishery. Further research is suggested 
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around target fleet capacity and optimum yield for the fishery (MEY) (Reid et al. 2013), as a 
precursor to possible change in the Maine lobster fishery and we the analyses provided herein as 
baseline for comparison. 
5.7 References 
 
Acheson, J. M. 1975. “Fisheries Management and Social Context: The Case of the Maine 
Lobster Fishery .” Transactions of the American Fisheries Society  104(4):653–68. 
Acheson, James M. and Ann W. Acheson. 2010. “Factions , Models and Resource Regulation: 
Prospects for Lowering the Maine Lobster Trap Limit.” Human Ecology 38(5):587–98. 
Acheson, James M. and Roy T. Gardner. 2012. “Strategies, Conflict, and the Emergence of 
Territoriality: The Case of the Maine Lobster Industry.” American Anthropologist 
106(2):296–307. 
Alexander, Michael A. et al. 2018. “Projected Sea Surface Temperatures over the 21st Century: 
Changes in the Mean, Variability and Extremes for Large Marine Ecosystem Regions of 
Northern Oceans.” Elem Sci Anth 6(1):9.  
Anderson, Lee G. 1973. “Optimum Economic Yield of a Fishery given Variable Price of 
Output.” Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada 30:509–18. 
Anderson, Lee G. 1980. “Necessary Components of Economic Surplus in Fisheries Economics.” 
Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 37(5):858–70. 
Anderson, James J., Eliezer Gurarie, Chloe Bracis, Brian J. Burke, and Kristin L. Laidre. 2013. 
“Modeling Climate Change Impacts on Phenology and Population Dynamics of Migratory 
Marine Species.” Ecological Modelling 264:83–97.  
ASMFC. 2002. “Proceedings of the American Lobster Transferable Trap Workshop October 
2002.” (75). 
Australia, Dept.of Fisheries. 2009a. A Quota Management System for the Western Rock Lobster 
Fishery. 
Australia, Dept.of Fisheries. 2009b. An Input Control Management System for the Western 
Australia Rock Lobster Fishery. 
Barten, A. P. and L. J. Bettendorf. 1989. “Price Formation of Fish: An Application of an Inverse 
Demand System.” European Economic Review 33(8):1509–25. 
 
  124 
Bell, Richard J., David E. Richardson, Jonathan A. Hare, Patrick D. Lynch, and Paula S. 
Fratantoni. 2015. “Disentangling the Effects of Climate, Abundance, and Size on the 
Distribution of Marine Fish: An Example Based on Four Stocks from the Northeast U.S. 
Shelf.” ICES Journal of Marine Science 72(April):1311–22. 
Béné, Christophe, Muriel Cadren, and Frédéric Lantz. 2000. “Impact of Cultured Shrimp 
Industry on Wild Shrimp Fisheries: Analysis of Price Determination Mechanisms and 
Market Dynamics.” Agricultural Economics 23(1):55–68. 
Berger, Tina L.(ed), Patrick Kilduff, John Carmichael, and Robert Latour. 2009. “Guide to 
Fisheries Science and Stock Assessments.” Management (June):1–67. 
Boyce, J.R., 2004. “Instrument choice in a fishery.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 47, 183–206. 
Chang, J. H., Yong Chen, W. Halteman, and Carl Wilson. 2016. “Roles of Spatial Distribution in 
Quantifying Stock-Recruitment Relationships for American Lobsters in the Inshore Gulf of 
Maine.” Canada Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 73:885–909. 
Chang, Jui-Han, Y. Chen, D. Holland, and J. Grabowski. 2010. “Estimating Spatial Distribution 
of American Lobster Homarus Americanus Using Habitat Variables.” Marine Ecology 
Progress Series 420:145–56.  
Chen, Y. and C. Wilson. 2002. “A Simulation Study to Evaluate Impacts of Uncertainty on the 
Assessment of American Lobster Fishery in the Gulf of Maine.” Canadian Journal of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 59(8): 1394–1403 
Diodati, Paul. 2010. Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries. Personal Correspondance. 
Cheng, Hsiang-tai and Ralph E. Townsend. 1993. “Potential Impact of Seasonal Closures in the 
U. S. Lobster Fishery.” Marine Resource Economics 8:101–17. 
Daskalov, Georgi M., Alexander N. Grishin, Sergei Rodionov, and Vesselina Mihneva. 2007. 
“Trophic Cascades Triggered by Overfishing Reveal Possible Mechanisms of Ecosystem 
Regime Shifts.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 104(25):10518–23. 
Fogarty, Michael J. and Louise Gendron. 2004. “Biological Reference Points for American 
Lobster (Homarus Americanus) Populations: Limits to Exploitation and the Precautionary 
approach1.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 61(8):1392–1403.  
 
  125 
Ford, James D., Lea Berrang-Ford, and Jaclyn Paterson. 2011. “A Systematic Review of 
Observed Climate Change Adaptation in Developed Nations.” Climatic Change 
106(2):327–36. 
Frank, K. T. 2005. “Trophic Cascades in a Formerly Cod-Dominated Ecosystem.” Science 
308(5728):1621–23.  
Friedland, Kevin D. et al. 2013. “Thermal Habitat Constraints on Zooplankton Species 
Associated with Atlantic Cod (Gadus Morhua) on the US Northeast Continental Shelf.” 
Progress in Oceanography 116:1–13. 
Fu, Caihong, Robert Mohn, and L.Paul Fanning. 2001. “Why the Atlantic Cod (Gadus Morhua) 
Stock off Eastern Nova Scotia Has Not Recovered.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Sciences 58(8):1613–23.  
Gardner, Caleb, Klaas Hartmann, Andre E. Punt, and Sarah Jennings. 2014. “In Pursuit of 
Maximum Economic Yield in an ITQ Managed Lobster Fishery.” Fisheries Research 
161:285–92. 
Grabowski, Jonathan H. et al. 2010. “Use of Herring Bait to Farm Lobsters in the Gulf of 
Maine.” PLoS ONE 5(4):1–11. 
Hare, Jonathan A. et al. 2016. “Forecasting the Dynamics of a Coastal Fishery Species Using a 
Coupled Climate — Population Model.” 20(2):452–64. 
Henderson, M.Elisabeth, Katherine E. Mills, Andrew C. Thomas, Andrew J. Pershing, and Janet 
A. Nye. 2017. “Effects of Spring Onset and Summer Duration on Fish Species Distribution 
and Biomass along the Northeast United States Continental Shelf.” Reviews in Fish Biology 
and Fisheries 27(2):411–24. 
Hobday, Alistair J. et al. 2016. “Planning Adaptation to Climate Change in Fast-Warming 
Marine Regions with Seafood-Dependent Coastal Communities.” Reviews in Fish Biology 
and Fisheries 26(2):249–64. 
Holland, Daniel S. 2011. “Planning for Changing Productivity and Catchability in the Maine 
Lobster Fishery.” Fisheries Research 110(1):47–58.  
Incze, Lewis et al. 2010. “Connectivity of Lobster (Homarus Americanus) Populations in the 
Coastal Gulf of Maine: Part II. Coupled Biophysical Dynamics.” Fisheries Oceanography 
19(1):1–20. 
 
  126 
Johnson, Craig R. et al. 2011. “Climate Change Cascades: Shifts in Oceanography, Species’ 
Ranges and Subtidal Marine Community Dynamics in Eastern Tasmania.” Journal of 
Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 400(1–2):17–32.  
Kleisner, Kristin M. et al. 2016. “The Effects of Sub-Regional Climate Velocity on the 
Distribution and Spatial Extent of Marine Species Assemblages.” PLoS ONE 11(2):1–21. 
Le Bris, Arnault et al. 2018. “Climate Vulnerability and Resilience in the Most Valuable North 
American Fishery.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115(8):201711122. 
Le Bris A., Pershing A.J., Hernandez C.M., Mills K.E., Sherwood G.D. (2015) Modelling the  
effects of variation in reproductive traits on fish population resilience. ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 72:2590–2599. 
Lehuta, S., D. S. Holland, and A. J. Pershing. 2014. “Investigating Interconnected Fisheries: A 
Coupled Model of the Lobster and Herring Fisheries in New England.” Canadian Journal 
of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 71(2):272–89. 
Lucey, Sean M. and Janet A. Nye. 2010. “Shifting Species Assemblages in the Northeast US 
Continental Shelf Large Marine Ecosystem.” Marine Ecology Progress Series 415(Belkin 
2009):23–33. 
Madin, Elizabeth M. P. et al. 2012. “Socio-Economic and Management Implications of Range-
Shifting Species in Marine Systems.” Global Environmental Change 22(1):137–46. 
McIlgorm, Alistair et al. 2010. “How Will Climate Change Alter Fishery Governance: Insights 
from Seven International Case Studies.” Marine Policy 34(1):170–77. 
Miller, Dana D., Yoshitaka Ota, Ussif Rashid Sumaila, Andrés M. Cisneros-Montemayor, and 
William W. L. Cheung. 2018. “Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change in Marine 
Systems.” Global Change Biology 24(1):e1–14. 
Mills, Katherine E., AJ Pershing, and CJ Brown. 2013. “Fisheries Management in a Changing 
Climate: Lessons from the 2012 Ocean Heat Wave in the Northwest Atlantic.” 
Oceanography 26(2):191–95.  
Morse, R. E., K. D. Friedland, D. Tommasi, C. Stock, and J. Nye. 2017. “Distinct Zooplankton 
Regime Shift Patterns across Ecoregions of the U.S. Northeast Continental Shelf Large 
Marine Ecosystem.” Journal of Marine Systems 165:77–91. 
Norman-López, Ana et al. 2014. “Price Integration in the Australian Rock Lobster Industry: 
Implications for Management and Climate Change Adaptation.” Australian Journal of 
  127 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 58(1):43–59. 
Nye, Janet A. et al. 2014. “Ecosystem Effects of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation.” Journal 
of Marine Systems 133:103–16. 
Nye, Janet A., Jason S. Link, Jonathan A. Hare, and William J. Overholtz. 2009. “Changing 
Spatial Distribution of Fish Stocks in Relation to Climate and Population Size on the 
Northeast United States Continental Shelf.” Marine Ecology Progress Series 393:111–29. 
Ogier, Emily M. et al. 2016. “Fisheries Management Approaches as Platforms for Climate 
Change Adaptation: Comparing Theory and Practice in Australian Fisheries.” Marine 
Policy 71:82–93.  
Oppenheim, Noah G. and Richard A. Wahle. 2013. “Cannibals by Night? In Situ Video 
Monitoring Reveals Diel Shifts in Inter- and Intra-Specific Predation on the American 
Lobster.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 70(11):1635–40.  
Ottersen, Geir et al. 2013. “Temporal Shifts in Recruitment Dynamics of North Atlantic Fish 
Stocks: Effects of Spawning Stock and Temperature.” Marine Ecology Progress Series 
480(Hjort 1914):205–25. 
Pearce, Jack and Nancy Balcom. 2005. “The 1999 Long Island Sound Lobster Mortality Event: 
Findings of the Comprehensive Research Initiative.” Journal of Shellfish Research 
24(3):691–97. 
Pecl, Gretta T. and et al. 2017. “Biodiversity Redistribution under Climate Change: Impacts on 
Ecosystems and Human Well-Being.” Science in press. 
Perry, A. L., P. J. Low, J. A. Ellis, and J. D. Reynolds. 2005. “Climate Change and Distribution 
Shifts in Marine Fishes.” Science 308(5730):1912–15. 
Perry, R. Ian et al. 2011. “Marine Social-Ecological Responses to Environmental Change and the 
Impacts of Globalization.” Fish and Fisheries 12(4):427–50. 
Pershing, Andrew J. et al. 2013. The Future of Cod in the Gulf of Maine. 
Pinsky, M. L. and Nathan J. Mantua. 2014. “Emerging Adaption Approaches for Climate Ready 
Fisheries Management.” Oceanography 27(4):146–59. 
Popova, Ekaterina et al. 2016. “From Global to Regional and Back Again: Common Climate 
Stressors of Marine Ecosystems Relevant for Adaptation across Five Ocean Warming 
Hotspots.” Global Change Biology 22(6):2038–53. 
 
  128 
Reardon, Kathleen M. 2006. “Development , Assessment , and Management of a Potential 
Directed Fishery for Jonah Crab, (Cancer Borealis), in the Near Shore Gulf of Maine.” 
Reid, Chris, Nick Caputi, Simon de Lestang, and Peter Stephenson. 2013. “Assessing the Effects 
of Moving to Maximum Economic Yield Effort Level in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery 
of Western Australia.” Marine Policy 39(1):303–13. 
Rose, Kenneth a., James H. Cowan, Kirk O. Winemiller, Ransom a. Myers, and Ray Hilborn. 
2001. Compensatory Density Dependence in Fish Populations: Importance, Contoversy, 
Understanding and Prognosis. 
Saba, Vincent S. et al. 2015. “Enhanced Warming of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean under 
Climate Change.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 120:1–15.  
Scheffer, Marten et al. 2018. “Anticipating Critical Transitions.” Science 338(6105):344–48. 
Steinback, Scott R., Richard B. Allen, and Eric Thunberg. 2008. “The Benefits of 
Rationalization: The Case of the American Lobster Fishery.” Marine Resource Economics 
23:37–63. 
Steneck, R. S. et al. 2011. “Creation of a Gilded Trap by the High Economic Value of the Maine 
Lobster Fishery.” Conservation Biology 25(5):904–12. 
Steneck, Robert S. and Richard a Wahle. 2013. “American Lobster Dynamics in a Brave New 
Ocean 1.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 1624(September):1612–24. 
Stoll, Joshua S. 2017. “Fishing for Leadership: The Role Diversification Plays in Facilitating 
Change Agents.” Journal of Environmental Management 199:74–82.  
Stoll, Joshua S., Emma Fuller, and Beatrice I. Crona. 2017. “Uneven Adaptive Capacity among 
Fishers in a Sea of Change.” PLoS ONE 1–14. 
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid, Louise Teh, Reg Watson, Peter Tyedmers, and Daniel Pauly. 2008. “Fuel 
Price Increase, Subsidies, Overcapacity, and Resource Sustainability.” ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 65(6):832–40. 
Sumaila, U. Rashid, William W. L. Cheung, Vicky W. Y. Lam, Daniel Pauly, and Samuel 
Herrick. 2011. “Climate Change Impacts on the Biophysics and Economics of World 
Fisheries.” Nature Climate Change 1(9):449–56.  
Sun, Chin Hwa, Fu Sung Chiang, Eugene Tsoa, and Min Hsiang Chen. 2006. “The Effects of El 
Nino on the Mackerel Purse-Seine Fishery Harvests in Taiwan: An Analysis Integrating the 
Barometric Readings and Sea Surface Temperature.” Ecological Economics 56(2):268–79. 
  129 
Sun, Chin Hwa Jenny et al. 2015. “Fewer Fish for Higher Profits? Price Response and Economic 
Incentives in Global Tuna Fisheries Management.” Environmental and Resource 
Economics. 
Tanaka, Kisei R., Samuel L. Belknap, Jared J. Homola, and Yong Chen. 2017. “A Statistical 
Model for Monitoring Shell Disease in Inshore Lobster Fisheries: A Case Study in Long 
Island Sound.” Plos One 12(2):e0172123.  
Thomas, Andrew C. et al. 2017. “Seasonal Trends and Phenology Shifts in Sea Surface 
Temperature on the North American Northeastern Continental Shelf.” Elem Sci Anth 
5(2007):48.  
Thunberg, E. M., T. E. Helser, and R. K. Mayo. 1998. “Bioeconomic Analysis of Alternative 
Selection Patterns in the United States Atlantic Silver Hake Fishery.” Marine Resource 
Economics 13:51–74. 
Thunberg, Eric M. 2007. “Demographic and Economic Trends in the Northeastern United States 
Lobster ( Homarus Americanus ) Fishery , 1970 – 2005.” Water (October):64. 
Tlusty, Michael F., Anna Myers, and Anita Metzler. 2008. “Short- and Long-Term Dietary 
Effects on Disease and Mortality in American Lobster Homarus Americanus.” Diseases of 
Aquatic Organisms 78:249–53. 
Townsend, Ralph E. 1990. “Entry Restrictions in the Fishery: A Survey of the Evidence.” Land 
Economics 66(4):359–78. 
Vert-pre, Katyana a, Ricardo O. Amoroso, Olaf P. Jensen, and Ray Hilborn. 2013. “Frequency 
and Intensity of Productivity Regime Shifts in Marine Fish Stocks.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 110(5):1779–84.  
Verweij, M. C., W. L. T. van Densen, and A. J. P. Mol. 2010. “The Tower of Babel: Different 
Perceptions and Controversies on Change and Status of North Sea Fish Stocks in Multi-
Stakeholder Settings.” Marine Policy 34(3):522–33. 
Walsh, Harvey J., David E. Richardson, Katrin E. Marancik, and Jonathan A. Hare. 2015.  
“Long-Term Changes in the Distributions of Larval and Adult Fish in the Northeast U.S. 
Shelf Ecosystem.” PLoS ONE 10(9):1–32 
Wang, S. D. H. and C. B. Kellog. 1988. “An Econometric Model for American Lobster.” Marine 
Resource Economics (New York) 5(1):61–70 
 
  130 
Wahle, Richard A. et al. 2009. “A Vessel ‐ Deployed Passive Postlarval Collector to Assess 
Settlement of the American Lobster Homarus Americanus A Vessel-Deployed Passive 
Postlarval Collector to Assess Settlement.” New Zealand Journal of Marine and Freshwater 
Research 43(1):465–74. 
Wernberg, Thomas et al. 2011. “Impacts of Climate Change in a Global Hotspot for Temperate 
Marine Biodiversity and Ocean Warming.” Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and 
Ecology 400(1–2):7–16.  
Xue, Huijie, Lewis Incze, Danya Xu, Nicholas Wolff, and Neal Pettigrew. 2008. “Connectivity 
of Lobster Populations in the Coastal Gulf of Maine. Part I: Circulation and Larval 
Transport Potential.” Ecological Modelling 210(1–2):193–211. 
Yandle, Tracy. 2006. “Sharing Natural Resource Management Responsibility: Examining the 
New Zealand Rock Lobster Co-Management Experience.” Policy Sciences 39(3):249–78. 
Yandle, Tracy, Nadya Hajj, and Rafal Raciborski. 2011. “The Goldilocks Solution: Exploring 
the Relationship between Trust and Participation in Resource Management within the New 
Zealand Commercial Rock Lobster Fishery.” Policy Studies Journal 39(4):631–58. 
  
  131 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, we examined the Maine Lobster fishery as an example of an ecosystem on the 
brink of change. Over the past twenty years, lobster governance in Maine has undergone many 
small adjustments in response to fishery, economic, and ecosystem changes, and adapted in 
keeping with the goals of the community. Maine has built a model of self-governance and 
regional management, that reflects the heritage upon which is has been built. The limited-entry 
licensing program, which guides policy-making, has retained an owner operator provision, and 
stock conservation efforts such as V-notching of berried females have protected the fishery and 
the fishermen. Long-standing cooperative relationships along the supply chain have ensured 
stable market conditions and strong and positive diplomatic and scientific relations with 
neighboring Canada have allowed for an efficient and cooperative trade. Ensuring livelihoods 
and protecting the next generation also feature prominently in the goals of the Maine lobster 
community, and an apprenticeship has provided a mechanism for knowledge-transfer and safety 
of the fleet. This ecosystem has adapted to small stresses and withstood change, but the research 
provided in this thesis would suggest that the Maine lobster fishery may have lost some 
resilience, and may be vulnerable to a complete restructuring as a result of observed climate 
shifts. This research provides a series of intertwined analyses to aid in the process of answering 
complex questions about ecosystem adaptation to climate driven changes. 
 
Our research has uncovered weaknesses in the ability of fisheries resource management to 
protect from over-fishing and ensure continued stability in supply and demand relationships, 
exposing fishermen to large swings in ex-vessel price. Long term changes are poised to occur as 
the water temperatures in the Gulf of Maine continue to increase and approach the lobster 
threshold of 20.5 degrees Celsius, leading to a continued cascade of habitat changes, such as the 
life history response to increase metabolic and growth rates, which already appears to be 
resulting in an evolutionary decrease in average age of maturity (Wahle at al. 2013).  
 
Permanent ecosystem restructuring and regime shifts, with changes in abundance of historical 
key species such as ground fish, scallops, and shrimp, are already being observed including the 
immigration of black sea bas, and squid and emigration of shrimp and cod (Frank 2005). Long 
  132 
term changes in the human component response also include the migrations are showing 
fishermen take on migrant worker habits, often traveling long hours on land to then board a 
fishing vessel in a different location. Young people find it increasingly difficult to derive a full 
wage in certain portions of the state of Maine, and an ageing of the fleet has been observed. 
Some fishermen from the Maine lobster fleet have permanently resettled closer to the fishing 
resource, others have taken multiple jobs, reflecting a start to pluralism, as predicted and 
observed in other research (Hobday et al. 2016). 
 
To help inform continued adaptation on the part of the community, I have evaluated four 
dimensions of the Maine lobster coupled human and natural ecosystem, to uncover opportunities 
and threats to the fishery, and build on our collective knowledge of how fisheries respond to 
large ecosystem changes. In this research I applied a variety of inter-disciplinary techniques to 
look at the complex fishery in a holistic way, such as non-market valuation techniques including 
surveys and contingent valuation methods, which originally were developed in support of other 
natural resources such as agriculture, and production efficiency analysis, typically used in 
fisheries aquaculture producer settings and with growing application for wild and trap fisheries. I 
also employed bio economic modeling techniques to build on growing body of knowledge in tis 
area, and I applied a unique blend of econometric and social engagement techniques, where data 
collection is combined with field interviews to derive meaning.  
 
In chapter 2, I have provided a series of production function performance baselines for future 
comparison, and to demonstrate potential efficiency gains on the part of lobstermen. Empirical 
results highlight the differences in technical inefficiency among vessel classes, and signal that 
societal benefits associated with employment levels have characterized the lobster production 
environment, over firm-level efficiency. We note a latent potential capacity increase on the part 
of existing lobstermen, through increases in skill and technical efficiency, and where this fishery 
places restrictions on number of traps, but not trap hauls or total removal quantity. This fishery, 
which is managed by input controls, has a 30% latent capacity and effort escalation is poised to 
occur. 
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In chapter 3, I look closely at current Maine limited entry licensing policies, and community 
goals, which resoundingly focus on the practice of ensuring the entry of young people as 
apprentices, ensuring the stability of the number of licenses and trap tags, and ensuring financial 
viability for existing Maine lobster businesses. This research also determined that if licenses 
were transferrable, incoming new entrants would be willing to pay an average of $16,665 for a 
Maine lobster license, and an average of $1,896 per trap tag, with those individuals seeking full 
time fishing willing to pay more than average.  
 
Landings patterns have changed in the Maine fishery, and routes to market and market response 
underpin the determinants of price. We found ex-vessel price in the Maine lobster fishery varies 
according to an inverse demand price response. Lobster landings volume tends to be based on the 
underlying ecological conditions as well as environmental factors, stock status, and input control 
regulatory limits, and not by price. Volumes of landings and projected volumes of landings then 
serve as a proxy for the total expected volume for the fishery and this in turn provides the basis 
for ex-vessel pricing. This research demonstrates that the recent addition of late season harvest 
contributes to excessive dealer inventory holdings over the winter, not just for the U.S. dealers, 
but neighboring Canadian processors as well. The combined effect of these product volumes has 
a direct negative effect on in-season ex-vessel price and introduces uncertainty in the business of 
lobstering.  
 
I applied a retrospective analysis against a baseline year to evaluate future profitability and 
economic performance in the fishery, under potential changing conditions facing the coupled 
natural and human system. We looked at both the individual harvester level impacts and 
compared this to the statewide impact of change. The production functions suggest 
overcapitalization in the Maine Lobster fishery, which is likely to confound efforts to effectively 
manage the resource in times of changing harvest patterns, and in light of variability in supply 
and changes in market demand. The fleet capitalization has implications and non-malleability of 
human and operating capital. 
 
Further research is recommended to build on the research methods applied in this thesis and 
enhance the resolution and applicability of the findings. An optimization question remains for the 
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Maine lobster fishery fleet capacity, and a simultaneously simulated bio economic model would 
allow for iterative modeling and better estimation of uncertainties associated with our models.  
More broadly, fisheries managers would benefit from specifically looking to enhance Maine’s 
unique limited entry system and developing further options for foundation change that will 
support what is likely to be major ecosystem restricting in the years to come (Dietz et al. 2003).  
Lessons and findings from other similar fisheries around the globe and linking with current 
ongoing research in Maine, much of it with lobster fishermen as collaborative partners, provides 
a basis for adaptation planning and community discussion. Industry-partnered independent 
fishery surveys, with specialized gear to capture ecosystem parameters over time also enhances 
the dialog around mitigation and behavior change, where all parties trust in the data provided. Or 
building on recent work to develop a harvest control framework for Maine lobster (Zhang et al. 
2011), and establishing thresholds for action according to in-season indices. This would create a 
nimble and rapid response to compliment traditional stock assessment methods, which at times 
lag behind observed trends due to data quality. Combined these yield a robust management 
framework. Further research into mechanisms to stabilize product volume spikes through supply 
chain collaboration, continued market development and trade relations with Canada, could 
bolster Maine’s return from the lobster fishery. Researchers in Australia have shown favorable 
results with management strategy evaluation that incorporates maximum economic yield 
concepts and metrics (Reid et al. 2013). This could in turn provide stability to the community 
upon which young families and the next generation can plan a future.  
 
In conclusion, the dynamic environment of the Maine lobster fishery in the Gulf of Maine offers 
a unique study system to evaluate the short and long term effects of anthropogenic changes in 
our environment, such as those associated with climate change. The lobster fishery has observed 
both large and small changes from historical patterns, with temperature rising faster in the Gulf 
of Maine than other bodies of water, and will need to continue to adapt to new inputs and 
stressors and change in an ecosystem where uncertainty and high variability have become the 
norm.  
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APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY COST SURVEY DESIGN AND RESPONSE 	
In collaboration with Maine Lobsterman’s Association, we conducted a comprehensive survey of 
the New England Lobster Industry. The target population consisted of all lobster permit holders 
in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts who fish in Lobster Management Area 1 (LMA 1) 
and landed at least 1,000 pounds of lobster in 2010. The goal of was to conduct a census among 
this group of lobstermen, and capture input and outputs associated with lobstering businesses, as 
well as demographics of the industry.  
 
Sample Frame 
The list of potential respondents was generated using lobster license lists provided by Maine, 
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and our overall survey response rate was 43%. Throughout 
the course of this research all 7,346 lobstermen included on the list were contacted by one or 
more of the following methods: mail, email, or phone (Dillman 1991).  
 
Table A.0.1 Summary of industry survey response rates 
  Response Rate 
Cooperation 
Rate 
Completion 
Rate 
Maine  44% 81% 98% 
New Hampshire  37% 84% 100% 
Massachusetts  35% 74% 96% 
Total  43% 80% 98% 
* Cooperation rate indicates they responded and began the survey; completion rate indicates the 
number who completed the entire survey. 		
Respondents were given the option to take the survey online or by telephone. Data collection 
began on April 11, 2011 and was completed by June 16, 2011. A total of 1,001 active lobstermen 
were interviewed during this period including 163 who completed the survey online and 838 who 
completed the survey over the telephone. Lobstermen were called up to 15 times by telephone 
until a contact was made and the lobstermen completed the survey or expressed that they were 
not interested in 2011 Lobster Industry Study and taking the survey. Most respondents did not 
require all 15 calls. On average 5.4 calls were made to each number in the sample list. 	
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Respondents provided a great deal of information about their lobster business. The goal was to 
obtain accurate information about the lobster business while limiting the time commitment 
required of the respondent. On average, the 1,001 interviews required 23.3 minutes each. While 
it was difficult to get an eligible participant on the phone, once a potential respondent was on the 
phone they were likely to cooperate and once they began the survey they were almost guaranteed 
to complete the survey. 	
Our survey penetration by Maine lobster Zone shows an average 23% of total potential 
lobstermen were surveyed. Survey coverage of Zones C and F was slightly less than the overall 
average at 18% and 19% respectively, and overall the number of responses within each zone 
provided sufficient statistical power to perform the analyses included in this report. These 
penetration rates were used to weight responses in our analyses. 
 
Table A.0.2 Maine LCMA I survey penetration rate by Maine lobster zone 
 
        
  Total # Licenses* 
# Survey % 
Responses Penetration 
Zone A 721 177 25% 
Zone B 395 93 24% 
Zone C 653 118 18% 
Zone D 720 187 26% 
Zone E 272 81 30% 
Zone F 494 92 19% 
Zone G 241 92 38% 
Overall 3,496 840 23% 
* Includes LC1, LC2, and LC3 license holders only 
*who land more than 1,000 lbs. of lobster per year. 			
Table A.0.3 Survey responses by vessel category 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Vessels w/lbs. > 1,000 (#) 3,496 1,641 1,218 637 
Total Surveyed (#) 1,001 461 373 167 
Survey population (%) 29 28 31 26 
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Data Collected Through the Survey 	
The survey questionnaire that was used in the 2011 Lobster Industry Study was developed in 
collaboration with the Maine Lobstermen’s Association, and input from other industry 
representatives and associations such as Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association. The basic 
components of the 2011 survey gathered information from active lobstermen fishing inshore in 
the designated area LMA 1 on the following areas of their fishing operations: 	
• Vessel Characteristics 
• Lobster Business Financing 
• Lobster Fishing Effort by Quarter 
a. Maximum Traps Fished 
b. Trap Configuration 
c. Number of Traps Hauled per Day 
d. Soak Time 
e. Time Spent on each Fishing Trip 
f. Days per Week Spent Fishing 
g. Number of Sternmen Taken on each Trip 
h. Steam Time to Fishing Grounds and Fuel Used 
• Time Spent on Gear Maintenance and Repair 
• Time Spent on Paperwork for Lobster Business 
• Other Fishing Activities Besides Lobster Fishing 
• Total Pounds of Lobster Landed 
• Revenue Generated by Lobster Business 
• Type, Amount and Cost of Bait Used for Lobster Fishing 
• Other Lobster Business Expenses 
a. Fuel 
b. Oil Changes 
c. Crew 
d. Gear and Vessel Maintenance and Repair 
e. Other Gear Purchases 
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f. Insurance 
g. Costs of Storing and Hauling Vessel 
h. Cost of Other Vehicles Used for Business 
i. Administrative Costs (office supplies, association dues, etc.) 
• Percentage of Household Income from Lobster Business 
Data Preparation and Audit Process 
 
Any survey process can result in erroneous reporting or recording of data. To ensure the 
accuracy of the data, we conducted data consistency checks on the data files. As a part of the 
data file preparation and analysis, the first stage of this process involved checking all data to 
insure that responses were consistent. This process involves insuring that respondents were asked 
appropriate questions based upon earlier responses to variables, skip patterns were followed 
based upon appropriate responses to earlier items, and that respondents provided consistent 
answers to questions on related concepts. 
 
The initial steps of data consistency checks were programmed into the survey instrument 
themselves. The programmed data checks insured that respondents were directed to appropriate 
questions and that answers to some key issues were verified. The next step involved using notes 
gathered during the interview that indicated different answers to those given. For example, some 
lobstermen provided responses that they then changed by the end of the survey. Instead of going 
back to the original question they simply added information at the end of the survey describing 
their updated response and these were coded into the data. Finally, data were analyzed for 
inconsistencies between related questions and corrected. If it was possible to deduce an 
unanswered question from answers to other questions then the original question was modified to 
reflect those other responses. For example, if a lobsterman said they were active during a 
particular quarter and then provided 0’s for all follow-up responses the questions were amended 
to be consistent. In the case of the above example, the lobsterman was considered as not active 
during the quarter in question. In general, however, unless responses were clearly inconsistent 
between two related questions responses were left as the respondent indicated during the survey. 
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Additional Data Used In the Analysis 	
The survey gathered quarterly cost and effort data from individual lobstermen and to ensure 
maximum participation rates did not collect corresponding quarterly harvest output data. So that 
we could analyze the data quarterly and generate estimated quarterly profitability, we secured 
permission to link this survey data with the mandatory dealer reports, and aggregated this at a 
broad scale to ensure confidentiality of individual harvesters. The data were stratified first by 
State, and within Maine again refined by Maine Lobster Zone, which provided regional 
perspective on the survey findings. We also stratified the data according to lobster vessel length 
category, and also by calendar quarter. Survey penetration rates were used to weight the 
responses when generating overall averages for the entire population. 
Survey Results and Summary 	
 
Fishing Effort 	
The estimate of the number of lobster traps deployed along the coast of Maine has been the 
subject of many debates. The number of sea surface marker buoys certainly makes the coast 
appear densely fished, at the same time GPS technologies, grapple hooks and new trawling up 
requirements mean there is less visible evidence of the true effort underway. It has become a 
younger man’s job -- for the pace is rigorous, and hauling and baiting a full string of traps is hard 
work.  
 
Our survey reveals that during the 1st quarter of 2010 (January to March) three in ten active 
lobstermen had landings. In the 1st quarter, on average, lobstermen had a maximum of 530 traps 
in the water (versus 450 traps in 2005), made two trips per week where they hauled traps, and 
hauled about 260 traps during each trip. Active lobstermen who fished during the 1st quarter 
reported landing just over 700 pounds of lobster on average, as compared to a similar study in 
2005 when they reported landing just under 900 pounds of lobster on average. 
 
During the 2nd quarter of 2010 (April to June) our survey shows three-quarters of active 
lobstermen had landings. In the 2nd quarter, on average, lobstermen had a maximum of 575 traps 
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in the water (versus 480 traps in 2005), made three trips per week where they hauled traps, and 
hauled about 252 traps during each trip. Active lobstermen who fished during the 2nd quarter 
reported landing about 2900 pounds of lobster on average, no change from 2005. 
 
During the 3rd quarter of 2010 (July to September) our survey shows 9 out of 10 active 
lobstermen had landings. In the 3rd quarter, on average, lobstermen had a maximum of 630 traps 
in the water (versus 557 traps in 2005), made four trips per week where they hauled traps, and 
hauled about 256 traps during each trip. Active lobstermen who fished during the 3rd quarter 
reported landing about 17,500 pounds on average, which is up significantly from 2005 when they 
reported landing 10,900 pounds of lobster on average. 
 
During the 4th quarter of 2010 (October to December) our survey shows 8 in 10 active 
lobstermen had landings. In the 4th quarter, on average, lobstermen had a maximum of 624 traps 
in the water (versus 550 traps in 2005), made four trips per week where they hauled traps, and 
hauled about 258 traps during each trip. Active lobstermen who fished during the 4th quarter 
reported landing about 11,200 pounds of lobster on average, which is up from 2005 when they 
reported landing 10,500 pounds of lobster on average. 
 
As a medium-term effort comparison, it is interesting to note that these effort reports trend 
closely with the survey responses provided in similar studies conducted in prior 5-year period. 
This suggests that on average fishing effort levels and fishing behavior have remained relatively 
constant over this 5 year period of time, although fishing locations may have changed and the 
average number of traps deployed per person increased in aggregate in all calendar quarters.  	
In our survey, we observed differences between vessel classes across the calendar quarters, 
which provides insight the differences in fishing techniques and skill that result in different 
levels of quarterly catch, revenue, and in turn annual profits for each type of fishing operation. 			
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Table A.0.4 Fishing effort expended within each quarter 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Quarter 1     
Actively Fishing (%)  28 14 35 54 
Number of trips (#/qtr) 29 29 27 30 
Soak Time (days) 7.53 7.07 7.59 7.91 
Max Traps (#/qtr) 482 362 536 692 
Traps Hauled (#/trip) 243 204 259 315 
Steam Time (hrs/trip) 1.17 0.78 1.18 1.55 
Quarter 2     
Actively Fishing (%) 77 73 81 82 
Number of trips (#/qtr) 46 47 45 45 
Soak Time (days) 4.69 4.62 4.71 4.72 
Max Traps (#/qtr) 531 414 594 718 
Traps Hauled (#/trip) 234 193 247 313 
Steam Time (hrs/trip) 0.66 0.47 0.61 0.90 
Quarter 3     
Actively Fishing (%) 94 94 95 93 
Number of trips (#/qtr) 55 53 56 56 
Soak Time (days) 3.67 3.65 3.71 3.64 
Max Traps (#/qtr) 592 474 665 756 
Traps Hauled (#/trip) 238 197 252 320 
Steam Time (hrs/trip) 0.57 0.49 0.49 0.74 
Quarter 4     
Actively Fishing (%) 85 78 92 90 
Number of trips (#/qtr) 50 48 51 52 
Soak Time (days) 4.37 4.08 4.89 4.11 
Max Traps (#/qtr) 582 466 648 758 
Traps Hauled (#/trip) 239 198 253 322 
Steam Time (hrs/trip) 0.81 0.57 0.77 1.08 
  
 
We first note a large number of similarities among vessel classes, for those vessels which are 
active in the quarter we see a similar average number of trips, and the soak time per trap fished in 
the quarter do not vary widely across the vessel categories. As well, active fishermen tend to haul 
through a similar percentage of their traps with each trip. We have concluded that these variables 
do not account for the observed differences in profitability. However, the variable Traps Hauled 
(#/trip) and Steam Time (hrs/trip) (with which a distance traveled variable was created) provide 
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good insight into distinguishing features of each vessel category and helps to explain observed 
variation in profitability, which is further explored in this analysis. 
 
Table A.0.5 Maine household dependence on lobstering and opportunity cost of labor 
Zone: A B C D E F G 
Household income %  77% 77% 81% 74% 64% 61% 69% 
Alt. Earnings/hr. $13 $17 $15 $16 $28 $20 $39 
 
The State dependence on lobstering as a profession is captured in table 2.5, where we see 
between 60% and 81% average dependence household on lobstering. The wage that individuals 
could earn if not lobstering also ranges greatly, from a low of $13 in the more rural and eastward 
portions of the State, to as high as $39 for western-most zones in the State. These values inform 
our profitability and economic return assessments, by zone.  
 
Operating Expenses  
Fishing expenses include the startup costs and licensing fees but on an ongoing basis fisherman 
incur expenses associated with labor, fuel & bait, annual vessel operations and maintenance, and 
business operations.  These expenses on average show labor as 19% of gross income, bait at 15% 
of gross, fuel at 10% of gross, vessel & gear maintenance expenses at 24% and administrative 
expenses at 6%. The details of each expense type are explored in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
 
Bait Usage 
The price of herring bait has significantly increased from $25 per barrel in 2000 to $150 per 
barrel in 2010, a 500% increase (Acheson and Acheson 2010). Furthermore, the herring industry 
faces a strict regulatory environment, with decreasing catches and increasing demand from 
Thailand, and eastern Asia. 
 
In our survey we collected information on the types of bait fished during the calendar quarters, 
and the cost expended on bait, and also units of bait purchased. Information was provided in 
great detail and collected in free text form, to retain as much value to the analysis as possible. 
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However, the variability in how much volume each of these bait units represents by bait type, 
and region of purchase, has confounded our efforts to derive bait quantity deployed from our 
survey. We therefore focus our analysis on bait types and bait costs, as a proxy bait quantity 
deployed. 
 
The bait types used vary significantly by region, reflecting the localized nature of this component 
of the industry. Herring remains the most widely used and efficient bait type, and the industry 
dependence on the continued availability of this pelagic species is deemed very high, and 
represents approximately 85% of the bait used. In Southern regions of the state pogies have 
become available as an alternative bait source, and redfish have become a choice for certain mid-
coast fishermen and sparsely in southern Maine. Racks, once very popular bait are now only seen 
used in New Hampshire fishing operations. Most experienced fishermen create a mix of bait, 
which they believe is more efficient and appealing to discerning lobsters. 
 
Table A.0.6 Bait type used by Maine lobster zone for fishing year 2010 
   
 
Zone 
A 
Zone 
B 
Zone 
C 
Zone 
D 
Zone 
E 
Zone 
F 
Zone 
G MA NH 
Herring 90% 86% 73% 73% 84% 37% 75% 76% 60% 
Pogies 3% 2% 0% 15% 14% 39% 11% 13% 4% 
Redfish 1% 8% 12% 4% 1% 19% 8% 0% 0% 
Racks 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 6% 26% 
Alewives 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 4% 2% 13% 5% 0% 4% 4% 4% 9% 
 
 
Fuel 
The price of diesel fuel has increased from $1.50 per gallon in 2004 to as high as $4.70 per 
gallon in 2008, $4.00 per gallon in 2013 and back down to $2.50 per gall on 2016 (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration). This cost is passed along the entire supply chain, making 
transportation one of the biggest expenses facing the lobster industry. Engine oil is another area 
of expense and time, and in our survey we found differences in the cost of an oil change, ranging 
from $85 to $186, and averaging $118 each time. Lobstermen typically change their oil 5 to 6 
times per year, and so this expense can be significant. 
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Table A.0.7 Average fuel consumption per fisherman by calendar quarter 
 
 
The strong seasonal differences in fuel and oil consumption reflect the weather conditions, 
distance traveled and spatial distribution of the lobster resource. Larger vessels are able to 
overcome these structural cost differences in the winter months, and fish profitably. In summer 
months none of the vessel categories experience a benefit, and the larger vessels may be over 
capitalized to profitably fish closer to shore. 
 
Labor 
One of the biggest expenses lobstermen can chose to incur or not is that of a crew. Most of the 
large vessels report bringing 2 crew per trip year round. More than half of the smaller vessels 
tend to fish without a sternman, although we see an increase in crew size for the third quarter of 
the year when the peak volume is landed, for all vessel categories.   
 
Table A.0.8 Vessel level crew and labor expenses 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Quarter 1 Fuel (gal/trip) 44 21 41 71 
Quarter 2 Fuel (gal/trip) 30 14 27 48 
Quarter 3 Fuel (gal/trip) 26 14 27 48 
Quarter 4 Fuel (gal/trip) 33 16 30 54 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Average Crew Share (%) 20 20 20 20 
Average Annual Crew Cost ($) 9,954 6,074 8,515 23,878 
Quarter 1     
Actively fishing (%) 28 14 35 54 
w/Crew aboard (%) 24 8 31 53 
Crew earnings ($/trip) 822 462 693 2,105 
Quarter 2     
Actively fishing (%) 77 73 81 82 
w/Crew aboard (%) 55 38 67 76 
Crew earnings ($/trip) 1,020  814 941 1,771 
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Crew wages are largely based on a percent of the revenue, after fuel and bait expenses have been 
deducted. Crews are typically paid extra for time on gear maintenance, vessel maintenance and 
other related tasks. Typical crew earnings reported in our survey are approximately $9,954 per 
year and range typically from $6,000 to $25,000, with some crew earning more or less than this. 
Zones A, B, and C have few other economic opportunities, and the wage earning potential 
outside of lobstering is low, with Zone A reporting a $13/hour potential alternate wage. 
Conversely, southern regions, especially those with strong tourism such as Zone G, offer more 
economic opportunity and the potential wage reported is much higher, at $39/hour. Compared to 
a similar study in 2005, dependency on the fishery increased across all regions as other job 
opportunities decreased. 
 
Maintenance 
Lobstermen work hard, and lobstering is a full-time year round job when all aspects of the 
business are included. Gear maintenance and repair often represents a significant investment of 
time and effort on the part of the fisherman.  Average annual equipment repair expenses total 
$30,433, of which $24,000 is related to the vessel and gear, and another $6,000 is related to 
administrative expense. In our survey, fishermen report expending significant amounts of time 
on gear maintenance, specifically: 17 hours per week in Q1 and Q2 when foul weather can 
damage gear and traps whereas they expend and average of 5 to 7 hours per week in each of Q3 
and Q4 when weather tends to be more favorable. 
 
 
 
Quarter 3 
Actively fishing (%) 94 94 95 93 
w/Crew aboard (%) 68 52 79 89 
Crew earnings ($/trip) 1,184 983 1,130 1,861 
Quarter 4     
Actively fishing (%) 85 78 92 90 
w/Crew aboard (%) 63 43 77 86 
Crew earnings ($/trip) 1,181 930 1,114 2,026 
Table A.8 continued 
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Table A.9 Annual vessel-level operating cost summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vessel Performance Measures 
 
Based on the data collected net return was positive for all vessel size classes ranging from a low 
of 26% of gross revenue to a high of 29% of gross (Table 2.11). While net returns above variable 
and fixed costs were all positive they do not account for the opportunity cost of capital or the 
opportunity cost of the owners labor. These opportunity costs provide a measure of whether 
capital would be better used in an alternative investment and whether the vessel owner would be 
financially better off in an alternative occupation.  
 
Table A.10 Annual vessel-level operating profits by vessel category 
Vessel length category: 
 
Overall 
Average 
34 feet and 
Under 35 – 39 feet 
40 feet and 
Over 
Gross Revenue ($) 97,333 56,132 114,331 173,103 
Bonus Amount1 12,304 6,499 13,037 26,693 
Variable Costs ($)2 42,810 24,223 51,795 74,053 
Variable Costs % Gross 44% 43% 45% 43% 
Fixed Costs ($)3 29,676 18,468 34,870 49,011 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Bank Fees ($) 860 392 1,266 1,245 
Boat Hauling & Storage ($) 606 455 618 994 
Safety Equipment ($) 909 501 1,070 1,677 
Equipment Maintenance ($) 8,468 4,705 10,150 15,101 
Equipment Taxes ($) 1,268 976 1,351 1,885 
Mooring and Wharf Fees ($) 702 383 895 1,150 
Office Supplies ($) 350 231 382 613 
Permits & Tags ($) 778 671 840 937 
Trap Replacement ($) 760 570 850 1,060 
Vehicle Costs ($) 4,752 3,901 5,450 5,545 
Vessel Maintenance ($) 7,792 4,254 9,346 14,087 
Vessel Operations ($) 907 461 987 1957 
Vessel Insurance ($) 2,282 1,537 2,515 3,819 
Total Expenses ($) 30,433 19,040 35,722 50,072 
Vessel Maintenance Total ($) 23,975 14,514 27,773 41,608 
Admin Costs Total ($) 5,963 4,524 7,098 7,403 
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Fixed Costs % Gross 30% 33% 30% 28% 
Net Return ($) 24,847 13,440 27,666 50,040 
Net Return % Gross 26% 24% 24% 29% 
Cost of Capital ($) 10,186 6,722 10,744 18,504 
Capital % Gross 10% 12% 9% 11% 
Opportunity Cost4 Labor ($) 36,015 29,379 43,381 37,887 
Economic Return ($) -33,897 -29,601 -41,088 -29,699 
Economic Return  % Gross -31% -47% -32% -15% 1	End	of	year	bonus	is	collected	as	a	separate	income	at	year’s	end. 2	Variable	costs	include	bait,	fuel,	labor	only.	3	Fixed	costs	include	all	other	operating	costs	including	vessel	operations,	insurance	and	vehicle	expenses,	as	well	as	safety	equipment,	administrative	expenses,	and	fees.	4	Opportunity	cost	represents	the	potential	earnings	if	not	lobstering.	
 
In our analysis we calculated opportunity cost of capital by multiplying the market interest rate 
of 2% for 2010 by the reported capital investment by each vessel owner; the opportunity cost of 
labor was based on the survey respondent’s self-assessment of what could be earned in an 
alternative occupation. After taking these economic costs into account net returns for all vessel 
classes is negative.  
 
Catch-per-unit-effort 
The differences in catch and revenue between the vessel classes appear to lie in the vessels 
themselves, the number of traps hauled per trip, and the average steam time per trip -- from 
which we have further derived a new quarterly variable, distance traveled, using steam time as a 
basis for calculating this, and which appears to have significant explanatory power for catch-per-
unit-effort (“CPUE”). 
 
We see that CPUE is significantly higher for the larger vessel classes than the smaller vessel 
class, as is the revenue per unit effort. These trends are observed, despite relatively uniform price 
per pound across vessel classes. We attribute the increases in pounds caught to the total distance 
traveled, and the total number of trap hauls per trip (versus haul through % or number of traps in 
the water). Our survey shows that a 50% increase in the distance traveled in Q1 for example, 
corresponds to a 650% increase in the catch per trap haul. This relationship remains positively 
correlated, in all quarters but the returns are lower in the other three calendar quarters. The 
production functions are explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Table A.10 continued 
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Figure A.1 Quarterly revenue by vessel class, and associated quarterly operating profits 
 
The efficiency of this strategy however is less clear, and so we take a closer look at the catch per 
fuel gallon expended in each calendar quarter. Here we see that in Q1 for example a 238% 
increase in gallons of fuel per trip is able to generate the 650% increase in the catch, but in the 
highly productive Q3 time period when the lobsters are closer to shore, a 185% increase in fuel 
per trip, leads only to a 47% increase in the catch. With the bulk of the lobster landings occurring 
in this time Q3 time period, the overall net effect of this strategy is to erode profitability. 
 
Revenue-per-trap also varies by size vessel and also by zone, which is higher for fishermen who 
fish in Zones A, B, C and D, and appears to be a function of average number of trap hauls, which 
is closely related to total traps fished, but can also be a function of a fisherman’s skill and effort. 
This suggests that it may be difficult to predict individual profitability based on number of trap 
tags purchased, since the number of trap hauls and the particular habitat may be a better indicator 
of financial success. 
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Table A.11 Quarterly vessel-level productivity measures 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Price Per Pound     
Q1 4.07 4.09 4.04 4.09 
Q2 3.78  3.68 3.85 3.91 
Q3  3.01 3.00 3.00 3.03 
Q4  3.55 3.56 3.53 3.58 
Catch per unit effort1      
Q1  0.06 0.02 0.08 0.15 
Q2  0.21 0.13 0.26 0.34 
Q3 1.11  0.89 1.31 1.31 
Q4 0.66 0.38 0.80 1.11 
Revenue per unit effort      
Q1  0.26 0.09 0.32 0.60 
Q2  0.81 0.49 0.99 1.34 
Q3  3.35 2.66 3.93 3.97 
Q4 2.35 1.37 2.83 3.97 
Distance Traveled2     
Q1  16 12 18 23 
Q2  9 7 10 14 
Q3  8 8 8 12 
Q4 12 9 12 17 
Catch per gallon fuel     
Q1  0.42 0.26 0.51 0.66 
Q2  2.19 1.88 2.45 2.46 
Q3  12.64 12.59 13.43 11.04 
Q4  6.04 5.00 6.79 7.25 
1 One unit of effort is defined as one trap haul. 
2 Distance traveled is measured in miles. 
 
As we saw in the profitability analysis for harvesters above, the profit margin associated with the 
harvester side of lobstering can be relatively low, favoring operations of scale, or larger vessels 
those landing more than 90,000 lbs. per year. Increases in operating costs, coupled with deflated 
landed boat price, have caused lobstermen to increase their annual catch further as a means of 
maintaining a certain level of operating income. This increase in supply without the increase in 
product demand, has a further negative effect on the boat and market price, and also places 
additional fishing pressure on the resource.  
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Survey of Maine Harvesters and Dealers 
In conjunction with the cost survey administered to Maine Lobstermen in 2011, a separate in-
depth survey was conducted as a series of interviews with individual prominent Maine lobster 
dealers from the Maine coastal area. Through these survey interviews, we compiled a general 
process upon which to develop our pricing assumptions, and these are described as a supply 
chain continuum from the vessel to the market place (Plagányi et al. 2014), with identified 
transaction points but we did not extend our analysis to quantify these relationships with a 
model.  
 
Maine’s lobster supply chain starts with the individual fishermen, who lands product at their 
home dock or a designated wharf and offers the product for sale to a first station buyer, as a bulk 
quantity of lobsters in a mixed quality and size called a “run”.  The survey results indicate that 
on average 89% of product has been landed in this way, with some distinction by Maine zone, 
with Maine Zone D landing the most “run” product at 94% on average.  Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire tend to have lower “run” product percentages, at 82% and 85% respectively. 
Harvesters are searching for ways to improve their product value and sorting and grading offers 
one such opportunity. 	
Table A.12 Ex-vessel price by fishing area for year 2010 
 
 
Zone 
A 
Zone 
B 
Zone 
C 
Zone 
D 
Zone 
E 
Zone 
F 
Zone 
G MA NH 
Product “run” (%) 86 88 90 94 91 87 85 88 82 
Avg ex-vessel price ($) 3.55 3.30 3.24 3.01 3.17 3.47 3.32 3.69 3.74 
Adj ex-vessel  price1 ($) 3.98 3.57 3.61 3.44 3.44 3.64 3.52 3.81 3.74 
1 Includes returns associated with end of year of coop bonus. 
 
Conversely, the larger scale operations and areas where the resource abundance and catch rates 
may be higher such as Maine Zone C, we see a higher percentage of their product sold as a 
“run”, in our survey we saw an 95% run rate for these operations. Implications from these figures 
relate to meat yield, and inventory perishability. 	
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Table A.13 Product grade and reported price for 2011 
Vessel Length Category: 
Overall 
Average 
34 and 
below 
35 to 39 
feet 
40 and 
above 
Product grade “run” (%) 89 86 91 90 
Reported Boat price ($)  3.78 3.68 3.85 3.91 
Adjusted Boat price1 ($)  4.07 4.09 4.04 4.09 
1Includes annual end of year bonus payment 
 
 
The dockside buyer, also referred to as a dealer or Cooperative (“Co-op”), takes this largely 
undifferentiated product from the harvester at a “boat price”.  To attract the needed volume of 
product, the Dealer can be organized as a fisherman’s Cooperative structure, and provide for an 
annual per pound bonus between $0.50/lb. and $0.75/lb. to incentivize harvesters. 	
The dealer then sorts, grades, and makes a decision about the route each piece of inventory will 
take, based on quality. This dealer is often competing with other dealers for the same markets, 
and so volume is required to overcome structural costs of labor, wharf, credit, and administrative 
overhead to perform the product differentiation, buying & selling, and arranging the transport. In 
addition, the dealer owns the product inventory and accepts 100% of the risk the associated 
shrink, which can be as high as 20% for shedders, or as low as 5% for hard shell product. 
Reduced lobster mortality, or shrink, provides an important opportunity for all segments to 
improve yield and reduce costs. It also offers an important biological consideration, and how this 
prematurely harvested product could help to ensure the longer-term population remains stable, 
with consistently high harvest yields in the future.  
	
Thirteen local industry owned cooperatives are major players in terms of buying direct from 
harvesters in Maine, but most sell directly to a dealer/processor as a primary buyer. Other buyers 
are dock owners or dealers. In some areas, harvesters have access to more than one buying 
station dock to sell their lobster catch. For example, in Beal’s Island, harvesters have access to 
more than 5 buying stations on any given day. This may be true for several more areas, but for 
many fishermen it can be the opposite – however accessibility rather than the availability of the 
dock is an issue and harvesters may have issues trying to reach a buying station that is not readily 
available. 
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One or several dealers may serve buying stations, and some wholesalers have moved into the 
dealer space in an effort to increase their overall business. However, dealers and wholesalers do 
not appear to dominate geographically to a sufficient scale to become price-setters. While there 
may be limited dealers serving any individual buying station, or even a group of stations in an 
area, there are no explicit contracts restricting access. Existing relationships or other informal 
arrangements may be present that affect the decision-making process. The harvester typically 
gets 70 to 75% of the export price or that first wholesale price.  
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APPENDIX B: A SURVEY TO UNCOVER ATTITUDES AND GOALS FOR LIMITED 
ENTRY LOBSTER LICENSING 
Survey Overview 
 
A separate survey was developed for the license holder and non-license holder groups. Data 
collection took place between August 10, 2012 and September 10, 2012.  Potential respondents 
from the sample list were mailed a survey along with a cover letter stating the purpose of the 
research, and a business reply mail envelope for easy return. The number and instructions on 
how to access the phone line were included in the cover letter as well. 
Sample Frame 
 
The sample files consisted of commercial lobster license holders as well as those not holding a 
commercial license but are on waiting lists to acquire a license or who are completing training. 
Lists consisted of 5,195 commercial lobster license holders and 1,572 non-license holders (1,276 
in training programs and 296 on a waiting list). Sample files contained addresses for mailing. 
Survey data were collected on 1,416 license holders and 313 non-license holders.  A breakdown 
of response rates is provided in the table below: 
 
Table B.1 Survey Response Rates 
Type of Survey Total Surveys Mailed 
Returned as 
Bad Address 
Total Completed 
Surveys Returned 
Response 
Rate 
License Holder 5,195 27 1,416 27.4% 
Non-License Holder 1,572 20 313 20.2% 
Total 6,767 47 1,730 25.7% 
 
A total of 44 comments were collected by phone. According to the distribution of population, the 
distribution of our sample by zones is relative similar to the distribution of the population, such 
as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure B.1 Survey penetration rates by Maine lobster zone 
 
Results 
 
We present the survey summary, goals and attitudes responses, as well as contingency table 
results of all the questions presented in each of two surveys; first for the individuals who hold a 
lobster license and a second section for the survey of those individuals who do not hold a lobster 
license. We also look at the sources of new entrants to the fishery in Table 7.2 below as context 
for the attitudes and outcomes uncovered in our surveys. 
 
Table B.2 An Analysis of entry sources for Maine lobster license holders 
Include	All	Zones	
Year:	
Existing	
Apprentice	
and	Student	
Licenses	over	
18	years	old	
(LA)		
New	
LC123	
Licenses	
off	
Waiting	
over	18	
years	old	
%	of	LA	
group	to	
awarded	
LC123	
Existing	
Student	
Licenses	
(LCS)	
under	18	
years	old	
New	
LC123	
Licenses	
under	18	
years	old	
%	of	LCS	
under	18	
years	old	
group	
awarded	
LC123	
Total	
%	of	all	new	
entrants	
started	as	
apprentice	>	
18	
%	of	all	new	
entrants	
started	as	
student	<	
18	
(A)	 (B)	 (B)/(A)	 (C)	 (D)	 (D)/(C)	 (B)+(D)	 (B)/(B+D)	 (D)/(B+D)	
2005	 420	 81	 19%	 602	 65	 11%	 146	 55%	 45%	
2006	 317	 61	 19%	 535	 67	 13%	 128	 48%	 52%	
2007	 251	 56	 22%	 550	 43	 8%	 99	 57%	 43%	
2008	 229	 50	 22%	 534	 31	 6%	 81	 62%	 38%	
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2009	 193	 30	 16%	 504	 26	 5%	 56	 54%	 46%	
2010	 174	 31	 18%	 475	 26	 5%	 57	 54%	 46%	
2011	 209	 36	 17%	 520	 27	 5%	 63	 57%	 43%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 201	 37	 18%	 508	 28	 5%	 64	 57%	 43%	
Zone	A	Entry	Only	
2005	 114	 11	 10%	 120	 24	 20%	 35	 31%	 69%	
2006	 62	 9	 15%	 92	 26	 28%	 35	 26%	 74%	
2007	 53	 13	 25%	 95	 11	 12%	 24	 54%	 46%	
2008	 40	 10	 25%	 97	 6	 6%	 16	 63%	 38%	
2009	 27	 5	 19%	 87	 5	 6%	 10	 50%	 50%	
2010	 25	 6	 24%	 83	 6	 7%	 12	 50%	 50%	
2011	 37	 4	 11%	 99	 7	 7%	 11	 36%	 64%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 51	 8	 18%	 96	 12	 12%	 12	 50%	 50%	
Zone	B	Entry	Only	
2005	 41	 4	 10%	 80	 2	 3%	 6	 67%	 33%	
2006	 29	 6	 21%	 60	 9	 15%	 15	 40%	 60%	
2007	 30	 8	 27%	 61	 6	 10%	 14	 57%	 43%	
2008	 22	 4	 18%	 62	 5	 8%	 9	 44%	 56%	
2009	 15	 0	 0%	 68	 5	 7%	 5	 0%	 100%	
2010	 9	 2	 22%	 76	 5	 7%	 7	 29%	 71%	
2011	 5	 2	 40%	 78	 6	 8%	 8	 25%	 75%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 13	 4	 20%	 69	 5	 8%	 7	 25%	 75%	
Zone	C	Entry	Only	
2005	 54	 27	 6%	 104	 6	 6%	 33	 82%	 18%	
2006	 54	 18	 6%	 95	 10	 11%	 28	 64%	 36%	
2007	 44	 8	 3%	 99	 3	 3%	 11	 73%	 27%	
2008	 54	 11	 5%	 98	 1	 1%	 12	 92%	 8%	
2009	 51	 18	 9%	 85	 4	 5%	 22	 82%	 18%	
2010	 41	 14	 8%	 84	 2	 2%	 16	 88%	 13%	
2011	 64	 22	 11%	 88	 3	 3%	 25	 88%	 12%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 52	 17	 7%	 93	 4	 4%	 21	 81%	 19%	
Zone	D	Entry	Only	
2005	 83	 11	 13%	 149	 11	 7%	 22	 50%	 50%	
2006	 61	 8	 13%	 132	 8	 6%	 16	 50%	 50%	
2007	 39	 9	 23%	 125	 9	 7%	 18	 50%	 50%	
2008	 26	 10	 38%	 117	 10	 9%	 20	 50%	 50%	
2009	 29	 3	 10%	 103	 3	 3%	 6	 50%	 50%	
2010	 22	 3	 14%	 87	 3	 3%	 6	 50%	 50%	
2011	 28	 2	 7%	 100	 2	 2%	 4	 50%	 50%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 41	 7	 17%	 116	 7	 5%	 13	 50%	 50%	
Zone	E	Entry	Only	
2005	 31	 3	 10%	 58	 6	 10%	 9	 33%	 67%	
Table B.2 continued 
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2006	 24	 4	 17%	 49	 6	 12%	 10	 40%	 60%	
2007	 18	 3	 17%	 55	 6	 11%	 9	 33%	 67%	
2008	 19	 5	 26%	 50	 2	 4%	 7	 71%	 29%	
2009	 12	 1	 8%	 41	 3	 7%	 4	 25%	 75%	
2010	 13	 1	 8%	 37	 4	 11%	 5	 20%	 80%	
2011	 13	 2	 15%	 40	 2	 5%	 4	 50%	 50%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 19	 3	 14%	 47	 4	 9%	 7	 39%	 61%	
Zone	F	Entry	Only	
2005	 51	 14	 27%	 69	 9	 13%	 23	 61%	 39%	
2006	 51	 12	 24%	 76	 7	 9%	 19	 63%	 37%	
2007	 40	 11	 28%	 85	 3	 4%	 14	 79%	 21%	
2008	 42	 6	 14%	 78	 4	 5%	 10	 60%	 40%	
2009	 32	 3	 9%	 83	 3	 4%	 6	 50%	 50%	
2010	 42	 2	 5%	 74	 2	 3%	 4	 50%	 50%	
2011	 44	 3	 7%	 81	 6	 7%	 9	 33%	 67%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 43	 7	 16%	 78	 5	 6%	 12	 57%	 43%	
Zone	G	Entry	Only	
2005	 83	 11	 13%	 120	 7	 6%	 18	 61%	 39%	
2006	 61	 4	 7%	 92	 1	 1%	 5	 80%	 20%	
2007	 39	 4	 10%	 95	 5	 5%	 9	 44%	 56%	
2008	 26	 4	 15%	 97	 3	 3%	 7	 57%	 43%	
2009	 29	 0	 0%	 87	 3	 3%	 3	 0%	 100%	
2010	 22	 3	 14%	 83	 4	 5%	 7	 43%	 57%	
2011	 28	 1	 4%	 99	 1	 1%	 2	 50%	 50%	
Average	'08	-	'11	 41	 4	 9%	 96	 3	 4%	 7	 48%	 52%	
  
License Holders Survey Results Detailed 
 
Question number 4a of the survey for current lobster license holders states “What do you believe 
should be the goals of a lobster limited entry system?” Table Q4-1 shows the survey responses of 
current lobster license holders in regard to the listed eight limited entry lobster license system 
goals.  
 
Respondents were asked to select all goals that apply. The clear favorite among respondents is 
the goal of having a system work as a mechanism for young people to obtain a lobster license. 
The nearly 23% margin of selection advantage it holds over the goal choice of having a system 
work as a mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster license may reflect the desire of lobstering 
families to ensure entry possibilities for the next generation. While slightly more than half of all 
Table B.2 continued 
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respondents included financial viability of existing license holders by limiting participation as a 
goal, their least popular choice, at 36.1%, was to reduce the number of license holders. This may 
be indicative of there being a greater concern among lobstermen about who gets a license as 
opposed to how many licenses are given. 
 
Table B.3 Tabulated Responses to Goals Question by License Holders 
      # Yes         %YES Mechanism for young people to obtain a lobster license 888 62.7
% Stabilize the number of license holders 743 52.5
% Protect the lobster resource from depletion 711 50.2
% Financial viability of existing license holders by limiting participation 709 50.1
% Stabilize the number of traps fished 649 45.8
% Reduce the number of traps fished 630 44.5
% Mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster license 564 39.8
% Reduce the number of license holders 511 36.1
% Other 293 20.7
%  
 
Question number 4b of the survey for current lobster license holders states “Does the current 
system achieve these goals?” Respondents were asked to give their opinion by way of choosing a 
number on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning strongly disagree and 5 meaning strongly agree. 
Figures Q4-1 through Q4-8 below illustrate the survey responses to this series of questions. 
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Figure Q4-1 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of Making a system a Mechanism 
for Young People to Obtain a License 
 
Figure Q4-2 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Stabilize the Number of License Holders 
Figure Q4-3 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Protect the Lobster Source from Depletion 
 
 
Figure Q4-4 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Achieve the Financial Viability of Existing 
License Holders by Limiting Participation 
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Figure Q4-5 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Stabilize the Number of Traps Fished 
 
 
 
Figure Q4-6 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Reduce the Number of Traps Fished 
 
Figure Q4-7 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system be 
a Mechanism for Adults to Obtain a License 
 
 
Figure Q4-8 Lobster License Holder 
Opinions of the Goal of Having a system 
Reduce the Number of License Holders 
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Question Three: “How worried are you about the number of traps fished in your zone?” 
Responses are generally uniform across zones, tag numbers, and landings, with roughly one third 
or respondents not worried, one third somewhat worried, and slightly under one third very 
worried. There are two notable exceptions. A lower proportion of respondents in Zone C said 
they were very worried than in all other zones. In Zone F, a higher proportion said that they were 
very worried, and a larger majority said that they were either somewhat or very worried. It may 
also be noted that least worried categories of respondents in terms of landings are the lowest 
bracket and the two highest brackets. 
 
Question Five: “Do you favor a change to the current trap limit per person in your zone?” 
There was universally small support among respondents for increases in trap limits. Most support 
for increasing the limit is found among the two highest levels of tags issued. A majority of 
respondents supports no change in all zones except in Zone F, where the most common response 
favored a decrease in the trap limit. 
 
Question Six: “If the trap limit were changed, do you favor a proportional adjustment or an 
across-the-board trap limit per person?” 
Support for a proportional change was very low in all tag and landings groups except for the 
highest trap bracket and highest landings bracket. The majority of respondents in all zones favor 
across-the-board changes. 
 
Question Seven: “Do you support the current regulations that allow students under age 18 who 
have completed the apprentice requirement to get a commercial license without going on the 
waiting list?” 
A majority of respondents favor the current system in Zones A, B, C and E. The margin is widest 
in Zones B and C. In Zone D, respondents are almost equally split between supporting and not 
supporting. In Zones E and G, a majority does not support the current system. Both the highest 
trap bracket and the highest landings bracket favor the current system by wide margins. 
 
Question Eight: “Do you support the current entry or exit ratio based on tags retiring in your 
zone?” 
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A majority agrees with current entry ratio in all categories. Only a small minority support more 
entrants in any category. The highest proportion of respondents that support allowing more 
entrants is found in zone A. There is also marginally higher support for more entrants in the 
lowest landings bracket. Zone F has the highest proportion of respondents who support allowing 
fewer entrants. 
 
Question Nine: “Do you favor eliminating latent effort in the form of trap tags that are not 
issued?” 
The majority of individuals in the lowest landings bracket do not wish to eliminate unissued tags. 
Individuals in with landings from ten to thirty thousand pounds per year are about evenly split, 
and individuals in the two highest landings brackets show the most support for eliminating 
unissued tags. In Zones B, C and E, the most common response was in favor of eliminating 
unissued tags. Zones A, D, and G are the opposite. 
 
Question Ten: “Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing licenses not 
being fished? 
Responses were almost evenly split in all zones. Eliminating unused licenses found the least 
support among those with less than 500 tags or less than a thousand pounds of landings. 
 
Question Eleven: “Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing trap tags 
that are issued but not fished? 
In all zones, the majority of respondents are against removing issued but unused tags. This 
preference was especially strong in Zone G. Elimination was highly unfavorable to lower 
landings and tags brackets but was the most common response among the highest landings 
bracket. 
 
Question twelve: “Do you believe licenses and or tags should be transferable?” 
The majority of respondents were in favor of transferable licenses in all zones and all tag ranges. 
Transferable tags were not as popular as licenses and did not receive majority support in any 
category. 
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Question Fifteen: “Do you support an overall limit on total lbs. of lobster landed in Maine per 
year?” 
In all categories, respondents overwhelmingly did not support an overall state limit. 
 
Question Sixteen: “Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per zone per year? 
In all categories, respondents overwhelmingly did not support an overall zone limit. 
 
Question Eighteen: “Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per fisherman per year? 
In all categories, respondents overwhelmingly did not support an individual quota. 
 
Table B.4 Contingency tables for license holders survey responses all questions  
Q01: What percentage of your total household income comes from your lobster 
business? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q01: What percentage of 
your total household 
income comes from your 
lobster business? 
80% - 100% 732.0 51.7% 
50% - 80% 260.0 18.4% 
25%- 50% 146.0 10.3% 
Less than 25% 244.0 17.2% 
NO ANSWER 34.0 2.4% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q02: How many traps did you fish last year (maximum # in the water at once)? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q02: How many traps did 
you fish last year 
(maximum # in the water at 
once)? 
0 62.0 4.4% 
1 2.0 .1% 
2 2.0 .1% 
3 1.0 .1% 
6 1.0 .1% 
9 1.0 .1% 
10 3.0 .2% 
12 1.0 .1% 
15 4.0 .3% 
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16 1.0 .1% 
18 1.0 .1% 
20 10.0 .7% 
25 7.0 .5% 
26 1.0 .1% 
28 1.0 .1% 
30 7.0 .5% 
35 2.0 .1% 
40 9.0 .6% 
50 26.0 1.8% 
53 1.0 .1% 
55 1.0 .1% 
60 4.0 .3% 
70 2.0 .1% 
75 7.0 .5% 
78 1.0 .1% 
80 7.0 .5% 
82 1.0 .1% 
90 1.0 .1% 
100 33.0 2.3% 
115 1.0 .1% 
120 4.0 .3% 
125 5.0 .4% 
130 1.0 .1% 
135 2.0 .1% 
140 1.0 .1% 
150 26.0 1.8% 
160 2.0 .1% 
165 1.0 .1% 
170 2.0 .1% 
175 1.0 .1% 
180 2.0 .1% 
190 2.0 .1% 
200 40.0 2.8% 
220 1.0 .1% 
230 2.0 .1% 
235 1.0 .1% 
250 19.0 1.3% 
270 1.0 .1% 
Table B.4 continued 
  178 
275 2.0 .1% 
280 2.0 .1% 
300 57.0 4.0% 
320 1.0 .1% 
325 1.0 .1% 
330 3.0 .2% 
340 2.0 .1% 
350 22.0 1.6% 
355 1.0 .1% 
360 1.0 .1% 
370 1.0 .1% 
385 1.0 .1% 
400 67.0 4.7% 
410 3.0 .2% 
425 1.0 .1% 
440 1.0 .1% 
450 19.0 1.3% 
460 1.0 .1% 
475 12.0 .8% 
490 1.0 .1% 
500 62.0 4.4% 
505 1.0 .1% 
510 1.0 .1% 
520 2.0 .1% 
525 1.0 .1% 
531 1.0 .1% 
535 1.0 .1% 
537 1.0 .1% 
540 1.0 .1% 
550 11.0 .8% 
570 3.0 .2% 
575 3.0 .2% 
580 3.0 .2% 
585 1.0 .1% 
600 126.0 8.9% 
621 1.0 .1% 
625 2.0 .1% 
630 1.0 .1% 
640 1.0 .1% 
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650 11.0 .8% 
670 1.0 .1% 
675 1.0 .1% 
700 41.0 2.9% 
704 1.0 .1% 
720 5.0 .4% 
730 2.0 .1% 
745 1.0 .1% 
750 20.0 1.4% 
760 3.0 .2% 
780 5.0 .4% 
781 1.0 .1% 
784 1.0 .1% 
785 1.0 .1% 
787 1.0 .1% 
790 2.0 .1% 
800 542.0 38.3% 
900 1.0 .1% 
1200 1.0 .1% 
5555 1.0 .1% 
REF 38.0 2.7% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q03: How worried are you about the number of traps fished in your Zone? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q03: How worried are you 
about the number of traps 
fished in your Zone? 
Very 411.0 29.0% 
Somewhat 494.0 34.9% 
No Worries 422.0 29.8% 
No Opinion 64.0 4.5% 
NO ANSWER 25.0 1.8% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q05: Do you favor a change to the current trap limit per person in your zone? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
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Q05: Do you favor a 
change to the current trap 
limit per person in your 
zone? 
Yes - Increase 94.0 6.6% 
Yes - Decrease 552.0 39.0% 
No Change 755.0 53.3% 
NO ANSWER 15.0 1.1% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q06: If the trap limit were changed, do you favor a proportional adjustment or an 
across-the-board trap limit per person? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q06: If the trap limit were 
changed, do you favor a 
proportional adjustment or 
an across-the-board trap 
limit per person? 
Proportional 396.0 28.0% 
Across-the-board 802.0 56.6% 
No Opinion 153.0 10.8% 
NO ANSWER 65.0 4.6% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q07: Do you support the current regulations that allow students under age 18 
who have completed the apprentice requirement to get a commercial license 
without going on the waiting list? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q07: Do you support the 
current regulations that 
allow students under age 18 
who have completed the 
apprentice requirement to 
get a commercial license 
without going on the 
waiting list? 
Yes 724.0 51.1% 
No 563.0 39.8% 
No Opinion 111.0 7.8% 
NO ANSWER 18.0 1.3% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q08: Do you support the current entry or exit ratio based on tags retiring in your 
zone? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q08: Do you support the 
current entry or exit ratio 
based on tags retiring in 
Yes - keep it as is 732.0 51.7% 
No - allow fewer entrants 300.0 21.2% 
No - allow more entrants 198.0 14.0% 
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your zone? No Opinion 149.0 10.5% 
NO ANSWER 37.0 2.6% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q09: Do you favor eliminating latent effort in the form of trap tags that are not 
issued? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q09: Do you favor 
eliminating latent effort in 
the form of trap tags that 
are not issued? 
Yes 431.0 30.4% 
No 509.0 35.9% 
No Opinion 417.0 29.4% 
NO ANSWER 59.0 4.2% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q10: Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing licenses 
not being fished? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q10: Do you support 
eliminating latent effort in 
the form of removing 
licenses not being fished? 
Yes 582.0 41.1% 
No 663.0 46.8% 
No Opinion 144.0 10.2% 
NO ANSWER 27.0 1.9% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q11: Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing trap tags 
that are issued but not fished? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q11: Do you support 
eliminating latent effort in 
the form of removing trap 
tags that are issued but not 
fished? 
Yes 419.0 29.6% 
No 802.0 56.6% 
No Opinion 158.0 11.2% 
NO ANSWER 37.0 2.6% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q12: Do you believe licenses and or tags should be transferable? 
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Total 
Count % 
Q12: Do you believe 
licenses and or tags should 
be transferable? 
Yes - Tags 71.0 5.0% 
Yes - Licenses 285.0 20.1% 
Yes - Both 511.0 36.1% 
No - Neither 488.0 34.5% 
No Opinion 44.0 3.1% 
NO ANSWER 17.0 1.2% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q13: If tags were transferable, how many traps would you ideally fish (max # in 
the water at once)? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q13: If tags were 
transferable, how many 
traps would you ideally fish 
(max # in the water at 
once)? 
0 20.0 1.4% 
3 1.0 .1% 
4 1.0 .1% 
6 1.0 .1% 
9 1.0 .1% 
11 1.0 .1% 
15 1.0 .1% 
16 1.0 .1% 
18 1.0 .1% 
20 2.0 .1% 
25 3.0 .2% 
35 1.0 .1% 
40 2.0 .1% 
50 12.0 .8% 
60 1.0 .1% 
80 5.0 .4% 
100 25.0 1.8% 
120 2.0 .1% 
135 1.0 .1% 
150 16.0 1.1% 
200 22.0 1.6% 
225 1.0 .1% 
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250 9.0 .6% 
300 44.0 3.1% 
350 12.0 .8% 
360 1.0 .1% 
400 77.0 5.4% 
450 16.0 1.1% 
475 5.0 .4% 
500 63.0 4.4% 
503 1.0 .1% 
550 4.0 .3% 
575 1.0 .1% 
600 147.0 10.4% 
650 11.0 .8% 
700 19.0 1.3% 
750 6.0 .4% 
760 1.0 .1% 
777 1.0 .1% 
790 2.0 .1% 
800 326.0 23.0% 
900 23.0 1.6% 
1000 41.0 2.9% 
1050 1.0 .1% 
1100 3.0 .2% 
1200 67.0 4.7% 
1300 1.0 .1% 
1350 1.0 .1% 
1400 1.0 .1% 
1500 4.0 .3% 
1600 25.0 1.8% 
1800 1.0 .1% 
2000 7.0 .5% 
2500 1.0 .1% 
3000 1.0 .1% 
4000 1.0 .1% 
5000 1.0 .1% 
6000 1.0 .1% 
9997 1.0 .1% 
REF 368.0 26.0% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
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Q14: If tags or licenses were transferable, what restrictions should be applied to 
transfers? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q14 Inter-family direct relation 694.0 49.0% 
Within a Harbor 76.0 5.4% 
Within a Fishing 
Cooperative 
21.0 1.5% 
Inter-family distant 
relations 
215.0 15.2% 
Within a Zone 369.0 26.1% 
No Restrictions 215.0 15.2% 
Owner-operator only 439.0 31.0% 
Within Island Communities 115.0 8.1% 
Other 101.0 7.1% 
NO ANSWER 112.0 7.9% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q15: Do you support an overall limit on total lbs. of lobster landed in Maine per 
year? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q15: Do you support an 
overall limit on total lbs. of 
lobster landed in Maine per 
year? 
Yes 90.0 6.4% 
No 1262.0 89.1% 
No Opinion 46.0 3.2% 
NO ANSWER 18.0 1.3% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q16: Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per zone per year? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q16: Do you support a 
quota on pounds of lobster 
landed per zone per year? 
Yes 76.0 5.4% 
No 1272.0 89.8% 
No Opinion 50.0 3.5% 
NO ANSWER 18.0 1.3% 
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Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q17: Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per fisherman per 
year? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q17: Do you support a 
quota on pounds of lobster 
landed per fisherman per 
year? 
Yes 102.0 7.2% 
No 1250.0 88.3% 
No Opinion 47.0 3.3% 
NO ANSWER 17.0 1.2% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
    Q18: If quota were transferable, what restrictions should be applied? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
$Q18 Inter-family direct relation 476.0 33.6% 
Within a Harbor 69.0 4.9% 
Within a Fishing 
Cooperative 
18.0 1.3% 
Inter-family distant 
relations 
137.0 9.7% 
Within a Zone 263.0 18.6% 
No Restrictions 299.0 21.1% 
Owner-operator only 344.0 24.3% 
Within Island Communities 66.0 4.7% 
Other 115.0 8.1% 
NO ANSWER 221.0 15.6% 
Total 1416.0 100.0% 
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Non-license Holders Survey Responses 
 
Question number 12a of the survey for non-license holders states “What do you believe should be 
the goals of a lobster limited entry system?” Table Q12-1 shows the survey responses of non- 
license holders in regard to eight limited entry lobster license system goals. Respondents were 
asked to select all goals that apply. As also evidenced in the license holder survey, the clear 
favorite among respondents is the goal of having a system work as a mechanism for young 
people to obtain a lobster license. In contrast to the non-license holder survey, the goal choice of 
having a system work as a mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster license is ranked much more 
highly. This quite likely reflects the opinions of adult non-license holders.  The two goal choices 
promoting reducing the number of license holders and limiting participation received the least 
support among non-license holders. This is easily understandable from the point of view of 
someone waiting to get a lobster license. 
 
Table B.5 Non-License Holder Responses to Goals questions 
 # Yes       %Yes 
Mechanism for young people to obtain a lobster license 198 63.3
% Stabilize the number of license holders 125 39.9
% Protect the lobster resource from depletion 161 51.4
% Financial viability of existing license holders by limiting participation 73 23.3
% Stabilize the number of traps fished 130 41.5
% Reduce the number of traps fished 61 19.5
% Mechanism for adults to obtain license 160 51.1
% Reduce the number of license holders 49 15.7
% Other 54 17.3
%  
Question number 12b of the survey for non- license holders states “Does the current system 
achieve these goals?” Figures Q12-1 through Q12-8 below illustrate the survey response to this 
question. 
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Figure Q12-1 Non-License Holder Opinions of Making a system a Mechanism for Young People 
to Obtain a License 
 
 
Figure Q12-2 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Stabilize the 
Number of License Holders 
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  188 
 
Figure Q12-3 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Protect the Lobster 
Source from Depletion 
 
 
Figure Q12-4 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Achieve the 
Financial Viability of Existing License Holders by Limiting Participation 
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Figure Q12-5 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Stabilize the 
Number of Traps Fished 
 
 
 
Figure Q12-6 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Reduce the Number 
of Traps Fished 
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Figure Q12-7 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system be a Mechanism for 
Adults to Obtain a License 
 
 
Figure Q12-8 Non-License Holder Opinions of the Goal of Having a system Reduce the Number 
of License Holders 
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Table B.6 Contingency tables for non-license holders survey responses  
Q01: What is your current employment status? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q01: What is your current 
employment status? 
Employed Full time 
(Fishing) 
82.0 26.2% 
Employed Full time(Other) 44.0 14.1% 
Employed Part time 
(Fishing) 
44.0 14.1% 
Employed Part time (Other) 13.0 4.2% 
Unemployed less than 6 
months 
15.0 4.8% 
Retired 3.0 1.0% 
Unemployed more than 6 
months 
8.0 2.6% 
Student 102.0 32.6% 
NO ANSWER 2.0 .6% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q02: What is your educational background? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q02: What is your 
educational background? 
Some High School 56.0 17.9% 
High School/GED 109.0 34.8% 
College - Associates, 
technical, or other 2-yr 
42.0 13.4% 
College - Bachelor's degree 32.0 10.2% 
College - Graduate degree 12.0 3.8% 
Other/None 55.0 17.6% 
NO ANSWER 7.0 2.2% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q03: Approximately, how much do you currently earn per year? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q03: Approximately, how $0 - $9,999 £ 127.0 40.6% 
  192 
much do you currently earn 
per year? 
$10,000 - $24,999 55.0 17.6% 
$25,000 - $39,999 66.0 21.1% 
$40,000 - $59,000 34.0 10.9% 
$60,000 - $79,999 12.0 3.8% 
$80,000 + 11.0 3.5% 
NO ANSWER 8.0 2.6% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q04: Why are you interested in getting your own lobstering license? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
$Q04 Add another species to my 
existing fishing business 
16.0 5.1% 
Take over the family 
lobstering business 
125.0 39.9% 
Get back into the business 
after leaving for a while 
58.0 18.5% 
Only job I've ever done, 
want my own business 
133.0 42.5% 
Supplemental income 66.0 21.1% 
Switch Careers 39.0 12.5% 
NO ANSWER 9.0 2.9% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q05: Do you intend to go lobstering: 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q05: Do you intend to go 
lobstering: 
Full Time 187.0 59.7% 
Part time all year 28.0 8.9% 
Hobby/Recreational 5.0 1.6% 
Part time seasonal 90.0 28.8% 
NO ANSWER 3.0 1.0% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q06: How many traps do you wish to fish per year? 
  
  
Total 
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Count % 
Q06: How many traps do 
you wish to fish per year? 
0 3.0 1.0% 
5 1.0 .3% 
10 4.0 1.3% 
12 1.0 .3% 
20 1.0 .3% 
30 1.0 .3% 
40 1.0 .3% 
50 9.0 2.9% 
70 1.0 .3% 
75 1.0 .3% 
100 9.0 2.9% 
150 21.0 6.7% 
200 12.0 3.8% 
250 3.0 1.0% 
300 14.0 4.5% 
350 1.0 .3% 
400 15.0 4.8% 
450 1.0 .3% 
475 6.0 1.9% 
500 15.0 4.8% 
600 43.0 13.7% 
700 2.0 .6% 
800 130.0 41.5% 
1000 1.0 .3% 
2000 1.0 .3% 
NO ANSWER 16.0 5.1% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q07A: How much do you currently have invested in lobster traps? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q07A: How much do you 
currently have invested in 
lobster traps? 
0 84.0 26.8% 
5 1.0 .3% 
10 1.0 .3% 
100 6.0 1.9% 
150 2.0 .6% 
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200 5.0 1.6% 
250 5.0 1.6% 
300 2.0 .6% 
400 3.0 1.0% 
500 11.0 3.5% 
560 1.0 .3% 
600 4.0 1.3% 
750 1.0 .3% 
800 2.0 .6% 
1000 24.0 7.7% 
1170 1.0 .3% 
1200 1.0 .3% 
1400 1.0 .3% 
1500 5.0 1.6% 
2000 16.0 5.1% 
2200 1.0 .3% 
2500 8.0 2.6% 
3000 13.0 4.2% 
3500 2.0 .6% 
4000 8.0 2.6% 
4500 1.0 .3% 
5000 18.0 5.8% 
5500 2.0 .6% 
6000 6.0 1.9% 
7000 2.0 .6% 
7500 3.0 1.0% 
8000 2.0 .6% 
9000 1.0 .3% 
10000 9.0 2.9% 
12000 6.0 1.9% 
13000 1.0 .3% 
14500 1.0 .3% 
15000 4.0 1.3% 
20000 3.0 1.0% 
28000 1.0 .3% 
30000 1.0 .3% 
40000 1.0 .3% 
50000 1.0 .3% 
51000 1.0 .3% 
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51750 1.0 .3% 
NO ANSWER 40.0 12.8% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q07B: How much do you currently have invested in Lobster boat? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q07B: How much do you 
currently have invested in 
Lobster boat? 
0 102.0 32.6% 
400 1.0 .3% 
500 6.0 1.9% 
800 1.0 .3% 
1000 7.0 2.2% 
1500 9.0 2.9% 
2000 3.0 1.0% 
2700 1.0 .3% 
3000 10.0 3.2% 
3500 5.0 1.6% 
4000 7.0 2.2% 
4500 1.0 .3% 
4600 1.0 .3% 
5000 15.0 4.8% 
5500 1.0 .3% 
6000 8.0 2.6% 
7000 9.0 2.9% 
8000 2.0 .6% 
9000 1.0 .3% 
9500 2.0 .6% 
10000 17.0 5.4% 
10500 1.0 .3% 
12000 3.0 1.0% 
15000 5.0 1.6% 
16000 1.0 .3% 
18000 1.0 .3% 
18500 1.0 .3% 
20000 9.0 2.9% 
22000 1.0 .3% 
25000 5.0 1.6% 
27000 2.0 .6% 
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28000 2.0 .6% 
30000 3.0 1.0% 
34000 1.0 .3% 
40000 3.0 1.0% 
45000 1.0 .3% 
50000 2.0 .6% 
60000 2.0 .6% 
70000 1.0 .3% 
80000 2.0 .6% 
90000 1.0 .3% 
100000 1.0 .3% 
120000 2.0 .6% 
160000 2.0 .6% 
NO ANSWER 52.0 16.6% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q08A: How much do you plan to invest in lobster traps? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q08A: How much do you 
plan to invest in lobster 
traps? 
0 8.0 2.6% 
150 1.0 .3% 
200 1.0 .3% 
250 1.0 .3% 
300 2.0 .6% 
500 3.0 1.0% 
900 1.0 .3% 
1000 7.0 2.2% 
1500 1.0 .3% 
2000 5.0 1.6% 
2100 1.0 .3% 
2500 5.0 1.6% 
3000 5.0 1.6% 
3500 1.0 .3% 
4000 3.0 1.0% 
4500 1.0 .3% 
5000 18.0 5.8% 
6000 8.0 2.6% 
6400 1.0 .3% 
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6500 1.0 .3% 
7000 1.0 .3% 
7500 1.0 .3% 
8000 2.0 .6% 
10000 30.0 9.6% 
12000 3.0 1.0% 
13000 1.0 .3% 
15000 12.0 3.8% 
18000 1.0 .3% 
20000 20.0 6.4% 
24000 2.0 .6% 
25000 8.0 2.6% 
30000 16.0 5.1% 
35000 1.0 .3% 
36000 1.0 .3% 
40000 6.0 1.9% 
50000 14.0 4.5% 
57000 2.0 .6% 
60000 12.0 3.8% 
64000 1.0 .3% 
72000 1.0 .3% 
80000 12.0 3.8% 
100000 5.0 1.6% 
As much as I need 
to/Whatever I can afford 
21.0 6.7% 
NO ANSWER 66.0 21.1% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q08B: How much do you plan to invest in Lobster boat? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q08B: How much do you 
plan to invest in Lobster 
boat? 
0 15.0 4.8% 
400 1.0 .3% 
1000 5.0 1.6% 
1500 1.0 .3% 
2000 3.0 1.0% 
4000 1.0 .3% 
4500 1.0 .3% 
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5000 7.0 2.2% 
6000 1.0 .3% 
6500 1.0 .3% 
8000 1.0 .3% 
9000 1.0 .3% 
10000 21.0 6.7% 
11000 1.0 .3% 
15000 5.0 1.6% 
20000 15.0 4.8% 
25000 7.0 2.2% 
30000 7.0 2.2% 
35000 4.0 1.3% 
40000 12.0 3.8% 
45000 1.0 .3% 
50000 32.0 10.2% 
60000 11.0 3.5% 
70000 3.0 1.0% 
75000 5.0 1.6% 
80000 2.0 .6% 
85000 1.0 .3% 
90000 1.0 .3% 
95000 1.0 .3% 
100000 18.0 5.8% 
125000 1.0 .3% 
130000 1.0 .3% 
150000 10.0 3.2% 
160000 1.0 .3% 
175000 1.0 .3% 
200000 7.0 2.2% 
230000 1.0 .3% 
250000 2.0 .6% 
300000 3.0 1.0% 
450000 1.0 .3% 
999999 1.0 .3% 
As much as I need 
to/Whatever I can afford 
18.0 5.8% 
NO ANSWER 81.0 25.9% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
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Q09: If you were able to get a license, how many sternmen would you 
employee? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q09: If you were able to 
get a license, how many 
sternmen would you 
employee? 
None 45.0 14.4% 
One 216.0 69.0% 
Two 48.0 15.3% 
NO ANSWER 4.0 1.3% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q10: Do you support the current entry or exit ratio based on tags retiring in your 
zone? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q10: Do you support the 
current entry or exit ratio 
based on tags retiring in 
your zone? 
Yes - keep it as is 91.0 29.1% 
No - allow fewer entrants 9.0 2.9% 
No - allow more entrants 171.0 54.6% 
No Opinion 33.0 10.5% 
NO ANSWER 9.0 2.9% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q11: How much longer do you expect to have to wait to obtain a license? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q11: How much longer do 
you expect to have to wait 
to obtain a license? 
0 10.0 3.2% 
1 26.0 8.3% 
2 31.0 9.9% 
3 24.0 7.7% 
4 17.0 5.4% 
5 29.0 9.3% 
6 11.0 3.5% 
7 13.0 4.2% 
8 9.0 2.9% 
9 4.0 1.3% 
10 35.0 11.2% 
11 1.0 .3% 
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12 3.0 1.0% 
14 2.0 .6% 
15 10.0 3.2% 
16 1.0 .3% 
20 17.0 5.4% 
24 1.0 .3% 
25 5.0 1.6% 
26 1.0 .3% 
30 5.0 1.6% 
35 1.0 .3% 
39 1.0 .3% 
40 8.0 2.6% 
50 5.0 1.6% 
Forever/a long time 8.0 2.6% 
NO ANSWER 35.0 11.2% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    
    Q13: Do you support the current regulations that allow students under age 18 
who have completed the apprentice requirement to get a commercial license 
without going on the waiting list? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q13: Do you support the 
current regulations that 
allow students under age 18 
who have completed the 
apprentice requirement to 
get a commercial license 
without going on the 
waiting list? 
Yes 188.0 60.1% 
No 106.0 33.9% 
No Opinion 14.0 4.5% 
NO ANSWER 5.0 1.6% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q14: Do you support the current requirement that someone who has previously 
been licensed as a lobsterman must go through the apprenticeship program to re-
obtain a license? 
  
  
 Count % 
Q14: Do you support the 
current requirement that 
Yes 122.0 39.0% 
No 161.0 51.4% 
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someone who has 
previously been licensed as 
a lobsterman must go 
through the apprenticeship 
program to re-obtain a 
license? 
No Opinion 23.0 7.3% 
NO ANSWER 7.0 2.2% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q15: Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per fisherman, per 
year? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q15: Do you support a 
quota on pounds of lobster 
landed per fisherman, per 
year? 
Yes 32.0 10.2% 
No 258.0 82.4% 
No Opinion 20.0 6.4% 
NO ANSWER 3.0 1.0% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q16: Do you believe licenses and/or tags should be transferable? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q16: Do you believe 
licenses and/or tags should 
be transferable? 
Yes - Tags 15.0 4.8% 
Yes - Licenses 56.0 17.9% 
Yes - Both 142.0 45.4% 
No - Neither 80.0 25.6% 
No Opinion 12.0 3.8% 
NO ANSWER 8.0 2.6% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q17: If tags or licenses were transferable, what restrictions should be applied to 
transfers? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
$Q17 Inter-family direct relation 175.0 55.9% 
Within a Harbor 34.0 10.9% 
Within a Fishing 
Cooperative 
6.0 1.9% 
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Inter-family distant 
relations 
71.0 22.7% 
Within a Zone 117.0 37.4% 
No Restrictions 39.0 12.5% 
Owner-operator only 46.0 14.7% 
Within Island Communities 29.0 9.3% 
Other 15.0 4.8% 
NO ANSWER 19.0 6.1% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q18: If licenses were transferrable, how much would you be willing to pay for 
one? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q18: If licenses were 
transferrable, how much 
would you be willing to 
pay for one? 
0 36.0 11.5% 
1 4.0 1.3% 
10 1.0 .3% 
50 1.0 .3% 
60 1.0 .3% 
70 1.0 .3% 
100 4.0 1.3% 
132 1.0 .3% 
150 3.0 1.0% 
167 1.0 .3% 
200 5.0 1.6% 
250 1.0 .3% 
300 4.0 1.3% 
400 1.0 .3% 
500 11.0 3.5% 
600 1.0 .3% 
800 1.0 .3% 
1000 16.0 5.1% 
1500 3.0 1.0% 
2000 4.0 1.3% 
2500 1.0 .3% 
3000 3.0 1.0% 
5000 22.0 7.0% 
6000 1.0 .3% 
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10000 30.0 9.6% 
15000 6.0 1.9% 
16000 1.0 .3% 
20000 15.0 4.8% 
25000 3.0 1.0% 
30000 4.0 1.3% 
40000 1.0 .3% 
50000 6.0 1.9% 
75000 1.0 .3% 
100000 9.0 2.9% 
1000000 1.0 .3% 
As much as it takes/market 
value 
12.0 3.8% 
NO ANSWER 97.0 31.0% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
    Q19: If tags were transferrable how much would you be willing to pay for one? 
  
  
Total 
Count % 
Q19: If tags were 
transferrable how much 
would you be willing to 
pay for one? 
0 38.0 12.1% 
1 64.0 20.4% 
2 16.0 5.1% 
3 1.0 .3% 
5 15.0 4.8% 
6 1.0 .3% 
9 1.0 .3% 
10 16.0 5.1% 
20 6.0 1.9% 
25 2.0 .6% 
30 1.0 .3% 
40 1.0 .3% 
50 5.0 1.6% 
100 8.0 2.6% 
200 1.0 .3% 
500 4.0 1.3% 
1000 1.0 .3% 
5000 2.0 .6% 
10000 2.0 .6% 
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50000 1.0 .3% 
100000 3.0 1.0% 
As much as it takes/market 
value 
13.0 4.2% 
NO ANSWER 111.0 35.5% 
Total 313.0 100.0% 
 
Survey Package: License Holders 
 
(Presented as legal size format in original mail package) 
 
***** 
 
2012 Lobster Limited Entry System Questionnaire for Existing License Holders 
 
We would like to get your feedback on how to address the issues surrounding the licensing system, and its 
impacts on the fishery.  Please answer the questions below as accurately as possible.  We recommend 
reading through all the questions first.  Thank you! 
       
1. What percentage of your total household income comes from your lobster business? 
a. 80% - 100% 
b. 50% - 80% 
c. 25%- 50% 
d. Less than 25%  
 
2. How many traps did you fish last year (maximum # in the water at once)? 
# _______________ 
 
3. How worried are you about the number of traps fished in your Zone? 
a. Very 
b. Somewhat 
c. No Worries 
d. No Opinion  
 
4. What do you believe should be the goals of a lobster limited entry system?  Please answer both parts 
of the question below: 
 
 4. a.) Which of these should be goals of the system? 
(Check all that apply) 
 4. b.) Does the current system achieve these goals 
(circle your choices below)  
          Strongly              No  Strongly
 Mark with “√”        Disagree              Opinion    Agree 
 a. Stabilize the number of license holders in the fishery 1          2          3          4          
5 
 b. Reduce the number of license holders in the fishery 1          2          3          4          
5 
 c. Stabilize the number of traps fished in the fishery 1          2          3          4          
5 
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 d. Reduce the number of traps fished in the fishery 1          2          3          4          
5 
 e. Protect the lobster resource from depletion 1          2          3          4          
5 
 f. Ensure the financial viability of existing license holders 
by limiting participation 
1          2          3          4          
5 
 g. Ensure that there is a mechanism for young people to 
obtain a lobster license 
1          2          3          4          
5 
 h. Ensure that there is a mechanism for adults to obtain a 
lobster license 
1          2          3          4          
5 
 i. Other: 
___________________________________________ 
1          2          3          4          
5 
 h.    Other: 
___________________________________________ 
1          2          3          4          
5 
 
5. Do you favor a change to the current trap limit per person in your zone? 
a. Yes – Increase 
b. Yes - Decrease                        
c. No Change 
 
6. If Yes to #5, do you favor a proportional adjustment (every lobsterman increases/decreases by the 
same percentage) or an across-the-board trap limit per person: 
a. Proportional 
b. Across-the-board 
c. No Opinion 
 
7. Do you support the current regulations that allow students under age 18 who have completed the 
apprentice requirement to get a commercial license without going on the waiting list? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. No Opinion  
 
8.  Do you support the current entry/exit ratio based on tags retiring in your zone? 
a. Yes – keep it as is 
b. No – allow more entrants 
c. No – allow fewer entrants 
d. No Opinion 
 
9.  Do you favor freezing the number of tags at current levels for each license holder? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. No Opinion 
 
10. Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing licenses not being fished? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. No Opinion 
 
11. Do you support eliminating latent effort in the form of removing trap tags that are issued but not 
associated with an active license?  
a. Yes 
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b. No  
c. No Opinion 
 
12.  Do you believe licenses and/or tags should be transferable? 
a. Yes - Tags 
b. Yes - Licenses 
c. Yes - Both 
d. No - Neither  
e. No Opinion  
 
14. If tags were transferable, how many traps would you ideally fish (max # in the water at once)? 
# ______________ 
 
14. If tags or licenses were transferable, what restrictions should be applied to transfers (check all that 
apply)? 
❏ Inter-family (direct relation ie. child/parent, sibling, spouse) 
❏ Inter-family (distant relations ie. uncle/nephew, cousin, in-law) 
❏ Free Market unlimited 
❏ Within a Harbor  
❏ Within a Zone 
❏ Within Island Communities 
❏ Within a Fishing Cooperative 
❏ Owner-operator only 
❏ Other: __________________________________ 
 
15. Do you support an overall limit on total lbs. of lobster landed in Maine per year? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
c. No Opinion 
 
16. Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per zone per year?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. No Opinion 
 
17. Do you support a quota for pounds of lobster landed per fisherman per year? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. No Opinion 
 
18. If quota were transferable, what restrictions should be applied (check all that apply)? 
❏ Inter-family (direct relation ie. child/parent, sibling, spouse) 
❏ Inter-family (distant relations ie. uncle/nephew, cousin, in-law) 
❏ Free Market unlimited 
❏ Within a Harbor  
❏ Within a Zone 
❏ Within Island Communities 
❏ Within a Fishing Cooperative 
❏ Owner-operator only 
❏ Other: __________________________________ 
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Comments (please indicate what question your comment(s) refer to if applicable): 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Lobster and Crab License number:  
 
Your license number is needed to verify your eligibility and to ensure a representative number of fishermen.   
Your license number will be cut off for confidentiality and your responses will not personally be associated with you. 
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Survey Package: Non-license Holders 
 
 
2012 Lobster Limited Entry System Questionnaire for Non-License Holders 
 
We would like to get your feedback on how to address the issues surrounding the lobster licensing 
system, and its impacts on the fishery.  Please answer the questions below as accurately as possible.  We 
recommend reading through all the questions first.  Thank you! 
       
5. What is your current employment status?  
£ Employed Full time (Fishing) £ 
Employed Part time 
(Fishing) £ 
Unemployed	less	than	6	months	 £	 Unemployed	more	than	6	months	
£ Employed Full time (Other) £ 
Employed Part time 
(Other) £ Retired	 £	 Student	
 
2. What is your educational background? 
£ Some High School £ College – Associates, technical, or other 2-yr  £ College – Graduate degree	
£ High School/GED £ College – Bachelor’s degree  £ Other/None	
 
3. Approximately, how much do you currently earn/yr? 
£ $0 - $9,999 £ $25,000 - $39,999  £ $60,000 - $79,999	
£ $10,000 – $24,999 £ $40,000 - $59,000  £ $80,000	+	
 
4. Why are you interested in lobstering (check all that apply)?  
£ 
 
Add another species to my 
existing fishing business 
 
£ Get back into the business after leaving for a while £ 
Supplemental	income		
£ Take over the family lobstering business £ 
Only job I’ve ever done, 
want my own business  £ Switch	Careers	
 
5. Do you intend to go lobstering: 
£ Full Time £ Part time all year  £ Hobby/Recreational	 £	 Part	time	seasonal	
 
7. How many traps do you wish to fish per year (maximum # in the water at once)? # _______________ 
 
 
8. How much do you currently have invested:  
a. lobster gear?   $ ___________________    b. Lobster boat?   $ ___________________ 
 
9. How much do you plan to invest?     
a. lobster gear?   $ ___________________    b. Lobster boat?   $ ___________________ 
 
10. If you were able to get a license, how many sternmen would you employee? 
£ One £ Two £ None	
 
11. Do you support the current entry/exit ratio based on tags retiring in your zone? 
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£ Yes – keep it as is £ No – allow fewer entrants 
£ No – allow more entrants £ No Opinion 
 
12. How much longer do you expect to have to wait to obtain a license? # years ____________________ 
 
13. What do you believe should be the goals of a lobster limited entry system?  Please answer both parts 
of the question below: 
 
12. a.) Which of these should be goals of the system? 
              (Check all that apply) 
  12. b.) Does the current system achieve these goals?    
                                  (Using the 1-5 scale below, circle your 
opinion)    
                           Strongly                           No     
Strongly                                                                          Disagree                         
Opinion                                    Agree 
£ Stabilize the number of license holders in the fishery 1             2             3             4             5 
£ Reduce the number of license holders in the fishery 1              2             3             4             5 
£ Stabilize the number of traps fished in the fishery 1              2             3             4             5 
£ Reduce the number of traps fished in the fishery 1              2             3             4             5 
£ Protect the lobster resource from depletion 1              2             3             4             5 
£ Ensure the financial viability of existing license holders by limiting participation 
1              2             3             4             
5 
£ Ensure that there is a mechanism for young people to obtain a lobster license 
1               2            3             4             
5 
£ Ensure that there is a mechanism for adults to obtain a lobster license 
1               2            3             4              
5 
£ Other: ___________________________________________ 
1               2            3             4              
5 
 
 
13. Do you support the current regulations that allow students under age 18 who have completed the 
apprentice requirement to get a commercial license without going on the waiting list? 
£ Yes £ No £ No Opinion 
14. Do you agree that someone who has previously been licensed as a lobsterman must go through the 
apprenticeship program to re-obtain a license? 
£ Yes £ No £ No Opinion 
15.  Do you support a quota on pounds of lobster landed per fisherman, per year? 
£ Yes £ No £ No Opinion 
16.  Do you believe licenses and/or tags should be transferable? 
£ Yes - Tags £ Yes - Licenses £ Yes - Both	
£ No - Neither  £ No Opinion   	
17. If tags or licenses were transferable, what restrictions should be applied to transfers (check all that 
apply)? 
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£ Inter-family direct relation  (i.e. child/parent, sibling, spouse) £ Within a Harbor  £ 
Within a Fishing 
Cooperative	
£ Inter-family distant relations  (i.e. uncle/nephew, cousin, in-law) £ Within a Zone £ No Restrictions	
£ Owner-operator only £ Within Island Communities £ Other:	_______________	
 
18. If licenses were transferrable, how much would you be willing to pay for one?  $ 
___________________ 
 
19. If tags were transferrable how much would you be willing to pay for one?               $ 
___________________ 
 
Comments (please indicate what question your comment(s) refer to if applicable): 
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